THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

Vol. XXXVIII 1957 Part 6

CHANGING PATTERNS OF PARENT-CHILD RELATIONS IN AN URBAN CULTURE [1]

By

MARGARET MEAD

It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the honour of being asked to give the Ernest Jones Lecture for 1957, as a recognition of the long and fruitful cooperation between cultural anthropology and psycho-analysis. Throughout the last thirty years the two approaches to the study of human behaviour have enriched each other in a variety of ways, as psycho-analysis has provided theoretical bases for the interpretation of human behaviour and cultural studies have made it possible to prune psycho-analytic theory of the inevitable provincialisms of theory based on observations made exclusively within the Euro-American tradition (1). Because both fields are young and growing, they have also been able to take advantage of other developments in the behavioural sciences, such as the approaches of Gestalt psychology (28), of learning theory (12, 3), of studies in normal child development (47), as, for instance, those of Piaget in Geneva (51), and of Gesell and Ilg in the United States (31, 36). The development of child analysis as a special field also meant a stepping up of the degree of relevance which each discipline found in the other, and the development of modern methods of anthropological field work, particularly in the field called 'culture and personality'—itself a product of earlier cooperation—has meant that more detailed observations in both fields were available for comparative study. The older reliance by anthropologists upon psycho-analytic theory based upon reconstructions from the cases of adult patients and by psycho-analysts upon anthropological reconstructions of the nature of early man and of contemporary primitive man, which stimulated Freud and his contemporaries, has given place to precise observations of the actual behaviour of children, during childhood, and of actual primitive peoples, carefully observed in their own habitats. The work of Erik Erikson (13) has been the most conspicuous example of a distinguished combination of the results of actual experience of anthropological field work, the practice of child analysis, and the study of normal children.

The years since World War II have brought a series of new behavioural approaches which have given a fresh impetus to these cooperative efforts; I should like to single out especially work on mother-child relationships at delivery and during the first year of life, particularly the work of Bowlby (9), Spitz (48), Aubry (41), Escalona (14), Jackson (27), Bakwin (2), and Mirsky (37), as well as the earlier work of Margaret Fries (23); the contributions which have been made to our understanding of circular relationships in human behaviour by the model introduced by cybernetics and general systems theory (6; 15, 16, 17, 18, *passium*; 20; 56); the contributions resulting from coordination between the work of the modern ethologists (19; 25; 29; 30; 45; 53; 54, etc.) and psycho-analytic and anthropological studies of behaviour; and

[1] The Ernest Jones Lecture 1957. This lecture was delivered, without a manuscript, before the British Psycho-Analytical Society in the Barnes Hall of the Royal Society of Medicine, London, on 30 January, 1957, and was tape-recorded. However, because of the film which was shown, the lecture had to be drastically rewritten, and I have taken the liberty of adding two pieces of material—the work of Dr. Mavis Gunther (24), which was only brought to my attention after the publication of a summary of my lecture in *The Lancet* (35), and filming of the birth of a reindeer in the new Norwegian film of Lapland, *Sammi Jaki* (26), excerpts from which were shown on British TV in the spring of 1957. A report of this Ernest Jones Lecture was published on page 301, Part 3–4 of this volume.

the emerging development of a new field of micro-behavioural analysis under the leadership of Bateson and Birdwhistell and their collaborators (4, 7).

It seemed appropriate to choose as the topic of this lecture a problem which would draw upon both the more traditional and the more recent developments in this long cooperation, that of parent-child relationships, particularly because this would also give me an opportunity to reintroduce some questions relating to human evolution in the light of our newer evolutionary theories of the relationship between evolution and behaviour (46).

Furthermore, it is in this field that psychoanalysts, anthropologists, and students of child development have been most willing to make recommendations for changes in our own traditional behaviour which might facilitate the development of a more desirable character structure in members of our own culture. Recent developments in practice in children's hospitals, changes in methods of child feeding —' self-demand ' or ' self-regulation '—the practice known in the United States as ' rooming in ', which permits the new mother to keep her baby with her in the hospital, and the greater role of the father during the early weeks of his child's life, have been the contributions of the last two decades, just as new methods of education in the knowledge of sex, and recognition of the child's ambivalence, of the importance of unconscious factors in the ability to learn, and of the harm that could be done by too restrictive parental practices or by discontinuities within the educative process were the contributions of psycho-analysis and of cultural findings during earlier decades. Because educators, therapists, and the designers of social institutions must always act as quickly as possible for the benefit of the actual living pupils, patients, and populations whom they are attempting to teach, cure, and plan for, there has been a recurrent danger that tentative findings would be put into practice too hurriedly or too uncritically. A continuing obligation of self-review is placed upon those of us who do believe in the relevancy of our work in the preventive and constructive fields of mental health (34).

Parent-child relationships during the early months have assumed an extra importance as mass methods of education—the radio, television and compulsory early school attendance—all invade the childhood years, even within the home, and as the actual period during which parents have an opportunity to create optimum conditions of growth for their children becomes steadily briefer. Mass methods of obstetrical and pediatric care at birth, especially in the United States but increasingly in other countries as well, were invading the neo-natal period, separating the parturient mother from her husband and other children and from the newborn itself, and enforcing methods of feeding and care which did not take into account the delicate circular relationships between each mother and each child, between the parents, and within the family group. The period of infancy, as a period when irreversible damage could be done and, equally, as a period within which the groundwork of trust could be firmly laid, has, understandably, become a focus of anxiety for parents and practitioners, as fashions have shifted rapidly so that the latest newborn might benefit from the newest theoretical formulation, and the subject of bitter controversy. It is a period also in which violent all-or-none reactions—so familiar to students of the primary process—are likely to cluster, and in which we therefore have a peculiarly difficult task in attempting to introduce our increasing and changing insights in such a way that the corrections will result not in a pendulum swing to the extreme opposite position but in a spiral movement, with the new position retaining the insights while correcting the errors of the earlier one.

In the present context I am using the word ' urban ' to characterize all those parts of the modern world which participate in industrialized society because, although people may still live in the country and raise their own food, the conditions of a modern economy are such that there are essential differences between life in any part of this world and the life of early man, during the many thousands of years when our species-specific behaviour was becoming stabilized. In urban societies people no longer live in small primary groups where the stranger is a rare phenomenon, infants are no longer entirely dependent upon being breast-fed, and men are not bound to their households through their immediate food-getting—as opposed to more remote money-getting—activities. The modern world is one in which many of the day-to-day relationships are with strangers—bus drivers, vendors, clerks—relationships which are segmented and official. As we learn more about the species-specific biological behaviour of man, developed when he lived in small, self-contained,

prevailingly monogamous groups, it is important to make use of these new insights in ways which are appropriate to the very different world which man has now built by relying upon his capacity to learn and to transmit what he has learned.

I shall take for special consideration first the establishment of the nurturing relationship in what has been called ' the nursing couple ', with all of its variations through the use of wet nurses, foster parents, artificial feeding, precise nutritional assessments based on assaying the food and the infant's response in weight, and the involvement of the male parent in the actual feeding and associated care of the child.

In order to make this as vivid as possible, I want first to show you a film made, in 1938, by Gregory Bateson and myself among the Iatmul of New Guinea: ' First Five Days in the Life of a New Guinea Baby ' (5). In the film you will see the establishment of a mother-child relationship from the moment immediately after birth, before the cord was cut, and during the next four days. Anthropologists share with psychoanalysts the difficulties which lie in the inaccessibility of their subjects to observation; films and tape recordings are the modern technical devices which can overcome this difficulty both for purposes of immediate communication and as a way of providing materials which can be critically reviewed and restudied in the light of developing theories.

When the film begins, you see the new mother seated in a little wood where sudden birth pains had overtaken her when her husband had sent her hurrying on an errand. The neonate, cord uncut, lies near her, and an old neighbour woman, hastily summoned, has brought water in a bamboo from the river and a shell to cut the cord. The mother ties the cord, cuts it with the shell, places the placenta carefully in an empty coconut shell, and tosses the newborn vertically and horizontally and then over on to an old grass skirt, where he first lies, crying vigorously, stretching and spreading his fingers and toes. The mother stands up while the attending old woman pours the cold river water over her. She then leans down to scrape the blood from her legs. Meanwhile the wet-nurse—another neighbour who has a baby young enough to qualify her as a neo-natal wet nurse because she is observing the same food taboos—sits holding her own child, smoking a cigar, and brushing insects away from the newborn. Then the wet nurse gathers up the baby, the mother picks up the placenta, and the procession—new mother, wet nurse, and the wet nurse's five-year-old daughter carrying her infant sibling, with her two-year-old brother tagging along, marches into the village, passing the father of the baby, who was debarred from being present at the birth not from rigid religious taboo but by shame, as he sits with his two young siblings, holding his older child, about four. The group settle down under a house (raised high on piles with an upper floor for the wet season), the mother binds her abdomen with bark, and the wet-nurse suckles the newborn. She places her nipple gently in the newborn's mouth and then, while its sucking proceeds vigorously, takes back her own child and jiggles it with one arm while keeping her nipple steady in the mouth of the newborn. The newborn's hands move, search-wise, in the direction of the breast and gradually relax. Then the newborn infant is covered with wet clay by the mother, his nose is shaped with warmed fingers, and he is placed in the hollow formed by her crossed legs. As the women wear only two narrow grass aprons and the infant is unclothed, the whole relationship of the infant to the bodies of mother and wet nurse is outlined—the baby a pale rose colour against their dark skins.

The film then shows the baby's breast-feeding by his mother on the subsequent four days, and the rhythmic accompaniment to his sucking made by the movement of her great toe. From the first he is handled by being held up and out, away from the mother's body, supported under one armpit and at the side of the head by her thumb and finger. He is stood up on the ground when bathed, and on the fifth day—cord fallen off, breast-feeding established, ready for the cold bath which now replaces the bath of warm swamp water—he is already firmly established in a world in which he will spend the day on his mother's lap or arm.

This situation of a natural birth without complications, in which the mother, with very little help, cares for her own baby and breast-feeds it in happy rhythmic relation to its eager, seeking, sucking behaviour, is the type which has served as a model in the minds of those who are seeking to judge maternal care, filial response and our present institutional care of infants. True, the image of ' natural childbirth ' conjured up by those who have never witnessed a birth in a primitive society fails to allow for the already high degree of stylization: the way the cord is tied, the disposal of the placenta, the presence of the wet nurse, her qualifications decided upon by a system of lactation taboos, the patterned baths of wet clay and of warm and cold water, the bark which the mother bound around her waist, the toss she gave the baby in the air, up and sideways, and the way she shaped its nose with fingers warmed on a leaf laid on a glowing log.

Where ethologists have shown the extreme detail in which some response on the part of the

infant evokes a corresponding and appropriate response in the mother, and a chain of interlocking appropriate maternal and filial responses is released and coordinated, anthropologists have documented the enormous variety in the practice of childbirth even among the simplest peoples. But among each people these activities are patterned, and participation in the pattern supplies a culturally predetermined sequence within which the child and the mother *either live or die*. For this is the essence of the primitive situation. Lacking any of the devices and practices of medicine and care, the birth situation among the Iatmul is far closer to that which we must assume for the early ancestors of man, when breast-feeding was the only known method of feeding a child and lactation by some other woman of a group was the first possible supplement to the capacity for lactation of the mother herself.

In judgements of maternal care, a great deal has been heard about ' the rejecting mother ' who, because of her own conflicts and anxieties, her rejection of the feminine role or of the sex of her child, etc., ' rejects ' her child and so is unable to breast-feed it or even to feed it artificially with sufficient relaxation so that it can trust her and thrive. Anthropologists supplied the information that every primitive woman somehow produced some milk to feed her child, that women who had been so ill with fever that they lost their milk for weeks regained it, and that women who had not had children could, by adopting a vigorously sucking baby, produce milk. All this appeared to reinforce the verdict that the sources of failure in breast-feeding were located in the mother, in defects of psychic functioning, psychosomatic but not somatic in character.

Parallel work by Margaret Fries (23) had focused on the infant in the hospital at birth, and her division of the newborn on the basis of a series of tests, which included suckling behaviour under interruption and frustration, into quiet, too quiet, and active babies placed the emphasis on the innate biological disposition of the infant, to which maternal behaviour should be adjusted. This demand for adjustment on the part of the mother was reiterated in the work of Margaret Ribble (39), which derived from that of Fries, on ' the rights of infants ', again returning the onus of failure to the mother. More recently, Arthur Mirsky (37) has suggested that there are ' rejecting babies '—infants so constituted at birth that they actively reject the feeding situation and arouse reactive rejections in the mother. This shifted the onus back to the infant with the possibility that the source of the failure might lie in the child, but the very phrase ' rejecting baby ', although providing a needed corrective for the blanket explanation of the ' rejecting mother ', still contained an element of blame.

Detailed studies of maternal-child behaviour in animals, especially the work of Helen Blauvelt (8) and of Mavis Gunther (24), both stimulated by modern ethological studies, by focusing upon the ' biological adequacy ' of the responses of mother and child, within a sequence, have now added a new perspective, if seen within the framework of human evolution. The paradigm for this kind of behaviour is admirably given in the Norwegian film, *Sammi Jaki* (26). Here we see the reindeer delivering during a period when the herd is pressing towards the sea, where birth would occur under better conditions, nuzzling the infant to get on its own feet, lying down beside it once it is strong enough to suckle, stimulating it to great activity on its feet, and meanwhile listening, restless and anxious, to the sounds of the departing herd. If the infant is strong enough to follow the herd, all is well. But it will avail nothing for the mother to stay with the calf, and so lose the herd with which her survival lies. So she stands, in nicely calculated conflict. Helen Blauvelt's studies of newborn sheep and goats show in detail that the period in which the mother will wait for the infant to get established on its feet is sharply limited; after a given number of hours, during which she has bleated and licked the newborn, she no longer recognizes it as hers. The reindeer film throws into relief the situation for wilder animals where the newborn must move on their own feet or else must selectively be left to die by parents who have no choice. *Turi's Book of Lapland* (55) points the parallel to the human situation.

In primitive human groups, both prehistoric and contemporary, we have to reckon with forms of maternal and filial behaviour in which the concept of biological adequacy has to be related to the conditions of life and of optimum survival. It has been too often assumed that the mother's anxiety, when her infant failed to breast-feed satisfactorily, was a biologically *inadequate* response. A good mother, it has been argued, will respond to the weak, poor feeder with increased attention and love. It would, I believe, be more correct to say that the good *nurse* will so respond. In this situation the

nurse, free from the same, precise maternal type of resonation to the child's behaviour, can put all her energies into compensating for the weakness of the child. But I want to advance the hypothesis that the biological mother—to the extent that she is asked to make a biological response, i.e. to provide milk adequate in quantity and quality and to evoke feeding behaviour from her infant, to the extent that her behaviour may be said to have biological roots—has the possibility of *two* ' biologically adequate ' responses, one leading to life and the other to death. For the child who sucks well and thrives on her milk, she has more milk and less anxiety. But when a child fails to thrive, her anxiety rises and, as clinical experience has shown, her milk supply falls, the infant receives less food, and a ' vicious circle ' is set up. Under primitive conditions, unless culturally patterned practices of wet nursing and adoption have been set up, such a child will die. So the child whom the mother is able to feed, the child who is able to feed from that mother, will live. The very existence of the lactating-anxiety cycle was a kind of guarantee that in the neo-natal period there would be rigid selection for the most suitable children, without an excessive expenditure of scarce energy on attempting to rear a child with a lesser hold on life. In the same way, genetic defects in maternal behaviour would tend to be held at a minimum. The survival possibilities of a society could be calculated in the numbers of compatible nursing couples in a population, corrected for the presence of supplementary institutions—wet nurses, the use of artificial foods, and so on.

With each addition to the cultural repertoire for the preservation of infants by means other than lactation by their biological mothers, this primary situation would become less determinative. The mother's anxiety over the child which failed to thrive would be lessened by the knowledge that other means were available, a recourse not open to the animal mother in a domestic herd, who does not know that the shepherd or herdsman may load her stumbling offspring into a cart or sled. The possible relaxation of the deep and, according to this hypothesis, biological anxiety cycle of nursing failure in mother and offspring, whenever alternative methods of feeding the child are available, would explain the seemingly contradictory statistical finding that infant mortality declines with the invention of bottle feeding but that the countries with a very low infant mortality—like Holland—have more breast feeding and a lower infant death rate than does the United States.

Mavis Gunther (24), directing research on breast feeding in the Obstetric Hospital, University College Hospital, London, in which the lactation behaviour of 150 ' nursing couples ' was studied in detail, believes that she has isolated biologically given elements in the establishment of suckling in human infants comparable to the internal releasing mechanisms of the ethologists: in the response of the infant, first, to a stimulation of the lips, easy to provide, and, second, within three days after birth, to a filling of the ' mouth right to the palate and the dorsum of the tongue ' by the nipple, which is dependent upon the length—specifically the protractility—of the nipple and also upon the infant not displaying certain feeding and breathing behaviour which interferes with this stimulation. In her sample of 150 nursing couples, 25 per cent of the mothers had nipples of too little protractility to meet this assumed instinctive need of the infant, and a few of the infants showed innate apathy, breathing difficulties, too small mouths, and so on, which interfered with the establishment of breast feeding and could not be attributed to any physical defect in the mother's breast. A device has been developed to wear during pregnancy for elongating the mother's nipples.

We have now, in this single situation, illuminated by thirty years of research, a paradigm of the relationships between innate dispositions and the characterological consequences when they are combined with the cultural arrangements of any society. We have recently witnessed attempts to restore more ' natural ' parental situations—assumed to be those which are supported by our biological inheritance. Attempts to induce mothers to breast-feed, irrespective of early failure and of failure of the infant to thrive, have produced their own train of new anxieties in which the diminution of the mother's milk, under conditions of anxiety induced by failure, is overlaid by the interpretation of this biologically *adequate* behaviour —seen in terms of evolution and of the need for selective survival under primitive conditions—as a sign of inadequate mothering. In so doing we have failed to take into account the fact that the history of human civilization has been the history of artificially supplementing physical defects, keeping alive the prematurely born and the aged, supplying spectacles, hearing aids, and

false teeth, keeping alive the congenitally diabetic with insulin, and so on. With each new advance in medicine or technology, another group of surviving, functioning individuals is added to the population and we come closer to the ideal that every infant who is born shall live, even at the cost of institutionalization of the extreme defectives. It is within this culture, where individual human life is valued and the weakest receive more attention than the strongest, that present-day mothers—and fathers—must function, where defects in their psychodynamic functioning are revealed and do harm to themselves and others. Instead of attempting to return to biological mechanisms which are only too biologically adequate, functioning as they do to ensure the immediate or premature death of large proportions of a population, the task would seem to be to clarify our theories so that we may prevent the release of these ancient biological responses from obscuring the appropriate tasks of twentieth century parents. At the same time, studies such as those of Mavis Gunther should make it possible for us to compensate for and to supplement, in detailed and specific ways, the specific defects or abnormalities which interfere with a body-dependent function like breast feeding.

Psycho-analysis has long recognized that man's basic biological equipment is very old and that the processes of education are often heavily at odds with biological propensities. It would seem that the inclusion of an explicit recognition of the extent to which our capacity to save life is at variance with our innate ability to select lives to save would deepen the theoretical discussion of all these problems.

Yet making allowance for the inappropriateness of some of the older biologically given responses need not blind us to possibilities of invoking biological responses which are perhaps far older than our specifically human history. Recent clinical observations have been reported on the capacity of infants a few days old to move a distance as great as fifteen or eighteen inches towards their mother on a flat surface. The method of locomotion is said to be something like that of a worm, involving a twisting of the whole body. These movements have not yet been systematically studied; we do not know what the stimulus is which evoked the movement—whether the odour of the mother's body or the specific odour of the milk, etc. Looked at in biological perspective, this ability of the newborn to orient itself and to move in the direction of the source of food is dramatically illustrated in the definiteness with which newborn turtles, having thrust their way up through the sand, make for the sea (38), or in the response of young mammals, whose four-legged, handless mothers can only guide them with muzzles and cries. But with the emergence of hands, the mother—ape or human—is able to grasp and manipulate her baby, and the infant's ability to move towards its mother would be of survival value only in the very rare instance where the mother became unconscious after delivery and the infant by moving towards her could rouse her.

The ability of human children to select a balanced diet is another example of a biological capacity very seldom exercised within human history (11). (The display by caged white rats, exposed to man-synthesized or distilled vitamins and minerals, of a capacity to select constructively among them is a complementary example of a biologically given type of behaviour which could never have been given as full expression in the wild (40).) Human beings exposed to drinking fountains, one containing and the other lacking an essential and 'tasteless' mineral, will drift towards the mineral one (40).

The new position of the father in the middle and upper classes in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Northern Europe—with the father's greater care of the young infant arising originally from the absence of servants and spare female relatives and from the restricted housing conditions of the modern, post-World-War-II home—may also exploit a biological given behaviour potential which has not been used for a long time. In very primitive societies it is not unusual to find fathers taking a good deal of care of small infants. So among some Australian aborigines, the father, after his morning hunt has been successful, will carry the young infant while the mother gathers vegetable foods. However, no complex society, so far as I have been able to ascertain, no complicated society with a written tradition has ever expected the man of stature and education to care for a baby. Mothers, nurses, female relatives, children, even eunuchs, but not fathers, had the physical care of young infants. So it has been possible to say that there seemed to be no instinctive basis for fatherhood comparable to the instinctive bases of maternal behaviour. Fathers were rewarded for caring for their young by the sexual and domestic services of the children's mother; elaborate social sanctions

for paternity, expressed in pride, prestige, or the validation of male status, and so on, had to be used, or unmarried men might be refused full citizenship or hunting and fishing licences. But post-World-War-II experience suggests that this new type of paternal behaviour, which is being pursued with such enthusiasm on both continents, may be drawing upon an instinctive response to a small creature—not necessarily identified as own child—of one's own species. Ethology provides us with many instances of the way in which the male, who pays no attention to his own offspring as such, may respond to the cry of distress of any infant of the same species. So, after many thousands of years in which this potential response of the male to handling a small infant—it is apparently necessary for it to be only a few weeks old to establish the effect—has been held in abeyance, possibly wisely, it now emerges at a period when the development of artificial feeding has loosened the dependence of the infant on the mother. It is too early to say what the effects will be—the diminution of that part of male creativity which was complementary to female creativity in childbearing, an alteration in character structure when infants are reared by both sexes, a greater equalization between husband and wife as the husband no longer has to act out, towards his wife, the cherishing behaviour which he learned from his mother but for which he had no other form of expression. But is is an example of the possible use of a biological potential which has been allowed to lie unused through many centuries of civilization.

In a somewhat similar way, the ability of women who have not borne children to lactate if they adopt a sufficiently vigorous infant, which, when I first reported this (32), was greeted with complete disbelief, has now been well established as occurring in several primitive societies. Although this would provide a way in which an adopting mother could establish a physical tie with her child, the use of any such device at present would collide with our sense of the importance of oral and nutritional satisfaction for developing trust in the young infant. The primitive adopting mother could tolerate the infant's cries, supplemented by milk from other mothers, while she established her milk supply by drinking the juice of many young coconuts; but this would be hard for the psychodynamically oriented pediatrician to tolerate.

Next, I want to come to the question of the kind of early experience that is best for children who, from their earliest days, will encounter strangers. Infants, wherever they have been observed, go through a period when they suddenly discriminate between the known and the unknown person. The Arapesh of New Guinea call this ' the time when human beings appear in the pupils of the child's eyes '. When people lived in small self-contained groups, everyone the child encountered was either a well-known person or else someone whom not only he but also the mother or relative in whose arms he was carried feared and rejected as an enemy. The closeness of his tie to the person in whose arm he was held was both his guarantee of safety and the medium through which he learned how dangerous enemies were.

In Bali, the mother smiles and bows as she greets with surface expressions of respect the stranger or the person of higher caste from another village, but the baby in her arms screams with terror. One can judge from the baby's behaviour how violently it is reacting to a kinesthetically experienced fear which the mother expresses neither verbally nor in her face or posture. When I was in Bali, I read for the first time Miss Freud's *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence* (21), and, going over it in the light of Balinese behaviour around me, I felt that a fourth kind of fear should be added to her list of three: the fear which is communicated kinesthetically to the very young infant. Later, I was delighted to find Miss Freud's descriptions of this kind of fear as experienced by an infant through a parent's fear of bombing (22).

It is significant that the individual traditionally educated Balinese seldom survived being taken away from Bali, and that even leaving his own village was frightening. But moving in a group —as an orchestra, a dance troop, a whole village going to present tribute to a distant raja—they manage with great ease. In New York, in 1952, the Balinese dancers were reported to ' triple up ' three in a chair or a bed, taking comfort from the kinesthetic closeness of the others. On the other hand, Samoans, who have been reared in large families and taken care of by many relatives, with no intense ties to mother or father, adapt easily when they go abroad as individuals.

We have not yet developed a method of bringing up our children so that they can journey easily, alone if necessary, to Hong Kong or Nigeria or the moon, tolerating with-

out fear strangers who look, speak, move, and smell very different. In a situation where the mother must take the child day by day to market, to the clinic, on the bus, on the underground, among strangers, the present tendency to advise very close ties between mother and child is doubtfully the best. Wider experiences in the arms of many individuals known in different degrees of intimacy, if possible of different races, may be a much better preparation.

In conclusion, I want to discuss very briefly another aspect of the urban world—the incongruity among all its parts. The house, the motor car, the street, the box the baby's food comes in, the bottle in which the milk is delivered, the book on the table and the pillow on the bed are in shape and colour and design extraordinarily unrelated to each other. In primitive societies, where change is very slow, or among traditional peasant peoples, where costume, crockery, and the shapes of roofs have not changed for generations, each part of the visible and sensible world reinforces each other part. Where the style is kindness, the occasional bad-tempered mother nevertheless lives beneath a kind roof. The shapes of pots, the light of the fire, the tones in other people's voices, the way the road winds around the house, all say to the child, ' You are safe '. The idiosyncrasy or failure of a particular mother or father is muted and made less important; the surrounding environment helps to highlight the moments when they are kind (33). And each child has a chance to learn from different parts of his experience. Some children will learn more from the shape of the roof, as they lie on their backs looking up at the thatch, others from the feel of the pot in their hands, still others from the cadence of voices, but as these things are all part of a whole, shaped and polished, ground down and tuned up through the generations until they fit and express to the child the particular view of the world within which it is safe and able to mature, there is a great deal more leeway in what can go wrong without doing irrevocable harm. Even extreme psychotic behaviour can be absorbed in such a setting, as people take quick precautions against a man with a spear in his hand, ' who will be all right tomorrow '. An occasional child may bear a scar from such an experience but, by and large, the familiar group seems able to take up the shock because they were all there together, each part supports each other part, nothing is so unexpected, so broken off that it cannot be dealt with.

Just as this is true of the shape of a roof, the shape of a pot, the line of an arrow, so it is also true of the way the child experiences the natural world. Whether the moon is calendrical and tells you when the fish will come over the reef, or whether the marks on the moon are an old woman beating bark cloth or a goddess who has just been swallowed by a demon, whatever the moon is, everyone agrees about it, and the child's experience of the moon and the way in which people see the moon are integrated, so that the child's need to order the natural world through perception is reinforced and supported and given symbolic form by the whole society. As we have reason to believe that the need to perceive the natural world is as deep a human need as is the need for strong, warm, meaningful interpersonal relations, the child in a coherent culture was safer (10).

But to-day most of our children are growing up in a world where the people who built the urban society believed that it was a violation of what they called ' nature '. ' Nature ' is what one's fathers had as opposed to what one's sons invent—I think this is a fair definition. A plough and a sailing ship are natural; a horse and cart was a great deal more natural than an automobile was; at the moment an automobile is more natural than an airplane, and an ordinary airplane is more natural than a jet plane. At present we live in an endless progression of rejection of the next change in energy relationships in the world, and as a result we tend to break and fragment our world and to build in a way that is ugly and forbidding those parts of the world which we regard as unnatural. Different peoples, of course, do this differently. I was very struck, I remember, in World War II with the efforts that post-card makers in Britain made to domesticate tanks. There were some perfectly charming post-cards showing tanks in the middle of wheat fields, with poppies in the field or a lark sitting on the tank, an attempt somehow to absorb into a domestic and meaningful picture this invasive thing that was tearing up the landscape. But by and large we haven't succeeded very well, and our children are growing up in a world where every line, almost every brick, says to them that man is not related to the universe in any reasonable way whatsoever, that he is violating it, exploiting it, extracting from it, and that he is being unnatural. He is eating reinforced bread instead of beautiful, pure, natural bread.

This particular breach in our whole cultural

tradition is something our children are experiencing, and the protection that was once given them by the coherence between the landscape and the human manufactured environment is gone. This is a new hazard against which we have to protect them. As we explore further and explore in a variety of ways, as we explore the living world and learn more about the particular detailed propensities of living creatures, particularly of human living creatures, as we learn more about our own origins and the probable conditions under which men once lived and under which we were shaped biologically in the past, as we learn more about the possibilities of life in different sorts of societies, as we learn more from the study of individuals here—both from the study of adult patients to whom something sorrowful has been done and from the study of small children to whom something sorrowful is being done, so that we can study it contemporaneously—and as we learn more in the field of education about the possible needs of the child for the understanding of the universe and for relating his internally perceived reality to the externally perceived reality, we have a continuing task of moulding these new insights and new researches together into a cultural expectation that will use accurately and not unfairly, not making too great demands and not misplacing their potentialities, the biologically given in our nature, as we imaginatively create out of our ability as human beings to build culture those conditions which will supplement and expand and, in many cases, use hitherto unused biological propensities and potentialities of mankind.

REFERENCES

(1) Alexander, F., and Ross, H. (Eds.) (1952). *Dynamic Psychiatry*. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.)

(2) Bakwin, H. (1944). 'Psychogenic Fever in Infants.' *Amer. J. Dis. Child.*, **67**, 176–181.

(3) Bateson, G. (1942). 'Social Planning and the Concept of Deutero Learning.' In *Science, Philosophy and Religion*, Second Symposium. (New York: Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, pp. 81–97.)

(4) —— *et al.* [1958]. *The Natural History of an Interview*. (In preparation.)

(5) —— and Mead, M. [n.d.]. *First Five Days in the Life of a New Guinea Baby*. (Film, 2 reels, 22 min., sound.) (New York: New York Univ. Film Library.)

(6) Bertalanffy, L. von (1952). *Problems of Life*. (New York: Wiley.)

(7) Birdwhistell, Ray E. [1954]. *Introduction to Kinesics, An Annotation System for Analysis of Body Motion and Gesture*. (Louisville, Ky.: Univ. of Louisville.)

(8) Blauvelt, Helen (1955, 1956, 1957). Contributions to *Group Processes*. Cf. Schaffner, B. (Ed.).

(9) Bowlby, J. (1951). *Maternal Care and Mental Health*. WHO Monograph No. 2. (Geneva: World Health Organization.) (Abridged version: *Child Care and the Growth of Love*. London: Penguin Books, 1953.)

(10) Cobb, E. [n.d.]. *Ecology of Imagination in Childhood*. MS.

(11) Davis, E. S. (1928). 'The Food Consumption of Rural School Children.' In *Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin*, **241**, 97–241.

(12) Dollard, J., and Miller, N. E. (1950). *Personality and Psychotherapy, An Analysis in Terms of Learning, Thinking and Culture*. (New York: McGraw-Hill.)

(13) Erikson, Erik H. (1950). *Childhood and Society*. (New York: Norton.)

(14) Escalona, S., and Leitch, M. [n.d.]. *Eight Infants: Tension Manifestations in Response to Perceptual Stimulation*. (Film.) (New York: New York Univ. Film Library.)

(15) Foerster, H. von, *et al.* (Eds.) (1951). *Cybernetics, Transactions of the Seventh Conference*, 2, 3, 4 October, 1950, New York. (New York: Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation.)

(16) —— (1952). *Cybernetics, Transactions of the Eighth Conference*, 15, 16 March, 1951, New York. (New York: Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation.)

(17) —— (1953). *Cybernetics, Transactions of the Ninth Conference*, 20, 21 March, 1952, New York. (New York: Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundations.)

(18) —— (1955). *Cybernetics, Transactions of the Tenth Conference*, 22, 23, 24 April, 1953, Princeton, N.J. (New York: Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation.)

(19) Ford, C. S., and Beach, F. A. (1951). *Patterns of Sexual Behavior*. (New York: Harper; Paul Hoeber.)

(20) Frank, L. K., *et al.* (1948). 'Teleological Mechanisms.' *Annals of New York Acad. Sci.*, **50**, 178–278.

(21) Freud, A. (1937). *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence*.

(22) —— and Burlingham, D. T. (1943). *War and Children*. (New York: Medical War Books.)

(23) Fries, M., and Woolf, P. J. [n.d.]. *Series of Studies on Integrated Environment: the Interaction between Child and Environment*. (Five films.) (New York: New York Univ. Film Library.)

(24) Gunther, M. (1955). 'Instinct and the Nursing Couple.' *Lancet*, 19 March, 575–578.

(25) HESS, E. H. (1955). Contributions to *Group Processes*. Cf. Schaffner, B. (Ed.).

(26) HØST, P. [n.d.]. *Sammi Jaki*. (Film.) (Oslo: ABC Films.)

(27) JACKSON, E. B. (1950). 'Pediatric and Psychiatric Aspects of the Yale Rooming-in Project.' *Connecticut State Medical Journal*, **14,** No. 7, 616.

(28) KOFFKA, K. (1935). *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*. (New York: Harcourt Brace.)

(29) LIDDELL, H. S. (1955, 1956, 1957). Contributions to *Group Processes*. Cf. Schaffner, B. (Ed.).

(30) LORENZ, K. (1950). 'The Comparative Method in Studying Innate Behaviour Patterns.' In *Physiological Mechanisms in Animal Behaviour*, Proc. Soc. for Exp. Biol. Symposium, No. 4, J. F. Danielli and R. Brown (Eds.). (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.)

(31) MEAD, M. (1947). 'On the Implications for Anthropology of the Gesell-Ilg Approach to Maturation.' *Amer. Anthropologist*, **49,** No. 1, 69–77.

(32) —— (1949). *Male and Female*. (New York: Morrow.)

(33) —— (1953). 'Introduction.' In Collins, R., *The Lost and the Found*. (New York: Woman's Press.)

(34) —— (1954). 'Some Theoretical Considerations on the Problem of Mother-Child Separation.' *Amer. J. Orthopsychiatry*, **24,** No. 3, 471–483.

(35) —— (1957). 'Mother and Child.' *Lancet*, VI, No. 6, 9 February, 317.

(36) —— and MACGREGOR, F. C. (1951). *Growth and Culture*. (New York: Putnams.)

(37) MIRSKY, I. A., MILLER, R., and STEIN, M. (1953). 'Relation of Adrenocortical Activity and Adaptive Behavior.' *Psychosomatic Medicine*, **15,** Nov.-Dec.

(38) RANK, A. J. (1956). *Among the Headhunters*. (Film.)

(39) RIBBLE, M. (1943). *The Rights of Infants*. (New York: Columbia Univ. Press.)

(40) RICHTER, C. P. (1943). 'The Self-Selection of Diets.' In *Essays in Honor of Herbert M. Evans*. (Berkeley: Univ. California Press, pp. 499–506.)

(41) ROUDINESCO (AUBREY), J., and APPELL, G. [n.d.]. *Monique* (*Maternal Deprivation in Young Children*). (Film, 2 reels, 22 min., sound.) (Paris: Association pour la Santé de l'Enfance.)

(42) SCHAFFNER, B. (Ed.) (1955). *Group Processes, Transactions of the First Conference*, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 September, 1954, Ithaca, New York. (New York: Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation.)

(43) —— (1956). *Group Processes, Transactions of the Second Conference*, 9, 10, 11 and 12 October, 1955, Princeton, N.J. (New York: Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation.)

(44) —— (1957). *Group Processes, Transactions of the Third Conference*. (In press.)

(45) SCOTT, J. (Ed.) (1950). 'Methodology and Techniques for the Study of Animal Societies.' *Annals New York Acad. Sci.*, **51,** Art. 6.

(46) SIMPSON, G., and ROE, A. [n.d.]. *Evolution and Behavior*. (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.) (In press.)

(47) SODDY, K. (Ed.) (1955). *Mental Health and Infant Development*, 2 vols. (London: Routledge.)

(48) SPITZ, R., and WOLF, K. A. [n.d.]. *Grief—A Peril in Infancy*. (Film, 3 reels, 35 min., silent.) (New York: New York Univ. Film Library.)

(49) —— [n.d.]. *Mother-Child Relations*. (Film, 2 reels, 22 min., silent.) (New York: New York Univ. Film Library.)

(50) —— [n.d.]. *The Smiling Response*. (Film, silent.) (New York: New York Univ. Film Library.)

(51) TANNER, J., and INHELDER, B. (Eds.) (1957). *Discussions on Child Development, Psycho-biological Development of the Child*, Vols. I and II. (London: Tavistock; New York: Int. Univ. Press.)

(52) —— [n.d.]. *Discussions on Child Development, Psycho-biological Development of the Child*, Vols. III and IV. (In press.)

(53) THORPE, W. H. (1956). *Learning and Instinct in Animals*. (London: Methuen.)

(54) TINBERGEN, N. (1951). *The Study of Instinct*. (London and New York: Oxford Univ. Press.)

(55) TURI, J. (1931). *Turi's Book of Lapland*. (New York and London: Harper.)

(56) WALTER, W. GREY (1953). *The Living Brain*. (New York: Norton.)

ON IDENTIFICATION *

By

ROY R. GRINKER, M.D., CHICAGO

I

The subject of identification is almost co-extensive with the entire field of psychodynamics, for it involves consideration of the processes of instinctual drives, the mechanisms of early socialization, and the intra-psychic and interpersonal behaviour and conflicts of the human being. Previous consideration of the participation of early physiological patterns in psychological development (12) naturally led me to the question: How do the periodic cycles of infantile metabolism influence developing ego patterns, and how do these obtain their content from relationships with representatives of the external world? The subject of identification, therefore, becomes an extension of biological theory. On the other hand, identifications develop from transactions between the maturing child and other persons transmitting the symbol systems of societies and cultures; and personality interacts with other personalities to form social and cultural systems. Therefore, identifications constitute theoretical bridges between biology and personality, and between personalities and social groups.

Recently, social psychiatrists and sociologists have been allocating bridging functions to social roles as systems of communications and expectations in transactions among human beings (Spiegel, 20). They constitute a description of behaviour gross enough to be defined through a period of time, but limited to what may be available or permitted in a specific social system. As communications occupying varying time spans, they are derived from unconscious attitudes based on past learning and are governed by motivations which have their origin in a multiplicity of internal identifications that may never, or at least not directly, be revealed in behaviour. Although the regulative mechanisms of role systems are concerned with complementarity between actors in any social system, without which there is tension, roles are determined by multi-levelled internal processes of thinking and feeling, all of which, comprising mentation, are richer, more complicated and faster moving than the available social roles.

Identifications that determine characteristics of the component parts of personality and, in compound, delineate the self are expressed not only in role performance, that is in the dimensions of words or action, but also internally in conscious or unconscious communications among the various processes of the mental apparatus. Some are then expressed in whatever social roles are available after filtering devices have been passed through; others, in conflict with each other, are neutralized, or locked in, or delayed for later expression. The formalized content of social roles represents but a small part of the internalized action system, much of which is in conflict or at least not in conformity with the main or observable self.

There is futility in attempting to define my subject in advance, since the purpose of this presentation is essentially one of definition of processes culminating in identification. Furthermore, there is little agreement on meaning among the countless people using the term, Therefore, I shall tentatively give you the usual definition so that you may know in general what I am considering.

Identification usually connotes an unconscious state of ' having become in part or total the same ' in that a person thinks, feels, and acts after the fashion (or as he thinks it is) of the one who is taken as a model. As you will soon discern, this is not my definition. My discussion of identification in general, to follow, will not end in a simple declarative definition, but will give you a notion of the areas of knowledge and ignorance about the way in which content of symbol systems of personalities, society, and culture are acquired for utilization and propaga-

* From the Institute for Psychosomatic and Psychiatric Research and Training of the Michael Reese Hospital, Chicago, Illinois. Presidential Address, read before the Illinois Psychiatric Society on 16 May, 1956.

tion. The end result may be your total confusion; but at least I hope that definitive questions will be raised in your minds.

The material of this presentation consists of a brief review of the literature, a few interspersed clinical vignettes to document an empirical foundation, data from six weeks of constant observations of infant Sue beginning at the fourth week of life, and some final theoretical conclusions.

II

The literature on identification is diffusely scattered, and it is difficult to determine the exact origin of many of our existing concepts. I shall, however, attempt to indicate in capsule form our present state of knowledge as derived from a variety of fields.

An analogy can be made between identifications and certain security operations in more primitive organisms. Stunkard (22) pointed out that in some animals the quest for security results in greater dependence on other species, with the abandonment of their own potentialities for growth. This frequently leads to regressive evolution, demonstrated by a simplification of structure after the adoption of safer, passive, more inert forms of living. Highly organized social forms of life maximize security at the cost of restricted lives of its members. This is particularly exemplified in parasites who become dependent, inert, and physiologically regressed. Although identification is an important part of psychological development, under certain circumstances and in excessive quantities it may be analogous to a parasitic security operation. Too great an identification with others or conformity with their values may produce a rigidly stable, other-directed or clinging, phobic type of personality with restriction of potential creativity and little freedom for self-realization.

Engel and Reichsman (3) have made a major contribution to the problem of identification in their psychosomatic studies of Monica, an infant with an oesophageal atresia and a gastrostomy. During the earliest months of life when objects were not differentiated from self and mental representations were not yet formed, the infant was only an *incorporative* being. At this time acid secretion in the stomach occurred mainly in relationship to the feeding-wakeful state. Later, object- and self-representations became differentiated, and Monica's stomach secreted acid either in response to food or when in the proximity of human beings with whom she had a pleasurable transaction. She seemed to *introject* these objects psychologically, using an alimentary model, as she developed mental representations of them. After self- and object-representations were clearly discriminated, qualities of the real object or their representations were acquired by Monica without alteration of gastric secretion. This, Engel and Reichsman call identification. Under conditions of stress, such as in the transference situations during psycho-analysis, when the boundaries of the self become regressively blurred, it is suggested that the processes of incorporation and introjection may be revived and earlier identifications reactivated.

Therese Benedek (1) states: 'Birth is a traumatic separation for both mother and child. Their relationship is re-established through the processes of alimentation. Through the rhythmic repetition of hunger and satiation, the biologic unity is replaced by psychologic communications through introjections and projections. The newborn eventually learns that the source of need is inside and the object of gratification is outside. At the same time, the infant is the object of the mother's receptive needs. She feels 'whole' with him and 'empty' without him. This attitude, plus the exaggerated charge of the mother's incorporating fantasies during lactation, indicate that the mother during the post-partum period as well as during pregnancy responds to the increased demands on her with an increased wish to receive. These emotions originate in the biological regression of motherhood; they indicate that the post-partum symbiosis is oral-alimentary, for both infant and mother.'

I might state parenthetically that the puerperal biological regression of the mother with its psychological implications may be based on the functions of the placental and other foetal endocrine systems. These support not only the child but also the mother. As a result, maternal diabetes and rheumatoid arthritis are often alleviated during pregnancy, the pituitary may become partially atrophied from disuse, and the lack of maternal adrenocortical hormone may make the sick mother worse after delivery. Although the need of the mother for the child is biological and temporary, it may be expressed psychologically for an extended time.

'Through memory traces of alimentary experiences, the infant introjects the "good-feeding mother = good-satiated-self"; and the "bad-frustrating mother" = "bad-frustrated (hungry, painful) self." Introjection of memory

images of the good mother produces confidence, hope and increasing capacity for tolerance to frustration. At the same time, the mother develops confidence in her own motherliness; her gratification is projected on to the child. These are repetitive, reciprocal, transactional processes of identifications and projections through which primary object relationship and primary self representation are established.

' Failures in gratifications *in the child* result in crying fits, i.e. in sudden total regression to the undifferentiated phase in which mother as object does not exist. In the process of calming down, the infant projects part of the aggressive motor excitement on to the mother, and by this the infant develops hatred for the object he needs to establish his " self " again. As the calming-down process continues, the aggressive impulses disappear via introjection, and the equation " bad mother = bad self " becomes established within the psychic organization. This introject constitutes the ambivalent core of the personality and represents the fundamental, alimentary origin of the depressive constellation.'

Turning to the strictly psycho-analytic literature, we find that, although it is voluminous, its contents are sparse, repeating monotonously the early contributions of Freud. The elements of identification in psycho-analytic theory may be abstracted under the headings of: (i) gratification, (ii) defences as they contribute to the development of mental functions and learning, and (iii) pathological identifications.

(i) Fenichel (5, 6) summarizes psycho-analytic theory as follows: the ego develops and changes its characteristics by acquisition of qualities perceived in external objects. The formula may be schematized as follows: drives originating in the body make demands on the ego, which searches for gratification. Eventually the idea of the *gratifying* object becomes integrated as an endopsychic representative of the object in the ego. This idea develops precedence and power over other ideas and exerts organizing, selective, and formative influences over a wide range of psychic processes (19). As a result, the subject is no longer fully interested in the external object. The ego alters its form by identification to become like the object, and libido is desexualized with its object now the altered ego. The ego becomes a precipitant of lost object cathexes—a record of past object choices (8, 9). This spares repression of the drives because the instinctual demands of the id are no longer aimed at the outer world.

(ii) Anna Freud (7) includes identification among the processes of *defence* against either internal or external stress. In the so-called identification with an aggressor who cannot be combated with impunity, the characteristics of the aggressor are introjected and identification ensues, making the person as aggressive as the one he fears. Projection of one's own needs results in altruism. The subject gives to and cares for another and receives gratification by identification with the recipient. However, this is more than a defence, for in psychological terms such role reversal (putting one's self in the other's place) is a learning process, increasing the strength and stability of the child's ego. It diminishes the dependence of the child on others and increases his sensitivity, enriches his inner life and facilitates socialization (15). Harry Lee formulates defensive or secondary identification as follows: When the mother employs negatively toned technics of teaching, the child introjects the anxiety-arousing aspects of the mother and represses his objectional expressions.

(iii) Jacobson (14) states that one of the major processes in infantile development is the building up of stable object representations in the ego. When the self becomes differentiated from the outer world, self-representations develop from pleasurable and unpleasurable inner experiences which are constantly changing, and are fused and confused with object images. Frustrations throw the child on its own resources and stimulate progressive identification with the parent. (By this, Jacobson probably means internalization of object-subject transaction.) Healthy and realistic object- and self-representations are thus built. Object libido may be used for further self-representations as the child becomes less dependent on the object and can obtain narcissistic satisfaction in his own behaviour. This, in turn, increases his capacity to love others. However, frustrations which mobilize intense aggressive reactions result in feelings of inferiority and self-criticism when the hated object is internalized.

Early infantile identifications are essentially magical, based on unconscious fantasies or the temporary belief of being one with or becoming the object regardless of reality. In psychotic states, normal object relationships disintegrate and magical mechanisms of identification reappear, sometimes to be enacted in animistic collective rituals. Normally, they find some expression in the ego-ideal and the superego. The core of the latter consists of idealized

parental images blended with archaic aggrandized images of the self. There is normally an awareness of this unrealistic element in the superego, which is reflected in the recognition of the discrepancies between ego and superego standards.

The most advanced type of psychological work in the field of identification comes from Piaget (17) in his work on imitation in childhood where he contrasts two processes which he terms assimilation (meaning identification) and adjustment. He states: 'Equilibrium consists in preserving the living aspects of the past by continual accommodation to the manifold and irreducible present.' Assimilation, especially affective, remains unconscious when it does not combine with accommodation to form an equilibrium. This seems to mean that something is imitated and then assimilated, but is useful only if it is available for adjustment to external, real, and novel situations. He considers that there is no need to imply repressive forces or censorship, because a split between assimilation and accommodation prevents symbolic thought and dreams from having access to reality. Representative thought consists in stages of development of imitation, symbolic play and cognitive representations which are interrelated, and their evolution is dependent on gradual establishment of assimilation and accommodation. The interplay between these two polar functions allows a recall of the past in the light of the present, tending to equilibrium or adaptation.

We now turn to some modern sociological concepts, the leading exponent of which is Parsons (16). He states that the family functions as a small social group in which the child's dependence needs may be temporarily gratified and from which he may be gradually emancipated. The principal stages in the development of personality, particularly on its emotional side, leave residues which constitute a stratification of the structure of the personality itself with reference to its own developmental history. As the child grows, he becomes differentiated into systems of action during separate phase patterns of socialization. Every stage of development or socialization of the child requires learning ' which is never only a triggering off of hereditary patterns'.

In the phase of oral dependence, the infant internalizes the mother's image and her concept of him as a recipient of care. In each process of social internalization there is not only an image of the object but also a mirror image of the object's attitude. Thus, personality structure is primarily organized from internalizations of systems of social objects. Personality does not develop by modification of instincts or drives but by differentiation of internalized object systems by binary fission. Parsons postulates an embryological scheme of fission from the single-celled mother-child symbiosis to a sixteen-celled genital maturity.

Personality establishment is an internalized object which regulates the orientation of the individual by defining for the self the relevant aspects of that object with stability over time and, with all, a range of adaptability to changing conditions. What is internalized is always a reciprocal interaction pattern of matched or complementary expectations. Those who play a part in socialization and internalization must participate with a subject on his own terms and for his own needs but also play an authentic role in a wider system. This constitutes the leverage and definition for the internalization of the next role for the developing child. The formula is permissiveness, support in spite of failure, denial of reciprocity, and reward for achievement on a supraordinate level. Harry Lee puts this concept in other words but considers that, when the mother gives up interest in certain zonal pleasures, the child renounces primary identification, increases auto-erotic activity, and becomes interested in participation with the mother in the next zone. He conserves a share of the valued object for narcissistic supplies at the expense of limiting free expression. The balance between denial of reciprocity and positive reward leads to the establishment of a stable system of expectations in the child. This constitutes internalization of the parent-mother in her role as the source of care, and identification of that aspect of her with the self that has stood in a meaningful relationship.

Internalization creates appropriate attitudes towards family role figures, capable of generalizations and substitutions. Later identifications, after the primary one with the mother, are more complicated because of the multiple role relationships among various members of the family or, for that matter, towards each. To each, a new set of values is attached. Identification becomes a process of internalization of any common collective we-categorization and, with it, the common values of the collectivity.

III

For the purposes of this discussion I should like to define identifications not as processes, but

as their results. Thus, introjection, as a psychological analogue of the biological prototype of incorporation, leads to internalization of subject-object transactions with many nuances of their behavioural patterns.

Generally, we have adopted from psychoanalytic theory concepts of allocation of specific psychological functions and assigned them a topological position as id, ego, superego, and ego-ideal. Unfortunately, they have been anthropomorphized and dealt with as structures although they only exist as symbols of function usable for the development of systems of analysis or as scientific models. These symbols are ' observer-defined ' rather than recognizable as genetic ' system-properties'.

To the *id* we have allocated the sum total of undifferentiated potential forces linked to the body in unexplained ways, energized by it and in turn influencing it. As a potential, it affects behaviour and mentation only by its driving capacities. The derivative psychological component of the id is a differentiated function whose activities are termed the ' primary processes'. This id communicates internally in pictorial symbols but can be, or has been, capable of conscious communication at higher levels when its information becomes attached to word symbols. Thus, even the psychological id is a product of constitutional potential plus life experiences, changing with motivation and growth.

The *ego* develops out of growth and differentiation of potential patterns of the id, and it is associated with varying degrees of consciousness (conscious or preconscious). Its multiple specific patterns are derived from internal and external bodily experiences, but content is a reflection of transactions with the outer world. As a product of growth, the ego becomes the pacemaker of further psychological growth and the regulator of psychological homeostasis.

To the *superego* we relegate the functions of automatic control of socially and culturally defined roles. Its contents and specific patterns of severity, permissiveness, corruptness, etc. are derived from transactional experience, which to some degree are modifiable long after maturity. The superego is not always a memory of experience with an authoritative figure as it existed in reality. Its origin is not at the resolution of the Oedipus complex but in neonatal experiences with the mother even before a ' self ' is well defined, for its content lies within poorly defined boundaries, sometimes experienced as inside and sometimes outside. Only later after the development of self-esteem does the superego become sufficiently differentiated, as it secretes further experience, to function as a warning mechanism signalling future danger.

To the *ego ideal* is allocated the function of striving for future gratification with pride in self as the reward and shame as the penalty (11). Its patterned process seems to be derived from experiences during metabolically oriented infancy when only need-gratifications exist. Frustration of unequivocal gratification facilitates growth and increases capacity to learn and develop. A modicum of success instils confidence, hope, and further aspirations. Thus, the ego-ideal receives its content from experiences in early life and only later becomes differentiated as an allocated function.

The resultant *self* is thus composed of many identifications distributed by our system of analysis into several categories to which are allocated general functional attributes and specific contents. The internal interactions and communications among them are manifold and rich compared to the stereotype of available behaviour patterns and verbal syntax.

Without specifying the later functional allocation, a large matrix of influences determines what is included in identifications. Among these are the genic constitution, strength of the instincts, antenatal experiences, birth trauma, neonatal metabolic patterns and feeding experiences, maternal influences, other siblings, father, later life experiences, etc. These many variables, and others not mentioned or not known, constitute a field in which identifications occur, for which *timing* or level of maturation is probably the most significant single variable.

When we consider the fact that the developing child has different needs and hence perceives special qualities of its environment which it introjects, we also touch on the problem of varying sensitivity to deprivation. As Bowlby (2) puts it, experiences occurring at critical plastic periods of phases of development have effects different from those at later more rigid periods. Since basic needs are considered instinctual, the ethologists have been helpful in formulating scientific concepts of instincts. Tinbergen (23) has conceived of primitive social responses evoked by simple perceptive stimuli as built-in ready-made responses awaiting innate releaser mechanisms (I.R.M.). Once these responses are released, further learning occurs by association with more differentiated stimuli. Thus infants,

with all due reference to hereditary differences, have a readiness to respond with a love relation to a parental figure. Later love relations are influenced by the character of the earliest, as for example a gosling if prepared early will follow the human experimenter and not a goose. Likewise human beings persist in attaching themselves to people similar to their first loves. The point of all this is to show that identifications require more than a mother-child relationship, but a readiness to respond, a specific timing and an appropriate releasing stimulus. In this enlarged field of latent forces which we call instinctual, imprinting through experiences at critical early periods is long-lasting.

IV

I think that we are now able to define our concepts concerning the processes which lead to identification more adequately and to raise some significant questions concerning them. Identification is an end-result of transactions between a subject, who may be any human individual, and an object, who may be any other human individual. In general, we use the terms subject and object, referring to the components of transactions. It should be clear that the object, whose transactional processes with the subject are internalized, furnishes to the subject not only personalized qualities and attributes, but also signs and symbols of a particular culture, the knowledge of the institutionalized and instrumental roles of the particular society and expressive roles characterized by a specific sex.

The self and objects are never isolated but always in relationship. Others are seen in the light of our own needs, and we view ourselves according to the opinion of others. Neither the ' I ' nor the ' you', the ' we ' or the ' others', can be torn apart. Identification is a transactional memory residue, always composed of subject and object. To consider that the ego is ever a rigid boundary between self and not-self is erroneous, since it is also composed of learned patterns involving self and others. As a filtering boundary process, it is shifting and permeable like any biological membrane. The time of the transaction between subject and object in terms of the developmental phases of the subject, what the object has to offer and what the subject needs, determines the ' partness ' or ' wholeness ' of the identification. For example, the neonate in the nursing stage sees, feels, smells, and tastes only *part* of the mother. For the infant at this time these perceptions are *all* of the mother. Therefore, what is actually part of the object is really the whole object from the frame of reference of the child and unconsciously remains so. Later, the overt personality or character of the object is viewed by the subject as an assemblage of qualities, some parts of which are needful, useful, or dangerous and with which identification may result or is avoided by a counter-identification (8). In this process, the whole of the object is broken down into specific parts from the frame of reference of the child. What is partialized is not the personality of the subject or the internalized object, but the transaction between what the subject is able to view in the outer world with whatever perceptive tools are matured, and the parts or whole of the object that it needs, is always a fragment of the whole.

Our next definition relates to the processes by which identification occurs. It seems universally accepted that the processes leading to internalization are derived from the biological prototype of incorporation which serves the purposes of ingesting life-maintaining nutrition. Only later is the mouth and tongue apparatus concerned with primary active explorations and mastery of the neonatal environment. Incorporation refers literally to the taking in through the mouth of fluid substances in infancy and should not be used to refer to a material symbol of an introjected object.

Although sucking is an innately patterned process evoked by stimulation of the lips and buccal mucosa, there is a small and quickly mastered learned component. The neonate's sucking pattern is not at first automatic, but requires repeated stimulation and sometimes an initial squirt of milk on to the nasopharyngeal wall, before the lips are pressed and sucking movements begin. As late as four weeks of age, this learned pattern may be temporarily lost during periods of greedy excitement, and then air is taken in simultaneously, resulting in choking, coughing, and rapid distension of the stomach. Furthermore, between the fourth and sixth week of life, satiation is not signalled only by a cessation of sucking, but also by an active ejection of the nipple by a forced protrusion of the tongue and still later by a sidewise turning away of the head (the rudimentary gesture for ' no '). New or distasteful foods administered by spoon may be quickly spat out by tongue protrusion. At six to eight weeks, mouth-play consists of in-and-out tongue movements over the lips, and at eight to ten weeks blathering

speech sounds are made by projections of the tongue over the lips. Thus, it becomes quite apparent that the biological prototype of incorporation is very quickly mixed with another prototype, that of ejection, riddance, or what later might be called projection in a psychological sense.

At first, incorporation results in the assimilation of external sources of nutritional supply at a time when such objects are not yet differentiated according to their relationship to the child boundaries. It is not able, in fact, to differentiate self from not-self, and it also gains temporary satisfaction by sucking at its own lips and fingers. From an anthropomorphic view of the neonate at this stage, its reactions may be interpreted as if they were pleasurable, unpleasurable, needful, greedy, etc. It seems plausible that these early transactional alimentary cyclic experiences have a role in patterning the later mental representations of the outer world. But any psychological representation of this process cannot be isolated from the concept of instincts or drives, for the very process of search for nutritive substance indicates an instinctual need. An attempt to derive internalization entirely from differentiation of objects within the subject is as unwarranted as the opposite of explaining identification as only an instinctual process.

Mouth functions, in the service of incorporation and ejection, have an important influence on early learning and on differentiation of the psychological system (11). They reappear during periods of regression (sleep, coma, brain damage, schizophrenia, etc.). We conceive of introjection as a psychological process akin to incorporation. In the earliest months of life, such introjection is associated with the physical manifestations of salivation which I have observed many times in Sue and, according to Engel, of increased gastric secretion. Introjection is a process by which object-representations and self-representations are created in the mental apparatus, independent of the primitive incorporative process although derived from it.

V

Imitation as an early process of learning may easily be observed in many infants, in children of all ages, and in adults. It is a transient and evanescent process associated either with adoration, or hostility to a significant object, and is often conscious and intentional. Exaggerated unconscious imitation in adult life is usually superimposed on an earlier identification. A middle-aged man suffered from depression beginning when he attained success in business which his henpecked, passive salesman father could not achieve. In the course of therapy, he became aware that he wore the same colour in suits and shirts, affected the same mannerisms, enjoyed only the same baseball team, etc., as had his father. But behind this caricature of detailed imitation was the introjected patterned relationship with his weak passive father (ego), driven on by another identification with his dominant mother (superego).

During the process of psycho-analysis I have often heard patients whose reaction formations, substitutions, sublimations and many other kinds of defences have been penetrated, express the following evaluations of themselves: ' I am worthless', ' I am an ugly, bad and greedy monster', ' I am an empty hollow shell with nothing to give anyone outside of me'. These are not simple intellectual expressions but are accompanied by intense affective experiences. Often they are associated with bodily distressful sensations. How does this sense of inner badness, emptiness and weakness come about? It is probably derived from early unpleasurable experiences from which the sense of pain and the feeling of badness became localized inside the potential ego boundaries.

One patient had a psychotic mother who often maniacally raved at home or sometimes disappeared mysteriously into a sanatorium. Another was underfed through the use of a deficient formula and cried incessantly in starvation long before her diet was corrected. Another was physically and emotionally circumscribed and constricted by an extremely neurotic mother who permitted little early independence or even freedom of motion.

These patients, like many others, came for treatment because of irrational feelings of shame and guilt, but, in spite of prolonged psychoanalytic therapy, the underlying personality processes and physiological concomitants remained fixed as ' bad self'. Their growth and change could only be helped by learning with great difficulty other concepts of self, and object in relation to self, which in adult life were still only illusions that attempted to cover up the poignancy of early disappointments.

I have observed several so-called ' borderline ' cases as they became temporarily psychotic and then gradually became re-integrated. The psychosis usually developed abruptly with very little warning. Then they behaved like angry

and frightened undomesticated animals indulging in cannibalistic and soiling behaviour. Gratification in lying curled up, in being dirty and unresponsive except to their own fantasies was accompanied by infantile fears of a strange confusing world. As this behaviour was abandoned and the patients seemed more adult —they dressed, ate naturally, maintained cleanliness and responded verbally—they identified the surrounding patients, nurses and physicians as actors who played parts corresponding to their most painful memories and only occasionally to some pleasant ones. Despite the actual kind and understanding roles of the nurses and doctors, they were constantly misinterpreted so that a ' corrective emotional experience ' was ineffective. This is the most important point I wish to make here: that such a patient cannot understand a good human environment because his earliest transactions have imprinted ' badness ' on him which is constantly in flux with those outside of him. Bad self cannot understand a good not-self until stronger boundaries are reconstituted and illusions accepted. Thus, even after a psychotic regression, primary identifications usually remain immutable.

I should like to present one of several examples of how the primary child-mother transactions at the time when psychological boundaries have either not been established or are very tenuous, affect personality (13). A boy who had celiac disease from birth to the age of eight had great difficulty in mastering the separation from the solicitous mother and resisted each step in psychological growth. The crowning blow occurred at the discovery of her pregnancy when he was four years old. During analysis, the following fantasy developed. ' I was out walking with my girl friend (who has a plump protruding abdomen), when a gunman approached us and threatened to shoot the girl. I stepped between them, and the man shot and hit me in the belly.' While recounting this story, the patient suddenly began writhing with severe abdominal pain and had to leave the room. In addition, the metabolic pattern of old: ingestion of food, abdominal pain, and distention followed by painful diarrhoea, was repetitively experienced in greedy approach to a girl, attempts to gorge himself in the relationship, discovery of her perfidy, followed by painful depression. At the same time, the actual mother and the sibling were completely ignored and treated as nonexistent. His hostility to the mother's abdomen was experienced within his own belly, guilt and depression followed, and, after a quiescent period, hunger for relationship and striving for mastery forced him to repeat the pattern anew. Here we see a pathological exaggeration of how a single early series of metabolic experiences imprint themselves on the psychological template through introjection of mother-child transactions. All aspects of psychological organization are involved: ego, ego-ideal, and superego. The same fundamental processes have been observed in many patients far less ill, those without metabolic disturbances in infancy and without a pregnancy as the target of attack.

It has been stated frequently in psychoanalytic literature that mourning consists in piecemeal digestion of the introjected lost object, as if that introjection occurred after the loss. At the same time, it is clear that pathological mourning like melancholia is found in persons whose loved objects have been narcissistically chosen, i.e. in their own projected images. A boy of eleven, closely attached to his mother through her neurotic and then actual malignant illness, experienced the death of the mother without mourning. Yet his primary identification was with her and revealed itself in many poorly covered feminine attitudes. The subject-object attitudes were preserved in him—he need not mourn her loss or suffer its pain. Yet compulsively he wooed and had sexual relationship only with sick girls whom he then ran from with guilt and depression. In these cases the object is not introjected, but the patterned relationships of the old introjects are re-animated —not only as a shadow on the ego toward which aggression is directed but also in the sadistic superego which represents another part of the same internalized transactional system.

Let us take an example of introjection leading to a life of suffering from guilt feelings and to constant acting-out of restitution. At the height of his oedipal feelings, when he was sneaking looks at his mother's body and feeling her naked back under her dress, a patient lost his father. The mother made the little boy of five a husband in miniature, even permitting him to take a superior position to her second husband. The patient all his life avoided success and continued to lose, share, or return all his earnings so that he was continually bankrupt. He constantly had a weight of guilt, like a yoke across his shoulders, bowing down his back. He could permit himself no pleasure in work, play, or family life, and acted, felt, and spoke as if he had killed the father and must suffer the

consequences. Here the introjected object influenced a pattern apart from most of his character structure. As such, it could be treated and attenuated, since the self-representation apart from this oppressive guilt-producing introject was reasonably realistic.

Since Piers (18) has called attention to the frequency of shame-anxiety, we have been able to detect such cases more frequently (13). There are many patients whose corrupt patterns of behaviour are accompanied by reactions of shame, especially for the actual or possible discovery of their acts or thoughts. Yet, when the reactions of shame are thoroughly understood, it can be discerned that they have been burdensome impositions upon the personality. When the underlying orientation, which is frequently that of greed, is exposed, the patient then often blandly asks, ' Why shouldn't I take or have as much as I want? '

VI

I have presented these brief statements about some types of patients in order to raise what I think are fundamental questions regarding identification. What identifications result in personality attributes that seem to feel at one with self and are relatively fixed? What identifications seem apart from the main psychological process as foreign bodies, as dissociated parts of the self or as allocated extra-ego functions creating tensions of guilt or shame?

The psychological system of the developing child may be viewed as having at least three significant dimensions—the inside, the outside, and the potential boundary processes between them. In the physiological sphere, there is a constant exchange between inside and outside through anatomical apertures and semi-permeable membranes, yet there is no sharp anatomical boundary (11). Air moves in and out of the tracheo-bronchial tree. Fluids move freely between tissues and preformed vascular and lymph spaces. The tongue propels food inside the mouth to evoke pharyngeal reflexes or protrudes rejected food in primitive spitting or extrusion functions. Since very early in the neonate's development there is no sharp differentiation of the psychological from the somatic, we may assume on the basis of observation and reconstruction that somatic experiences, conditioned and learned patterned responses affect the developing psychological functions. Also adverse circumstances such as pyloric spasm, celiac syndromes, colic, partial or total starvation, overfeeding, dehydration, nasal obstructions interfering with nursing by forcing interruption for respiration, etc., all have a profound influence on developing psychological patterns. Some have their origin, as does the degree of hunger, within the child's constitution. Others are derived from the actions of the mother or her surrogates. No matter where a factor originates, it influences the other, and the transactional process spirals.

All through this early developmental pattern, the in-and-out processes go on. Introjection and projection are like the rhythms of an alternating electric current, the sum of which, within limits, constitutes an unstable equilibrium. The needed, the not-needed—the good, the bad —the satisfying, the not-satisfying—the pleasurable, the unpleasurable—are respectively inside and outside. Reversal of the curve is never abrupt at its limits, so that the good and the bad are simultaneously inside and outside. Furthermore, repetitiously throughout life the projected is constantly being reintrojected as a patterned process although the objects may change.

VII

Now we may pose more detailed questions and attempt to answer them according to the available evidence, which is far from complete.

(i) How are the patterned processes of the external human environment internalized to form identifications? The answer to this is usually according to the oral pattern and its transactional experiences. But I have stated before, ' The more we have learned about the structure and function of the mouth in the human organism, the more dissatisfaction there is with our current psycho-analytic formulations. Some things are clear. In psychology we have considered mouth functions too literally. We have neglected to evaluate other systems of mastery, perception, and sensuality, and we have considered mouth functions as isolated. For psychological purposes, it would be better if we paid less attention to the mouth as a single area of action and considered the potentialities of the entire organism as a projection of many surfaces, not a surface. All inner processes enter into transactional relationship with the environment on the surfaces of the body, where they can be experienced (11).' This, of course, still holds true and applies particularly to developmental processes beyond the earliest weeks of life.

There are many systems of relationship

between the neonate and the external environment that are not included when we talk about the oral pattern. Many of them are unconscious and never become conscious and may be significant not only by their presence, but also by their absence. Such relationships between mother and child as are mediated through vision, near or far, through tactile skin sensations which help define the borders of the self between the mother and the child in the sphere of audition which assists also in determining what is in and out, and, finally, the tension with which the child is held or manipulated by the mother, affecting its deep sensibilities. How do we reconcile these manifold transactions between the neonate and its mother with the oral pattern of incorporation which seems to lead to the process of psychological introjection which forms identifications? This is an extremely difficult question to answer, especially since very little information is available from direct observation or by reconstructive analysis. Spitz (21) includes, among the primary perceptions that contribute to earliest psychological experience, the hand, labyrinth, and outer skin which combine and cannot be distinguished from intra-oral sensations. Later, distance perceptions such as vision and, still later, language assume greater importance. My own observations indicate that they become significant even in the second month, for Sue focused only on the eyes of her mother as early as eight weeks. At ten weeks, she became startled by her own blathering, as if discovering that sounds ordinarily heard outside could come from inside.

Certainly there are many aspects of ego and of ego-ideal or superego that include elements of vision, audition, smell, and touch. They are, however, rarely isolated in the early weeks of life, but seem always to attain some connexion or relationship with the primary oral processes. They are significant, but they are rarely dominant in the process of identification. As silent associations, they become integrated in the total representation of the pattern. Yet, like the cortical homunculus, the hand-mouth representations seem to be overwhelmingly most significant.

(ii) What is introjected? We may say that this is always a patterned relationship between the subject and the object. The primary motivation is cyclic, corresponding to the alimentary cycle, in which drives, seeking for aim-gratification, repeat themselves in a compulsive manner, just as hunger-satiation recurs many times during the neonate's first days. The patterned relationships, however, develop not only from instinctual need plus gratification, but also include nuances of frustrations leading to suffering and pain, influencing the introjected pattern identified as within the self to be as painful or as pleasurable as the child's early experiences. Thus, the frustrating mother is, as it were, what the subject experiences within himself, and the self becomes like the bad mother.

(iii) After introjection, where is the pattern located or, we might say, allocated? The Freudian theory postulates certain topological aspects of the mind consisting of ego, superego, ego-ideal, and id. These are processes located internally in various degrees of harmony and conflict with each other. They are non-conscious automatic processes, subserving functions not requiring attention, strain, or reflection. Thus, they are favourable for the self to attend to the business of current reality with an economy of energy. The cost of such allocative functions may be a rigid repetition, which is difficult to alter by new learning, and a predisposition to neurotic conflict. Hence, basic personality attitudes follow a repetition compulsion which is only with difficulty changed.

Form and content are developed through various influences. The form is prescribed by the strength and quality of the instinct; that is, by physical, chemical, endocrinological and metabolic influences, some of which are constitutional. On the other hand, the content is derived from early experiences with other persons, modifiable to some extent by learning and ever-assembling new patterns which develop around the nuclear form and content.

What introjects develop into aspects of the ego, what into the superego and ego-ideal? It is only when the boundaries become blurred, either through psychoses, regressive phenomena, or in the regression during psycho-analytic therapy that we see each of them in semi-pure culture. When we do, we observe some connexion between the degree of aggressiveness and the quality of the superego, some relationship between libidinal qualities and the ego-ideal, and a connexion between the ego boundaries of the self with the degree of boundary-making functions that the mother exerts or permits on the child.

(iv) What happens after allocation? The primary patterned template receives content from further experiences through many perceptive systems, extending in space from direct tactile or mucosal stimulation to distant sym-

bolic communication. The infant is able to experience those influences that modify the primary introjects after the ripening of new tools of perception within the organism. Nevertheless, the original template remains as a permanent structure.

(v) What is the effect of various introjections on the role behaviour in society and culture? Tenable theory indicates that introjections are developed through experience with external objects whose images are transferred to become part of the self. There is no decision-making in this process of allocation and no longing for the lost good objects. In later life, when boundaries have already been formed, introjection of the object is no longer easily possible. The subject may search for a new object which can only be found when reality testing has matured. In this sense, then, various coded social roles represent systems of expectations from substitute objects (20).

Now we may ask, how does the patterned template of the primary introjects help the person to fit into various social roles? The end result of the primary introjects determines the capacities of the individuals to perform the social role. In this sense, the intervening variables between personality and society are implicit identifications which are integrated and synthesized, later to be activated on appropriate occasions. However, the degree of integration and synthesis determines the strength of silent ungratified implicit roles which impede the success of socialization. Social equilibrium, then, which is an idealized state of role complementarity, is related to a dominant identification, but there are many internalized roles that are not satisfied at the moment and produce or initiate cyclic responses which require a rapid shifting or changing of explicit roles. If such dysequilibrium occurs, it may lead to an internal disturbance, producing or threatening anxiety or depression, and a new equilibrium will have to be found, either immediately in the acting-out individual or later in the repetition compulsion of the more silently neurotic person.

VIII

It may be conjectured that the human personality system has common qualities of ' structure ' that characterize its formal attributes. Anterior to these are innate needs, and drives which energize goal-seeking behaviour (motivations). Original undifferentiated behaviours within the child-mother metabolic transactions are patterned during inner-outer experiences into specific forms of relationships differentiated on a *quantitative* axis. Contents of *qualities* are allocated later and continue throughout life, developing and changing in response to a wide variety of experiences, channelled inward at first by contact and later by distance-perceptive systems, and channelled outward by several effector systems.

I suggest that the basic groundwork or template of personality is developed early by transactional identifications before differentiation of personality into special psychological ' structures ' or sub-systems. The identical early transactional processes leading to identification may contribute basic patterns to *each* of the psychological sub-systems to be differentiated later by our observations of their specific functions. Once isolated, further accretions of content depend on the maturation of mechanisms of perception and motor control in relationships with significant persons.

Some of the modern students of personality usually utilize the psycho-analytic model which is more concerned with opposition of instinctual drives and reality, resulting in defences and symptoms, than with cohesive, integrating, organizing, or homeostatic principles. Like the biologists who are attempting to augment the stability or homeostatic principle with concepts which include growth, learning, and evolution, psycho-analysts are now separating a conflict-free sphere of the ego concerned with development and learning using so-called ' neutralized energy'. Theoretically and operationally we have fused the concepts of ego processes with the total personality or what social scientists call the personality system. We need a term to apply to a supra-ordinate process which functions in integrating the sub-systems, including the many identifications that constitute the ego, ego-ideal, and superego, and in organizing behaviour into available social roles.

The most suitable available term is the self, which is a synthetic compound of many identifications. Erikson (4) uses the term self-identity which, as a gestalt composed of many identifications, is greater than its parts. It is attained when the multiple identifications have permitted satisfactory interaction with family roles and when society recognizes the subject as a person. There is then self-realization and mutual recognition between self and the others.

Finally, we come to the question regarding the means of testing our current hypotheses

concerning the many aspects of identification that remain unclear. Extending from earliest neonatal suckling to ever-changing role-playing all through life, many disciplines can contribute to the understanding of identification: biology, psychology, psycho-analysis, and sociology. Whether a unified theory will ever develop cannot be foretold. What is needed first is a decoding of meanings, confused by the sacred terminology within each field, so that isomorphic hypotheses can be examined by several operations. Perhaps the limits of psycho-analytic reconstructions may be breached by appropriate child observations, animal experimentation, or more significant psychological tests. Needless to say, the developing human infant cannot answer unless we pose our questions properly. Yet, answers to questions concerning introjection, internalization, or identification, whichever term one desires, are the stanchions on which a long series of intersystem bridges can be built.

REFERENCES

(1) Benedek, T. 'Toward the Biology of a Depressive Constellation', *J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assoc.*, **4,** 389, 1956.

(2) Bowlby, J. In Tanner's *Prospects in Psychiatric Research.* (Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1955.)

(3) Engel, G., and Reichsman, F. 'Incorporation, Introjection and Identification.' Unpublished material.

(4) Erikson, E. H. 'The Problem of Ego Identity', *J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assoc.*, **4,** 56, 1956.

(5) Fenichel, O. (1926). 'Identification', *Coll. Papers*, Vol. 1.

(6) Fenichel, H., and Rapoport, D. *The Collected Papers of Otto Fenichel.* (New York: Norton, 1953.)

(7) Freud, A. (1936). *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense.* (New York: Int. University Press, 1946.)

(8) Freud, S. *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.*

(9) —— *The Ego and the Id.*

(10) Greenson, R. 'The Struggle Against Identification', *J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assoc.*, **2,** 200, 1954.

(11) Grinker, R. R. *Psychosomatic Research* (New York: Norton, 1953.)

(12) —— 'The Effect of Infantile Disease on Ego Patterns', *Amer. Journ. Psych.*, **110,** 290, 1953.

(13) —— 'Growth, Inertia and Shame', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **36,** 1, 1955.

(14) Jacobson, E. 'Contributions to the Metapsychology of Psychotic Identifications', *J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assoc.*, **2,** 239, 1954.

(15) Moreno, J. L. 'The Discovery of the Spontaneous Man with Special Emphasis upon the Technique of Role Reversal', *Group Psychotherapy*, **8,** 103, 1955.

(16) Parsons, T., and Bales, R. F. *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process.* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955.)

(17) Piaget, J. *Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood.* (New York: Norton, 1951.)

(18) Piers, G. *Shame and Guilt.* (Springfield: Thomas, 1954.)

(19) Rapoport, D. *Organization and Pathology of Thought* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951.)

(20) Spiegel, J. P. In.: *Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behaviour* (ed.: R. R. Grinker; New York: Basic Books, 1956).

(21) Spitz, R. 'The Primal Cavity', *Psychoanal. Study of Child*, **10,** 215, 1955.

(22) Stunkard, H. W. 'Freedom, Bondage and the Welfare State', *Science*, **121,** 811, 1955.

(23) Tinbergen, N. *The Study of Instincts.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951.)

(Received 4 June, 1956)

NOTES ON SYMBOL FORMATION[1]

By

HANNA SEGAL, London

The understanding and interpretation of unconscious symbolism is one of the main tools of the psychologist. Often he is faced with the task of understanding and recognizing the meaning not only of a particular symbol but also of the whole process of symbol formation. This applies particularly to work with patients who show a disturbance or inhibition in the formation or free use of symbols, as for instance, psychotic or schizoid patients.

To give a very elementary example from two patients. One—whom I will call A—was a schizophrenic in a mental hospital. He was once asked by his doctor why it was that since his illness he had stopped playing the violin. He replied with some violence: 'Why? do you expect me to masturbate in public?'

Another patient, B, dreamt one night that he and a young girl were playing a violin duet. He had associations to fiddling, masturbating, etc., from which it emerged clearly that the violin represented his genital and playing the violin represented a masturbation phantasy of a relation with the girl.

Here then are two patients who apparently use the same symbols in the same situation—a violin representing the male genital, and playing the violin representing masturbation. The way in which the symbols function, however, is very different. For A, the violin had become so completely equated with his genital that to touch it in public became impossible. For B, playing the violin in his waking life was an important sublimation. We might say that the main difference between them is that for A the symbolic meaning of the violin was conscious, for B unconscious. I do not think, however, that this was the most important difference between the two patients. In the case of B, the fact that the meaning of the dream became completely conscious had in no way prevented him from using his violin. In A, on the other hand, there were many symbols operating in his unconscious in the same way in which the violin was used on the conscious level.

Taking another example—this time from a schizophrenic patient in an analytical situation: One session, in the first weeks of his analysis, he came in blushing and giggling, and throughout the session would not talk to me. Subsequently we found out that previous to this hour he had been attending an occupational therapy class in which he was doing carpentry, making a stool. The reason for his silence, blushing, and giggling was that he could not bring himself to talk to me about the work he was doing. For him, the wooden stool on which he was working, the word 'stool' which he would have to use in connexion with it, and the stool he passed in the lavatory were so completely felt as one and the same thing that he was unable to talk to me about it. His subsequent analysis revealed that this equation of the three 'stools', the word, the chair, and the faeces, was at the time completely unconscious. All he was consciously aware of was that he was embarrassed and could not talk to me.

The main difference between the first and second patient quoted in their use of the violin as the symbol for the male genital was not that in the one case the symbol was conscious and in the other unconscious, but that in the first case it was felt to *be* the genital, and in the second to *represent* it.

According to Ernest Jones's (2) definition, the violin of A, the schizophrenic, would be considered a symbol. Similarly in the dream of B. But it would not be a symbol in B's waking life when it was used in sublimation.

In his paper written in 1916 (2), Jones differentiated unconscious symbolism from other forms of 'indirect representation', and made the following statements about true unconscious symbolism:

[1] Paper read at the meeting of the Medical Section, the British Psychological Society, in May 1955, based on an earlier paper presented at a Symposium on Symbolism at St. Anne's House, London, in November 1954.

(i) A symbol represents what has been repressed from consciousness, and the whole process of symbolization is carried on unconsciously.
(ii) All symbols represent ideas of ' the self and of immediate blood relations and of the phenomena of birth, life and death '.
(iii) A symbol has a constant meaning. Many symbols can be used to represent the same repressed idea, but a given symbol has a constant meaning which is universal.
(iv) Symbolism arises as the result of intrapsychic conflict between the ' repressing tendencies and the repressed '. Further: ' Only what is repressed is symbolized; only what is repressed needs to be symbolized '.

He further distinguishes between sublimation and symbolization. ' Symbols,' he says, ' arise when the affect investing the symbolized idea has not, as far as the symbol is concerned, proved capable of that modification in quality which is denoted by the term sublimation.'

Summarizing Jones's points, one might say that when a desire has to be given up because of conflict and repressed, it may express itself in a symbolical way, and the object of the desire which had to be given up can be replaced by a symbol.

Further analytical work, and particularly play analysis with young children, has fully confirmed some main points of Jones's formulation. The child's first interests and impulses are directed to his parents' bodies and his own, and it is those objects and impulses existing in the unconscious which give rise to all further interests by way of symbolization. Jones's statement, however, that symbols are formed where there is no sublimation soon gave rise to disagreement. In fact, Jones himself as well as Freud wrote many interesting papers analysing the content of works of art. In 1923, in her paper on infant analysis (3), Melanie Klein did not agree with this view on the relation between symbolization and sublimation. She tried to show that children's play—a sublimated activity—is a symbolic expression of anxieties and wishes.

We might consider it as a question of terminology, and accept Jones's view that we should call symbols only those substitutes which replace the object without any change of affect. On the other hand, there are very great advantages in extending the definition to cover symbols used in sublimation. In the first place the wider definition corresponds better to common linguistic usage. Jones's concept excludes most of that which is called ' symbol ' in other sciences and in everyday language. Secondly, and I shall elaborate this point later, there seems to be a continuous development from the primitive symbols as described by Jones to the symbols used in self-expression, communication, discovery, creation, etc. Thirdly, it is difficult to establish a connexion between the early primitive desires and processes in the mind and the later development of the individual, unless the wider concept of symbolism is admitted. In the analytical view, the child's interest in the external world is determined by a series of displacements of affect and interests from the earliest to ever new objects. And, indeed, how could such a displacement be achieved otherwise than by way of symbolization?

In 1930, Melanie Klein (3) raised the problem of inhibition in symbol formation. She described an autistic little boy of four, Dick, who could not talk or play; he showed no affection or anxiety, and took no interest in his surroundings apart from door-handles, stations, and trains, which seemed to fascinate him. His analysis revealed that the child was terrified of his aggression towards his mother's body, and of her body which he felt had turned bad because of his attacks on it; because of the strength of his anxieties he had erected powerful defences against his phantasies about her. There resulted a paralysis of his phantasy life and of symbol formation. He had not endowed the world around him with any symbolic meaning and therefore took no interest in it. Melanie Klein came to the conclusion that if symbolization does not occur, the whole development of the ego is arrested.

If we accept this view it follows that the processes of symbolization require a new and more careful study. To begin with, I find it helpful, following C. Morris (4), to consider symbolizing as a *three*-term relation, i.e. a relation between the thing symbolized, the thing functioning as a symbol, and a *person* for whom the one represents the other. In psychological terms, symbolism would be a relation between the ego, the object, and the symbol.

Symbol formation is an activity of the ego attempting to deal with the anxieties stirred by its relation to the object. That is primarily the fear of bad objects and the fear of the loss or inaccessibility of good objects. Disturbances in the ego's relation to objects are reflected in

disturbances of symbol formation. In particular, disturbances in differentiation between ego and object lead to disturbances in differentiation between the symbol and the object symbolized and therefore to concrete thinking characteristic of psychoses.

Symbol formation starts very early, probably as early as object relations, but changes its character and functions with the changes in the character of the ego and object relations. Not only the actual content of the symbol, but the very way in which symbols are formed and used seem to me to reflect very precisely the ego's state of development and its way of dealing with its objects. If symbolism is seen as a three-term relation, problems of symbol formation must always be examined in the context of the ego's relation with its objects.

I shall try to describe briefly some basic attitudes of the ego to the objects, and the way in which I think they influence the processes of symbol formation and the functioning of symbolism. My description is based here on Melanie Klein's (3) concept of the paranoid schizoid position and of the depressive position. According to her, the oral stage of development falls into two phases, the earlier being the point of fixation of the schizophrenic group of illnesses, the later that of the manic-depressive. In my description, which will of necessity be very schematic, I shall select only those points which are directly relevant to the problem of symbol formation.

The chief characteristics of the infant's first object relations are the following. The object is seen as split into an ideally good and a wholly bad one. The aim of the ego is total union with the ideal object and total annihilation of the bad one, as well as of the bad parts of the self. Omnipotent thinking is paramount and reality sense intermittent and precarious. The concept of absence hardly exists. Whenever the state of union with the ideal object is not fulfilled, what is experienced is not absence; the ego feels assailed by the counterpart of the good object—the bad object, or objects. It is the time of the hallucinatory wish-fulfilment, described by Freud, when the thought creates objects which are then felt to be available. According to Melanie Klein, it is also the time of the bad hallucinosis when, if the ideal conditions are not fulfilled, the bad object is equally hallucinated and felt as real.

A leading defence mechanism in this phase is projective identification. In projective identification, the subject in phantasy projects large parts of himself into the object, and the object becomes identified with the parts of the self that it is felt to contain. Similarly, internal objects are projected outside and identified with parts of the external world which come to represent them. These first projections and identifications are the beginning of the process of symbol formation.

The early symbols, however, are not felt by the ego to be symbols or substitutes, but to be the original object itself. They are so different from symbols formed later that I think they deserve a name of their own. In my paper of 1950 (7) I suggested the term ' equation '. This word, however, differentiates them too much from the word ' symbol ' and I would like to alter it here to ' symbolic equation '.

The symbolic equation between the original object and the symbol in the internal and the external world is, I think, the basis of the schizophrenic's concrete thinking where substitutes for the original objects, or parts of the self, can be used quite freely, but, as in the two examples of schizophrenic patients which I quoted, they are hardly different from the original object: they are felt and treated as though they were *identical* with it. This non-differentiation between the thing symbolized and the symbol is part of a disturbance in the relation between the ego and the object. Parts of the ego and internal objects are projected into an object and identified with it. The differentiation between the self and the object is obscured. Then, since a part of the ego is confused with the object, the symbol—which is a creation and a function of the ego—becomes, in turn, confused with the object which is symbolized.

Where such symbolic equations are formed in relation to bad objects, an attempt is made to deal with them as with the original object, that is by total annihilation and scotomization. In Melanie Klein's paper quoted above (3), it seemed as though Dick had formed no symbolic relations to the external world. The paper was written very early on in Dick's analysis, and I wonder, on the basis of my own experience with schizophrenics, whether it did not, perhaps, subsequently transpire that Dick had formed numerous symbolic equations in the external world. If so, then these would have carried the full anxiety experienced in relation to the original persecutory or guilt-producing object: his mother's body, so that he had had to deal with them by annihilation, that is by total withdrawal of interest. Some of the symbols which

he had formed as his analysis progressed, and he started to show an interest in certain objects in the consulting room, seemed to have had the characteristics of such symbolic equations. For instance, when he saw some pencil shavings he said: 'Poor Mrs. Klein'. To him the shavings were Mrs. Klein cut into bits.

This was the case in the analysis of my patient Edward (7). At one stage in the analysis a certain degree of symbol formation on a symbolic equation basis had occurred, so that some anxiety was displaced from the person of his analyst, felt as a bad internal object, on to substitutes in the external world. Thereupon the numerous persecutors in the external world were dealt with by scotomization. That phase of his analysis, which lasted several months, was characterized by an extreme narrowing of his interests in the external world. At that point also his vocabulary became very poor. He forbade himself and me the use of many words which he felt had the power to produce hallucinations and therefore had to be abolished. This is strikingly similar to the behaviour of a Paraguayan tribe, the Abipones, who cannot tolerate anything that reminds them of the dead. When a member of the tribe dies, all words having any affinity with the names of the deceased are immediately dropped from the vocabulary. In consequence, their language is most difficult to learn, as it is full of blocks and neologisms replacing forbidden words.

The development of the ego and the changes in the ego's relation to its objects are gradual, and so is the change from the early symbols, which I called symbolic equations, to the fully formed symbols in the depressive position. It is therefore only for the sake of clarity that I shall make here a very sharp differentiation between the ego's relations in the paranoid-schizoid position and in the depressive position respectively, and an equally sharp differentiation between the symbolic equations and the symbols which are formed during and after the depressive position.

When the depressive position has been reached, the main characteristic of object relation is that the object is felt as a whole object. In connexion with this there is a greater degree of awareness and differentiation of the separateness between the ego and the object. At the same time, since the object is recognized as a whole, ambivalence is more fully experienced. The ego in this phase is struggling with its ambivalence and its relation to the object is characterized by guilt, fear of loss or actual experience of loss and mourning, and a striving to re-create the object. At the same time, processes of introjection become more pronounced than those of projection, in keeping with the striving to retain the object inside as well as to repair, restore and re-create it.

In favourable circumstances of normal development, after repeated experiences of loss, recovery, and re-creation, a good object is securely established in the ego. Three changes in relation to the object, as the ego develops and integrates, affect fundamentally the ego's reality sense. With an increased awareness of ambivalence, the lessening of the intensity of projection, and the growing differentiation between the self and the object, there is a growing sense of reality both internal and external. The internal world becomes differentiated from the external world. Omnipotent thinking, characteristic of the earlier phase, gradually gives way to more realistic thinking. Simultaneously, and as part of the same process, there is a certain modification of the primary instinctual aims. Earlier on, the aim was to possess the object totally if felt as good, or to annihilate it totally if felt as bad. With the recognition that the good and the bad objects are one, both these instinctual aims are gradually modified. The ego is increasingly concerned with saving the object from its aggression and possessiveness. And this implies a certain degree of inhibition of the direct instinctual aims, both aggressive and libidinal.

This situation is a powerful stimulus for the creation of symbols, and symbols acquire new functions which change their character. The symbol is needed to displace aggression from the original object, and in that way to lessen the guilt and the fear of loss. The symbol is here not an equivalent of the original object, since the aim of the displacement is to save the object, and the guilt experienced in relation to it is far less than that due to an attack on the original object. The symbols are also created in the *internal* world as a means of restoring, re-creating, recapturing and owning again the original object. But in keeping with the increased reality sense, they are now felt as created by the ego and therefore never completely equated with the original object.

Freud (1) postulates that a modification of instinctual aims is the basic pre-condition of sublimation. In my view the formation of symbols in the depressive position necessitates

some inhibition of direct instinctual aims in relation to the original object and therefore the symbols become available for sublimation. The symbols, created internally, can then be re-projected into the external world, endowing it with symbolic meaning.

The capacity to experience loss and the wish to re-create the object within oneself gives the individual the unconscious freedom in the use of symbols. And as the symbol is acknowledged as a creation of the subject, unlike the symbolic equation, it can be freely used by the subject.

When a substitute in the external world is used as a symbol it may be used more freely than the original object, since it is not fully identified with it. Insofar, however, as it is distinguished from the original object it is also recognized as an object in itself. Its own properties are recognized, respected, and used, because no confusion with the original object blurs the characteristics of the new object used as a symbol.

In an analysis we can sometimes follow very clearly the changes in the symbolic relations in the patient's attitude to his faeces. On the schizoid level the patient expects his faeces to be the ideal breast; if he cannot maintain this idealization his faeces become persecutory, they are ejected as a bitten-up, destroyed and persecuting breast. If the patient tries to symbolize his faeces in the external world the symbols in the external world are felt to be faeces—persecutors. No sublimation of anal activities can occur under these conditions.

On the depressive level, the feeling is that the introjected breast has been destroyed by the ego and can be re-created by the ego. The faeces may then be felt as something created by the ego out of the object and can be valued as a symbol of the breast and at the same time as a good product of the ego's own creativity.

When this symbolic relation to faeces and other body products has been established a projection can occur on to substances in the external world such as paint, plasticine, clay, etc., which can then be used for sublimation.

When this stage of development has been achieved, it is of course not irreversible. If the anxieties are too strong, a regression to a paranoid-schizoid position can occur at any stage of the individual's development and projective identification may be resorted to as a defence against anxiety. Then symbols which have been developed and have been functioning as symbols in sublimation, revert to concrete symbolic equations. This is mainly due to the fact that in massive projective identification the ego becomes again confused with the object, the symbol becomes confused with the thing symbolized and therefore turns into an equation.

In the example of the schizophrenic patient A quoted at the beginning of this paper, there was a breakdown of an already established sublimation. Prior to his schizophrenic breakdown, the violin had been functioning as a symbol and used for purposes of sublimation. It had only become concretely equated to the penis at the time of his illness. Words which had certainly developed at the time when the ego is relatively mature, become equated with the objects that they should represent, and become experienced as concrete objects when projective identification occurs with the resulting confusion between the symbols created by the ego: the word, or even the thought, and the object that they were to symbolize.

I should like at this point to summarize what I mean by the terms ' symbolic equation ' and ' symbol ' respectively, and the conditions under which they arise. In the symbolic equation, the symbol-substitute is felt to *be* the original object. The substitute's own properties are not recognized or admitted. The symbolic equation is used to deny the absence of the ideal object, or to control a persecuting one. It belongs to the earliest stages of development.

The symbol proper, available for sublimation and furthering the development of the ego, is felt to *represent* the object; its own characteristics are recognized, respected, and used. It arises when depressive feelings predominate over the paranoid-schizoid ones, when separation from the object, ambivalence, guilt, and loss can be experienced and tolerated. The symbol is used not to deny but to overcome loss. When the mechanism of projective identification is used as a defence against depressive anxieties, symbols already formed and functioning as symbols may revert to symbolic equations.

Symbol formation governs the capacity to communicate, since all communication is made by means of symbols. When schizoid disturbances in object relations occur, the capacity to communicate is similarly disturbed: first because the differentiation between the subject and the object is blurred, secondly because the *means* of communication are lacking since symbols are felt in a concrete fashion and are therefore unavailable for purposes of communication. One of the ever-recurring difficulties in the analysis of psychotic patients is this difficulty of

communication. Words, for instance, whether the analyst's or the patient's, are felt to be objects or actions, and cannot be easily used for purposes of communication.

Symbols are needed not only in communication with the external world, but also in internal communication. Indeed, it could be asked what is meant when we speak of people being well in touch with their unconscious. It is not that they have consciously primitive phantasies, like those which become evident in their analyses, but merely that they have some awareness of their own impulses and feelings. However, I think that we mean more than this; we mean that they have actual *communication* with their unconscious phantasies. And this, like any other form of communication, can only be done with the help of symbols. So that in people who are ' well in touch with themselves ' there is a constant free symbol-formation, whereby they can be consciously aware and in control of *symbolic expressions* of the underlying primitive phantasies. The difficulty of dealing with schizophrenic and schizoid patients lies not only in that they cannot communicate with us, but even more in that they cannot communicate with themselves. Any part of their ego may be split off from any other part with no communication available between them.

The capacity to communicate with oneself by using symbols is, I think, the basis of verbal thinking—which is the capacity to communicate with oneself by means of words. Not all internal communication is verbal thinking, but all verbal thinking is an internal communication by means of symbols—words.

An important aspect of internal communication is the integration of earlier desires, anxieties, and phantasies into the later stages of development by symbolization. For instance, in the fully developed genital function, all the earlier aims—anal, urethral, oral—may by symbolically expressed and fulfilled, a point beautifully described in Ferenczi's *Thalassa*.

And this takes me to the last point of my paper. I think that one of the important tasks performed by the ego in the depressive position is that of dealing not with depressive anxieties alone, but also with unresolved earlier conflicts. A new achievement belonging to the depressive position; the capacity to symbolize and in that way to lessen anxiety and resolve conflict, is used in order to deal with the *earlier* unresolved conflicts by symbolizing them. Anxieties, which could not be dealt with earlier on, because of the extreme concreteness of the experience with the object and the object-substitutes in symbolic equations, can gradually be dealt with by the more integrated ego by symbolization, and in that way they can be integrated. In the depressive position and later, symbols are formed not only of the whole destroyed and re-created object characteristic of the depressive position, but also of the split object—extremely good and extremely bad—and not only of the whole object but also of part-objects. Some of the paranoid and ideal object relations and anxieties may be symbolized as part of the integrative process in the depressive position.

The fairy tale is an example in point. It deals basically with the witch and the fairy godmother, Prince Charming, the ogre, etc., and has in it a great deal of schizophrenic content. It is, however, a highly integrated product, an artistic creation which very fully symbolizes the child's early anxieties and wishes. I should like to illustrate the function of the fairy tale by some material from the analysis of an adolescent schizophrenic. This girl had been hallucinated and openly schizophrenic since the age of four. She had, however, a great many depressive features and there were in her life phases of relatively greater integration. In these phases, when she felt less persecuted, and, as she told me, could experience some longing for her parents, she used to write fairy tales. In the bad phases, the bad figures of her fairy tales came to life and persecuted her. One day, after many weeks of silence, when she was obviously hallucinated in a very persecutory way she suddenly turned round to me and asked with great fear ' What are the Lancashire witches?' I had never heard of the Lancashire witches, she had never mentioned them before, but I knew that she herself came from Lancashire. After some interpretations she told me that when she was about 11 (she had at that time actually a whole year free of hallucinations), she had written a fairy tale about Lancashire witches. The phase of her analysis following this session has been very revealing. It turned out that the Lancashire witches represented both herself and her mother. The anxiety situation went right back to early childhood, when she saw herself and her mother as devouring one another or devouring father. When a greater degree of integration was achieved and she established a more realistic relation to her parents, the earlier situation was dealt with by symbol formation: by writing the fairy tale about the Lancashire witches. In the

subsequent deterioration of her health, the early persecutory situation recurred with concrete intensity but in a new form. The fairy tale come to life: the Lancashire witches—the fairy-tale figures which she had created, had become a concrete external reality. In the consulting room it was quite clear how this concretization of the fairy tale depended on projective identification. She turned to me and asked me about the Lancashire witches. She expected me to know who they were. In fact, she thought that I was a Lancashire witch. She had unconsciously phantasied that she had put into me the part of herself which had invented the Lancashire witches, and she had lost contact with this part. She lost all sense of reality in this projection and all memory that she had created this symbol, the 'Lancashire witches'. Her symbol became confused with me, an actual external object, and so became for her a concrete external reality—I had turned into a Lancashire witch.

The way in which the maturing ego, in the process of working through the depressive position, deals with the early object relations, is of paramount importance. Some integration and whole object relations can be achieved in the depressive position, accompanied by the splitting off of earlier ego experiences. In this situation, something like a pocket of schizophrenia exists isolated in the ego and is a constant threat to stability. At worst, a mental breakdown occurs and earlier anxieties and split-off symbolic equations invade the ego. At best, a relatively mature but restricted ego can develop and function.

However, if the ego in the depressive position is strong enough and capable of dealing with anxieties, much more of the earlier situations can be integrated into the ego and dealt with by way of symbolization, enriching the ego with the whole wealth of the earlier experiences.

The word 'symbol' comes from the Greek term for throwing together, bringing together, integrating. The process of symbol formation is, I think, a continuous process of bringing together and integrating the internal with the external, the subject with the object, and the earlier experiences with the later ones.

REFERENCES

(1) FREUD, S. *The Ego and the Id.*

(2) JONES, ERNEST (1916). 'The Theory of Symbolism.' *Papers on Psycho-Analysis.*

(3) KLEIN, MELANIE (1930). 'On the Importance of Symbol Formation in the Development of the Ego.' *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, 1921–45.*

(4) MORRIS, C. 'Foundations of the Theory of Signs.' *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, **2.**

*(5) RODRIGUEZ, E. 'Notes on Symbolism.' *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **37.**

(6) *RYCROFT, C. 'Symbolism and its Relation to Primary and Secondary Processes.' *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **37.**

(7) SEGAL, H. (1950). 'Some Aspects of the Analysis of a Schizophrenic.' *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **31.**

(8) —— (1952). 'A Psycho-Analytic Contribution to Aesthetics.' *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **33.**

(9) —— (1955). 'Depression in the Schizophrenic.' *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **36.**

(Received 30 November, 1955.)

* No reference is made in this paper to these two contributions, as the three papers were written and read almost concurrently.

THE AWARDING OF A PENIS AS COMPENSATION FOR RAPE

A DEMONSTRATION OF THE CLINICAL RELEVANCE OF THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC STUDY OF CULTURAL DATA

By

GEORGE DEVEREUX, PH.D., NEW YORK, N.Y.

It is proposed to discuss a previously unreported infantile-mythological theory of the female penis fantasy.

The Lapiths were a legendary horse-taming tribe, whose epic combat with the Centaurs is frequently mentioned in Greek literature, especially in connection with the legend of Theseus.

One of the most important Lapith chiefs was Kaineus, who—like Teiresias—had once also been a woman, at which time he bore the name of Kainis, which is the feminine form of Kaineus. Kainis was raped by Poseidon, who then offered to make restitution for this act by granting any request which she cared to make. Kainis chose to ask that she might be changed into a man and made invulnerable, so that no one might again be able to rape her. Her wish was granted and she became the man Kaineus.

The chieftain Kaineus, however, became noted for his impiety. He refused to worship anything except his spear.

Zeus, incensed by such impiety, incited the Centaurs to assault Kaineus during the battle which erupted at Peirithous' wedding, after a Centaur almost *raped* the bride. They had to kill invulnerable Kaineus by hitting him on the head with fir logs, driving him into the ground like a stake and then piling the logs on top of him until Kaineus suffocated. A sandy winged bird—identified by Mopsus as Kaineus' soul—then flew away from the pile of logs. When Kaineus' corpse was about to be buried, it was found that it was that of a woman. This suggests that—like some primitive 'kings'—Kaineus was a woman in disguise; a hypothesis possibly strengthened by the fact that Kaineus was one of the Argonauts—a group which also included one other masculine female: Atalanta of Calydon, whose father had wanted a son and not a daughter. The hammering of Kaineus into the ground suggests the well-known equation: body = phallus, as well as the equation: girl = phallus (12).

Professor Rose, an eminent classical scholar, suggests that this spear-worship may represent some local Thessalian aniconic cult (18). This comment does not preclude the possibility of offering also a psycho-analytic interpretation of Kainis' story and subsequent conduct.

The notion that woman 'acquires' a penis through having intercourse is not new and has been previously reported in the literature. By contrast, we know of no report of the fantasy that a woman may acquire a penis to *compensate* her for having been raped, deflowered, and penetrated by a father figure; three acts which easily arouse anxiety.[1] In this particular instance the raped girl also asks for specific protection against further penetration and re-feminization (re-castration) by becoming invulnerable. There remains, of course, the possible resurgence of passive-submissive feminine wishes, which may find expression in the male by means of passive homosexual impulses. Kainis' explicitly phallic position—the exclusive and impious worship of her own spear = penis—may be interpreted as a defence against possible passive-homosexual urges.

The worship of her spear, and Kainis = Kaineus' 'impiety' alike also reflect the urge to retaliate. After having been 'wounded' and penetrated, 'he' worships only 'his' spear—a weapon exclusively intended for piercing the foe. (The sword is described in the *Iliad* chiefly as a cutting, rather than as a piercing, weapon.) Directly related to his urge is an obvious 'identification with the enemy'. The pierced girl becomes the piercing warrior; the person subjected to violence begins to inflict violence upon others.

[1] Defloration anxiety was discussed in detail by Freud (13), Yates (19) and Devereux (5). Penetration anxiety—the anxiety about being pierced—was described by Bonaparte (2).

The identification with the enemy is also made explicit by the specification that Kaineus was noted for his impiety—his refusal to worship the Gods. It does not appear too far-fetched to suggest that the Gods lost something of their glamour and majesty for a girl who was raped by one of them. This interpretation, however, is far from complete. The violence, injustice, and exploitiveness of the Greek Gods did not prevent the Greeks from worshipping them. Being Gods (parents), they had the right to do as they pleased (8), without being accountable to mere mortals—children.

What seems to account for Kainis = Kaineus' impiety is, we suspect, not her rape, but the fact that she had consorted with a God sexually—i.e. in a manner incompatible with the normal relationship obtaining between child and adult. Throughout Greek mythology, we note that persons who cohabited with the Gods were either elevated to a near-divine status, or else enjoyed near-divine privileges . . . or discomforts; witness, for the latter, Hera's extraordinary jealousy of, and hostility toward, Zeus' paramour, Io. A similarly privileged status is also assigned to mortals who have one divine parent, who, *inter alia*, is in a position to intercede for them, as Achilles' mother intercedes for him with Zeus in the *Iliad*. The privileged position of such *theogenitoi* is repeatedly referred to, e.g., in the *Iliad*. Agamemnon feels that Achilles can 'get away' with things, because his mother is a goddess. Odysseus and Diomedes ridicule the Trojan spy Dolon's presumption in believing that, even if the Trojans won and, as Hector promised, rewarded him for his share in such a hypothetical victory by giving him Achilles' horses, he could actually drive these horses, which only a person of divine ancestry like Achilles can do.

We are therefore inclined to suggest that the avoidance of incest has, on the side of the parents, an additional strong motivation in the realization that a child who cohabits with his or her parent is thereby placed in a position of near-equality, and would cease to be submissive and obedient (as Kainis = Kaineus became impious —*pietas* meaning dutifulness) and challenge parental authority, by identifying with them. There is even clinical evidence to support this view. Bender and Blau (1) found that children who cohabit with adults acquire an altogether premature poise.

We also believe that this myth casts some light upon the nature of narcissism and of regression from the oedipal to the phallic stage. We note that Kaineus worshipped only his spear = phallus. It is permissible to suggest that, in this instance, Kaineus' worshipping of his spear presupposes a kind of splitting off of the phallus from the total body image, and its quasi-animistic personification, which should not be confused with Greenacre's concept of 'phallic awe'.(15) In this context it is of some interest that the writer concluded, on the basis of Mohave Indian data only (3), that in early masturbatory activities the penis is experienced and manipulated as though it were a 'foreign body'. It is possible to offer a dynamic interpretation of this manner of experiencing the phallus, at the time when diffuse and polymorphous sexuality becomes more concentrated and more localized in the genitalia. In this connexion it is significant that, according to an extremely ticklish patient, all his ticklishness disappears once his penis becomes erect. 'It is as though all skin-sensitiveness became concentrated in the penis; diffuse and moderate ticklishness being transformed into highly localized and extremely intense sexual sensations.' This patient subsequently remarked that his whole penis, and not just the glans, was highly sensitive—in fact, he suspected that circumcision had made his glans slightly less sensitive than it would have been otherwise, and felt that this explained the fact that his entire penis was about equally sensitive everywhere. He also evolved the view that the decreased sensitiveness of the circumcised glans led to a prolongation of coitus, and concluded that the true beneficiary of circumcision practices was the woman. This view may be related to Nunberg's (17) supposition that circumcisers are women. (Compare the obscure passage in the Old Testament, which seems to imply that Moses was circumcised by his wife and the legend that castration was invented by Semiramis.)

If the inference that, at the phallic stage, the erect penis is experienced as a 'foreign body' is correct, a new 'dimension' may be added to Greenacre's well-known view that the belatedness of the discovery of the female genitalia is due to the fact that, unlike the penis, they can not be seen (14). Our hypothesis introduces the supplementary view that, precisely because the penis is a kind of 'limb', its sensations tend to be more localized and, when they first occur in an intense form, are more easily experienced as 'extraneous' to the body than are the erotic sensations of the internal female genitalia, whose

excitement is more likely to be ' echoed ' by the entire body.

This inference leads us back—somewhat circuitously—to the problem of Kaineus = Kainis' identification with the enemy, i.e. with Poseidon, in the sense that ' his ' spear represents not only ' his ' own phallus, but also the phallus of Poseidon, i.e. the self-same phallus which had raped, deflowered, and penetrated her. Thus, in the very act of seemingly rejecting this violent phallus, Kainis = Kaineus appropriates it and worships it. This view is entirely compatible with Freud's thesis that in attempted rape part of the woman's self is on the side of the rapist. It leads one to suspect that, at least in some cases of ' penis awe ', the phallus which inspires awe is viewed and ' experienced ' narcissistically, as a split-off part of the woman's own body image, to which it ' belongs ' by identification with the sexual partner, and by its incorporation *via* the vagina. This ' oralization of the vagina ' is the counterpart of the ' vaginalization of the mouth and of the anus ' which we described elsewhere (6). The ' reintegration ' of this ' acquired penis ' into the girl's body image may, in turn, be responsible—partly at least—for the unconscious equation ' girl = phallus ' discussed by Fenichel (12).

Methodological Postscript

Needless to say, there exists no reason for assuming that Kainis = Kaineus was a real person, or that, if she was a real person, her reported experiences and attitudes are authentic ones. We simply imply that myths frequently represent the projection of ego-dystonic insights, which are at once too powerful to be repressed and too painful to be applied to oneself. The ' mythopoeic position ' appears to be the following: ' This is the truth, but it happened not to me, but to someone else; it applies not to me, but to someone else.' Such inventions are accepted by the listeners, and are transmitted to future generations because the listener's unconscious echoes the latent content of the myth (4) while the manifest content of the myth—the fact that it *is* a myth—enables the listener *not* to apply the insight to himself.

It is extremely likely that many hitherto unformulated psycho-analytic facts may ultimately be derived from the study of myths, beliefs, and the like; such facts seldom if ever make an appearance in the psycho-analytic chamber, precisely because culture, in providing myths or beliefs for the ' cold storage ' of certain fantasies and insights, keeps them out of ' private circulation '. This view is quite in accordance with the thesis proposed elsewhere (11) that culture provides a set of standard defences against, and solutions for, 'type-conflicts ' characteristic of a given cultural milieu.

Early psycho-analytic studies of mythology and folklore had as their purpose the demonstration of the presence of fantasies and mechanisms, discovered in the course of psycho-analytic therapy, also in man's cultural productions and endeavours. It is our belief that the time has come for a new orientation in the psycho-analytic study of culture, including mythology: it is suggested that the study of cultural phenomena, *in terms of the most strictly classical psycho-analytic frame of reference*,[2] is certain to yield new types of unconscious fantasies and other therapeutically relevant insights which—once recognized in their cultural form and setting—can then be more easily identified in, and verified by means of, clinical data (10). Thus, a series of new fantasies were derived from a strictly classical psycho-analytic study of various sets of cultural data (e.g. 5, 7, 9) some of which have subsequently been identified in clinical contexts too by other workers (16). In brief, we feel that the psycho-analytic exploration of *cultural material* will, in the long run, appreciably broaden and expand also our *clinical* horizons. Were it otherwise, the great clinician Freud would not have wasted his time on writing books and papers on problems of society and culture.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(1) Bender, L., and Blau, A. ' Reaction of Children to Sexual Relations with Adults.' *Am. J. Orthopsychiatry*, 7, 1937.

(2) Bonaparte, Marie. *Female Sexuality*. (New York: Int. Univ. Press, 1953.)

[2] This specification is of the utmost importance. The entire so-called ' culturalist orientation ' of the ' neo-Freudians ' is unsatisfactory both anthropologically and psycho-analytically. The ' neo-Freudian ' thesis that the data and the frame of reference of anthropology ' require ' a modification of the classical psycho-analytic frame of reference is fallacious and simply shows that the ' culturalist neo-Freudian ' has no *real* grasp of the problems of culture and anthropology . . . problems which can best be solved by means of the classical psycho-analytic frame of reference.

(3) DEVEREUX, G. *Mohave Field Notes*, 1932–1933 (MS.).

(4) —— ' Mohave Coyote Tales.' *J. Am. Folklore*, **61,** 1948.

(5) —— ' The Psychology of Feminine Genital Bleeding.' *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **31,** 1950.

(6) —— ' Cultural and Characterological Traits of the Mohave Related to the Anal Stage of Psychosexual Development.' *Psychoanal. Quart.*, **20,** 1951.

(7) —— ' Why Oedipus Killed Laius.' *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **34,** 1953.

(8) —— ' Charismatic Leadership and Crisis ' (in) Muensterberger, Warner (ed.). *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences* IV. (New York: Int. Univ. Press, 1955.)

(9) —— *A Study of Abortion in Primitive Societies.* (New York: Julian Press, 1955.)

(10) —— ' Anthropological Data Suggesting Unexplored Unconscious Attitudes toward and in Unwed Mothers.' *Arch. Criminal Psychodynamics*, **1,** 1955.

(11) —— ' Normal and Abnormal: The Key Problem of Psychiatric Anthropology ' (in) *Some Uses of Anthropology: Theoretical and Applied.* (Washington, D.C.: Anthropological Soc. of Washington, 1956.)

(12) FENICHEL, O. ' The Symbolic Equation: Girl = Phallus.' *Coll. Papers*, **2.** (New York: Norton, 1954; London: Routledge.)

(13) FREUD, S. ' The Taboo of Virginity.' *Coll. Papers*, **4.**

(14) GREENACRE, PHYLLIS. *Trauma, Growth, and Personality.* (New York: Norton, 1952.)

(15) —— ' Penis Awe and its Relation to Penis Envy ' (in) Loewenstein, R. M. (ed.): *Drives, Affects, Behavior.* (New York: Int. Univ. Press, 1953.)

(16) HEIMAN, M. ' Psychosocial Influences in Functional Uterine Bleeding.' *Obstetrics and Gynecology*, **7,** 1956.

(17) NUNBERG, HERMAN. ' Circumcision and Problems of Bisexuality.' *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **28,** 1948.

(18) ROSE, H. J. *A Handbook of Greek Mythology.* (London: Methuen, 1929.)

(19) YATES, S. L. ' An Investigation of the Psychological Factors in Virginity and Ritual Defloration.' *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **11,** 1930.

THE TIBETAN LAMAIST RITUAL: CHÖD

By

JACQUES SCHNIER,[1] San Francisco

Our ever-growing knowledge of id-processes and ego-psychology discloses that the highest achievements of the human mind result from strivings for mastery of unconscious impulses. Among these achievements, such as art, philosophy and religion, there are to be found the same attempts at a solution of inner conflicts and appeasement of urgent drives as are found in those valueless patterns we refer to as hysterical or obsessional behaviour. Even outwardly, there is a marked resemblance between certain features of these social and non-social patterns. In *Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices* (1907) Freud examined and elucidated the similarities for at least these two specific patterns of behaviour.

In the obsessional neurosis, the ceremonial of the person concerned is the most tangible aspect upon which psycho-analytic work can be focused. The results of this work provide us with invaluable information regarding the mental process of which the strange and unprofitable behaviour is the outcome. Because ritual is so much like the ceremonial of the obsessional neurosis, Theodor Reik (10) took it as the starting-point for his analysis of religion. By means of this analysis he endeavoured to expose in a detailed manner the motives which led to the origin of a number of ritualistic religious patterns and to disclose the paths and transformations taken in their development. In his investigation he found it profitable to focus attention on the characteristic feature of action in ritual rather than the commands, prohibitions, dogmas, and complicated sentiment which later become religion's chief contents.

With a similar point of view in mind I have undertaken to investigate the Tibetan Lamaist ritual *chöd* (*gchod*), which is an extraordinary bizarre ordeal practised by novices as well as monks on the way up the Lamaist religious ladder to enlightenment. The result of this investigation broadly confirms the underlying mental processes, defence mechanisms and repressive forces as uncovered by previous psycho-analytic studies of ritual But the feature that should be of particular interest to psycho-analysts is the fact that some of the unconscious factors and defensive measures appear to be quite transparent in the interpretations given to this ritual in the Lamaist religious system itself. And, as in psycho-analytic therapy, the novice apparently climbs another rung towards mental freedom only when he himself grasps its true significance.

The following description of *chöd* is from the eye-witness accounts of Alexandra David-Neel, a French Buddhist scholar of considerable attainment who has spent many years in Tibet critically observing, studying, and practising the religious system of that country (1). According to Mme. David-Neel, *chöd* can be thought of as a Christian mystery play presented by one actor who is also his own single audience. It usually takes place at night in a cemetery or lonely wild site—a setting which is not hard to find in Tibet—and preference is given to a place associated with a terrible legend or some tragic event which has recently happened. The object of the performance is for the participant to work himself into a mental state where he begins to see himself surrounded by demons of the occult world who proceed to play unexpected and utterly fantastic rôles. The more readily he can hallucinate these demons, the more effective are the results of the ordeal.

Before performing *chöd*, the apprentice must first learn his part by heart. Then he must practise the ritual dance—an integral part of the performance—in which the step patterns form special geometrical figures. He also learns to turn on one foot, to stamp, and to leap while keeping time with his liturgical recitations. Finally, he must learn to handle, according to a fixed formula, the *dorje* (thunderbolt) and the *phurba* (magic dagger), and to beat rhythmically the *damaru* (small drum made of top half of two human skulls) and to blow the *kangling* (*rkang gling*, trumpet made from a human femur). The Lama teacher who directs the preparation or lessons is sort of a ballet master. And the dancers, his apprentices, are young ascetics emaciated by their austere practices, clad in ragged robes, their faces unwashed and their eyes gleaming with ecstatic light.

The long mystic preliminary preparation also includes a phase in which the apprentice ' tramples

[1] Professor of Sculptural Design, Art Department, University of California, Berkeley.

down ' all passions and crucifies his selfishness. But the essential part of the entire training is the preparation for the dreadful lonely banquet which comes at the end of the ritual and at which the apprentice offers his own body to be devoured by the hungry demons. This mystic banquet can be briefly described as follows: The participant blows his *kangling*, calling the hungry demons to the feast he intends to lay before them. A feminine deity, who is considered to personify his own will, is hallucinated as springing from the top of his head and standing before him, sword in hand. Then, while troops of ghouls crowd round for the feast, the goddess severs his limbs, skins him, and rips open his belly. The bowels fall out, the blood flows like a river, and the monsters ravenously bite here and there (1, p. 150).

All the while, as the demons masticate noisily, the performer excites and urges them with the following ritualistic words of unreserved surrender: ' For ages, in the course of renewed births, I have borrowed from countless living beings—at the cost of their welfare and life—food, clothing, all kinds of services to sustain my body, to keep it joyful in comfort and to defend it against death. To-day I pay my debt, offering for destruction this body which I have held so dear. I give my flesh to the hungry, my blood to the thirsty, my skin to clothe those who are naked, my bones as fuel to those who suffer from cold. I give my happiness to the unhappy ones. I give my breath to bring back the dying to life. Shame on me if I shrink from giving myself ! Shame on you, wretched and demon beings, if you do not dare to prey upon it! ' (1). (In major Tibetan rituals the *yogin* (officiant) usually includes a vow, *lus hbul ba;* Sanskrit: *ātmānam niryatayāmi*, in which he offers his self, his ego, to the Buddha.) The vision of the gruesome banquet then vanishes and the laughter and cries of the ghouls die away. A complete loneliness in the gloomy landscape follows the weird orgy and the ecstatic condition aroused in the performer by his dramatic sacrifice gradually subsides.

This act of the ritual is called the ' red meal '. It is followed by the ' black meal ', whose mystic significance is disclosed only to those who have received initiation and training of unusually high degree. Now the novice must imagine that he has become a small heap of charred human bones that emerges from a lake of black mud. This is the mud of misery, of moral defilement and of harmful deeds in which he has co-operated during the course of numberless lives, whose origin is lost in the night of time. He must also realize that the very idea of sacrifice is but an illusion, an offshoot of his blind conceit or pride. The fact is, he has *nothing* to give away because he is *nothing* (1).

Some lamas undertake tours to perform *chöd* near one hundred and eight lakes and one hundred and eight cemeteries; this is in accordance with the number of beads of their rosaries. They may devote years to this exercise of the ritual, wandering, not only over Tibet, but also in India, Nepal, and China. Others may retire to solitary places for daily celebration of *chöd* for shorter or longer periods of time.

Before proceeding to any interpretation of this ritual it is appropriate to explain briefly the position of *chöd* in the orthodox, official Tibetan system of religious training, and to outline briefly this religious system itself. By most Occidentals, this system is called Lamaism, the name deriving from *bla-ma*, the Tibetan word for monk or superior one. Actually, the Tibetans call their system simply ' The Religion ' or ' Buddha's Religion '. But Lamaism, as I shall continue to call the Tibetan religious system, is far from being a pure form of Buddhism. More correctly speaking, Lamaism is a fusion of an indigenous, primitive, shamanistic nature worship called Bön, and Mahayana Buddhism, with a strong overlay of Hindu-Buddhist Tantrism. This latter religion is a form of aboriginal nature-worship of India, combined with Hindu mysticism and, more or less, presented in the terminology of Mahayana Buddhism (7). Thus, it should not be surprising to find that although Lamaism is considered as Buddha's religion it contains many beliefs and practices which are in direct opposition to those as taught in early Hinayana Buddhism as well as in the later Mahayana system. Though Lamaism has been subjected to a long series of reforms and changes since its introduction into Tibet from India in the seventh century A.D., it continues to retain many obvious features inherited from the early demon and nature cults. On the other hand, Buddhistic teachings constitute more than a mere flavour in Lamaism; notwithstanding the strong Bön elements, Buddhism is definitely one of its major ingredients. It is this fact, as will be shown later, that should make certain of the Lamaist practices of more than passing interest for the psycho-analyst.

The ritual *chöd* itself is part of an esoteric training procedure not followed by all the young monks, of whom there are thousands in the monasteries. Usually, many of these latter lack initiative; they listlessly attend the various classes in the monastic colleges, or, as Mme. David-Neel describes, they just vegetate in a sort of sanctimonious ignorance (1). In contrast to these, the future participant in the *chöd* ritual is an independent, venturesome, self-determined individual. Rather than follow the easy-going existence of the *gompas* (*dgompa:* monasteries), he chooses, instead, to come to direct grips with the forces of his mind. For this purpose, he carefully chooses a lama or *guru* (Sanskrit: spiritual father and guide) who can guide him along the path to enlightenment. In certain instances, this may require his moving to some far distant hermitage in an isolated region in order to be near his guru, and in so doing, he may cut himself off from the material assistance of his relatives and friends, who, in Tibet, are ever ready to support generously one who puts on the monk's robes.

It is the contemplation of the workings of his mind

that keeps a novice in such lonely retreats day after day or year after year. To do this he must cultivate from the beginning the power to assume the attitude of a calm and detached observer of his thoughts, and to avoid imagining things. When imagination is prescribed in contemplative meditation or practices such as *chöd*, it is only to demonstrate (by conscious creation of perceptions and sensations) the illusory nature of those unconsciously determined perceptions and sensations which are accepted as real but which are really imaginary. He is instructed to observe the acts he performs, the awakening within himself of sensations, attractions, and repulsions, and to endeavour to discover their causes, then the causes of these causes, and so on. He must also be capable of mastery over certain impulsive inclinations and fleeting appetites, that is to say, he must develop the ability to avoid what we would call ' acting out '. Eventually he is able to erase from his mind, as they appear, all those mental functionings not based on reality, until a time comes when unprofitable reasoning ceases because it has been replaced by direct perception.

Using Buddhist figurative speech, the objective of the participant may be described as follows: to calm down the storms of the mind, raised by thought-creating theories and speculations, in order that the ocean of the mind may become tranquil and smooth, without a single ripple disturbing its surface. It is in this faultlessly smooth mirror that things are reflected without their image becoming distorted. The importance of this undistorted mental image is attested by the teachings attributed to the Buddha: ' He who knows and sees things as they really are makes an end of *dukkha* (sorrow) ' (*Udana* VII).

Original Buddhist practice is clearly the cultivation of that faculty which makes it its business to see things in their own light rather than in that of our mind's providing; to listen to what the fact has to say about itself rather than what we have to say about the fact. As we shall see, however, the methods as encompassed by the *chöd* ritual are drastically at variance with those propounded by early Buddhism. Actually, early Buddhism listed ' faith in efficacy of religious rites ' as one of the ten bonds or hindrances which prevent human beings from attaining salvation. The discarding of belief in the value of ritualistic, sacramental, and other ceremonies was considered indispensable before starting on the path of enlightenment. This is called ' entering the stream.'

Some Buddhistic concepts are so like those of psycho-analysis that a few words about this similarity are in order. Of first importance in both systems is the high regard assigned to mental analysis as a means of understanding and taming the passions. In Buddhism the conquest of mind by man is frequently compared with his conquest of the mighty elephant. According to what we know to-day of the power of the mind's instinctual forces, the comparison is an apt one. Like psycho-analytic thought, Buddhist thought was also pre-eminently devoted to reality. Speculations were regarded not only as profitless but as actually harmful. Among these were the contemplation of metaphysical matters and the nature of the hereafter. Buddhism, like psycho-analysis, taught that what is needed to solve the problems of life is not moral estimates (*māyā:* illusion), but more knowledge (*vijjā:* wisdom). *Nirvana* meant simply the state of mental tranquillity. It was to be achieved by the ' dying out ' in the mind of the fires of the three cardinal sins: the fires of *raja* (passion), *dosa* (hatred) and *moha* (folly or illusion). Only in this life and world, and by oneself, was it to be obtained. There is nothing in Buddhist scriptures that conceives of Nirvāna as a dying out of the soul, as we see it explained in a number of Occidental discussions (3).

Like psycho-analysis, Buddhism supports no concept of a God. The *Dhammapada*, which is part of the *Khuddaka Nikaya*, is a Buddhist manual or guide to enlightenment. It has four hundred and twenty-three stanzas set in twenty-six chapters, yet it contains no single reference to a saviour or supreme being, nor does it make any reference to an immortal individual soul. In fact, we may think of the whole course of Buddha's thought as being nothing but a perpetual pointing out that a soul, a true *attā* [*atman*], does not exist in a human body. ' It is a well-known fact ', writes Ferdinand Lessing, ' that Buddhism denies the existence of a soul in any sense in which we understand it. The ensemble of phenomena which lead to the assumption of a soul substance or substratum is attributed in Buddhism to some sort of actualism, a complicated dynamic interplay of conscious and subconscious forces, *dharmas*, a term which has been translated by " elements ", states " of consciousness ", " essence ", [but which I prefer to call by] the colourless expression " data " ' (9). The anti-attā arguments of Buddhism are mainly and consistently directed against the notion of a soul as a persistent, unchanging, blissful, transmigrating, superphenomenal being, as well as the concept of soul as residence of the supreme *ātman* or world-soul. Herein the Buddhist differs from the Vedāntist, who seeks to realize identity with ātman, that is, identity with the world soul and himself or ätman—*tat tvam asi* (that art thou). In fact, in Buddhism there is no sense of union with the Divine One, or any other One, implied or felt (2).

Enlightenment according to Buddhist scriptures is the replacement of profitless reasoning by direct perception. ' It is only by passing beyond all imaginings that a man is called a tranquil *muni* ' (Majjhima Nikaya III). An almost exact parallel to this idea is found in Freud's statement regarding the reality-adjusted personality: ' Only for the most select and most balanced minds does it seem possible to guard the perceived picture of external reality against the distortion to which it is otherwise subjected in its transit through the psychic individuality of the one perceiving it ' (5). In another context he states, ' The

shadows of thought in the mind dim the new perceptions' (6). A comparative study of ancient Buddhism and modern psycho-analytic thought discloses many other similar concepts of the mind's workings. It is for this reason that Buddhism can be considered the first and, perhaps the only great religion-psychology of the past whose goal, although, granted, not its methods, parallelled those of present-day psycho-analytic thought.

Both systems aim at the differentiation between the real and the unreal, the elimination of anxiety and fear, the seeking after knowledge, and the attainment of mental tranquillity. The existence of these similarities has already been recognized, but, to my knowledge, the first psycho-analyst to do so, was Joseph C. Thompson, who in 1927 under the pseudonym of 'Joe Tom Sun' published his observations in an article, *Psychology and Primitive Buddhism* (11). His unpublished notes contain an additional wealth of pertinent observations on this subject.

Returning once more to the investigation of *chöd* we find that the training methods as followed by different *gurus* vary considerably. Like artists' techniques, no two seem to be alike. Some *gurus* tend more towards mysticism than others, and at one extreme are those who should be called *sngagspas* (magicians) rather than 'wise men'. If a lama or guru is a follower of what is called the 'short path' he may even avoid all lengthy explanations of the scriptures or demonstrations of truth and error. Instead, he encourages his disciple to deliberately seek fear-evoking situations as a means of overcoming the very feelings of fear.

Conquering the fear of demons can be used as an illustration of this last point. There is hardly a country that can compete with Tibet as to the number, the variety, and the weirdness of its folklore regarding ghosts and demons. To judge by popular belief, the evil demons far outnumber the human population. Mme. Alexandra David-Neel reports the case of a young novice, with whom she was acquainted, who was instructed by his master to go to a solitary gloomy ravine supposed to be haunted by evil, non-human beings. He was told to tie himself to a tree or rock and at night call on the ferocious *towos*, demons, who in Tibetan paintings are shown eating the brains of victims. He was to challenge them and, no matter how terrified he might feel, he was commanded to resist the temptation of untying his bonds and running away. He was to remain bound to his post until sunrise (1).

According to Mme. David-Neel, this is very common practice, the first step of the novice up the mystic ladder. Eventually he may reach the upper rung, where, upon imagining monstrous forms, he is able to reflect, 'All these are non-existent; mind evokes them out of the void and can dissolve them into void.'

When we examine the wording of the novice's liturgy referring to the 'red meal', we notice the following outstanding features: (1) The novice is paying back a debt by offering his body for destruction. He offers his flesh to the hungry, his blood to the thirsty, his skin to clothe those who are naked, and his breath to bring back the dying to life. He does all this because formerly he had borrowed from others; and it would not seem too farfetched to assume that what he has borrowed in phantasy is just that which he is returning. 2) There is a strong emphasis on cannibalism; the body is to be ripped apart, disembowelled and devoured. 3) The chief demon-devourer, who cuts off his head, is a female monster—a personification of the novice's own will. 4) There is an immediacy or urgency in the novice's supplication that he be devoured; 'Shame on you', he cries to the demons, 'if you refuse to dismember and prey on me.'

Now it is these four features of the *chöd* ritual which are also found, though in different forms, in the classical manifestations of oral-sadistic impulses —stronger or fainter unconscious traces of which probably exist in all human beings. One of our most convincing sources of information on this class of impulses is from the observations and analysis of children. Melanie Klein (8), as well as a host of other workers, have reported extensively on this stage of libido development. It is ushered in with the appearance of the first teeth about the latter half of the first year, and represents the child's impulses to bite and devour its mother; first her breast and then her body. It wants to get at what it considers the good things inside her.

During this period the child's dominant aim seems to be to possess itself of the contents of the mother's body and to destroy her by every weapon his sadism can command—biting, ripping, tearing, and cutting. In attacking its mother's insides, it fantasies it is attacking many other objects as well—siblings, faeces, the father's penis, etc. This does not apply exclusively to emotionally disturbed children. The analysis of normal children shows them to be dominated by similar impulses as well. And even our analysis of grown-ups demonstrates that in the oral-sadistic stage the individual passed through a cannibalistic phase associated with a wealth of similar fantasies. These fantasies, although centred around devouring the mother, are not solely concerned with gratification of the primitive need for nourishment; they also serve to gratify the child's innate destructive impulses (8).

Because of the child's omnipotence of thought, it confuses its imaginary attacks with real ones. Then, with the development of its rudimentary superego—its inner conscience, built up of identifications with its parents—it begins to develop anxiety about its destructive wishes. To cope with this situation it sets up defences; for example, by means of the defence mechanism of projection it attributes its own oral-sadistic impulses to others. This tends to lessen its sense of guilt but, in turn, results in the dread of being devoured and destroyed by these others—by

its mother, father, or more frequently, by symbols of its parents in the form of demons.

Projection, of course, is just one of several mechanisms available to the ego for defending itself against anxieties arising from oral-sadistic impulses (4). It can also defend itself by reaction-formation or by phobia—by developing an aversion for food or the activities associated with eating. The use of this particular defence mechanism is illustrated by a young woman with overpowering unconscious oral-sadistic impulses who repeatedly described during her consultations with me how she would become ill from experiencing the sounds of her parents eating, especially from the sounds they made when drinking soup. She herself had pronounced eating anomalies which manifested themselves in low appetite, difficulties with swallowing, and feelings that people were staring at her when she ate. The physical result of all this was a thin, under-weight figure lacking in the common feminine configurations. Her discomfort was especially pronounced when eating in restaurants with her parents as was frequently necessary on the many trips they took away from home. On such occasions she had a marked fear lest people were watching her. This made it difficult for her to swallow food. When she did, she frequently became ill and vomited, or after each bite she would feel herself compelled to spit it out immediately into a napkin. As a child, she could not get home fast enough from school to have her dinner and to go to bed, where, in the dark, she revelled in sadistic fantasies dealing with gruesome aggressive attacks on people.

A dramatic acting-out of oral-sadistic impulses on the actual body of a person—in this case, a dead person—is seen in the Tibetan practice called *Rolang*. The *sngagspa* shuts himself alone with the corpse in a dark room. To animate the body he lies on it, mouth to mouth, and while holding it in his arms, continuously repeats mentally, a magic formula. After a certain time the corpse begins to move. It stands up and tries to escape. Now the body struggles more fiercely; it leaps and jumps to extraordinary heights, dragging the sorcerer with it. All the while he keeps his mouth pressed to that of the animated body while continuing to repeat the magic words. At last the tongue of the corpse protrudes from its mouth. This is the crucial moment. The sorcerer seizes the tongue between his teeth and bites it off; the corpse collapses immediately. Any failure on the sorcerer's part to control the body, once he has awakened it, means certain death for him. A Tibetan who had practised Rolang described most vividly how the corpse slowly gained in strength until he was unable to prevent the agitation of the jumping monster. He strained his muscles to the utmost to hold it until the critical moment arrived. And during the entire ordeal his thoughts were occupied with the idea that if he failed to conquer the corpse, the horrible being would kill him (1).

Because of the similarity between the ideas expressed in the ' red meal ' of *chöd* and those observed in children and adults in analysis, we might be inclined to apply our psycho-analytic knowledge to interpret the underlying meaning of this part of the ritual. Thus, on the basis of these similarities we might explain the ritual as the participant's defence against his own oral-sadistic impulses (the verb *gchöd pa* means: to hack, to cut into pieces). The action would then be an attempt to master these impulses by projecting them on to the hallucinated demons who in turn are consciously encouraged to attack the participant. Specifically, the feminine deity who springs from the top of his head (a figment of his own thinking, so to speak) and stands before him, sword in hand, would symbolize his mother against whom his oral-sadistic impulses were originally directed. The sword would refer to her as possessing a penis—a childhood fantasy (later repressed into the unconscious) that is as widespread as the use of fire. And the plea that the demons hurry would represent the urgency for relief from his pangs of conscience. But it is not necessary to depend solely on the method of analogy to interpret *chöd;* the Tibetan lamas themselves apparently understand, at least in part, the underlying meaning of the ritual. This is best illustrated by referring to Mme. David-Neel's description of a *chöd* ceremony at which she was an eye-witness.

In Northern Tibet a herdsman had died and preparations were being made by his family and friends for his funeral. After much chanting, beating of drums, ringing of bells, and copious eating and drinking by all present, the dead body was carried to a ledge on a lonely mountain top. There it was cut into pieces and left as alms for the vultures. That night a *trapa* (novice monk) of a neighbouring lama-guru selected the place for performing *chöd*. But unknown to the novice, Mme. David-Neel had also climbed to the place and thus was able secretly to observe the ritual performance of the lean, sickly ascetic. With his *kangling* in his left hand and his *damaru* lifted high in his right, he beat an aggressive staccato. In a challenging voice he exclaimed, ' I, the fearless, *naljorpa* (i.e., *yogi*), trample down the self, the gods and the demons.' Then he began the ritualistic dance, reciting the while, ' I trample down the demons of pride, the demons of anger, the demons of lust, the demons of stupidity.' The stamping of the ground was accompanied by ritual exclamations which grew louder and louder until the last one was thundered out in a deafening tone. After looking at the pieces of the corpse scattered on the ground he seized his *kangling* and blew loudly a number of times. Then he entered his crude cotton tent.

Within the tent the trapa's indistinct mutterings and moanings were followed by shouted passages from his liturgy: ' I pay my debts. As I have been feeding upon you, so feed upon me. Come ye hungry ones, in this banquet my flesh will transform itself into the very object of your craving; eat! eat!'

Then the excited monk jumped up so hastily that his head knocked against the low roof of his tent, which caused it to fall in on him. He struggled for a while under the cloth, and eventually emerged with the distorted face of a madman, howling convulsively and gesturing as if in actual physical pain. By working himself into a hypnoid state he seemed to be actually experiencing the teeth of the invisible demons in his body. Finally, in staggering around in the dark, he stumbled on one of the tent pegs and fell heavily to the ground, where he remained immobile as if he had fainted.

Mme. David-Neel became so concerned about the young monk—she feared he might seriously injure himself—that she decided to return and inform the lama what was happening to his disciple. There, in the lama's cave, she described what had transpired on the mountain top. She warned him that the trapa might gravely injure his health, or that he might be driven to madness by the terror of his experiences. She exclaimed: ' He really appeared to feel himself being eaten alive.'

To this the lama calmly answered, ' No doubt he is, but he does not yet understand that he himself is the *eater*. Maybe he will learn that later on.' Then he added, ' It is hard to free oneself from delusion, to blot out the mirage of the imaginary world and to liberate one's mind from fanciful beliefs. Enlightenment is a precious gem and must be bought at a high price. Methods to reach *tharpa* (supreme liberation) are many. You may follow another way, less coarse than that suited for the man you now pity, but I am certain that your way must be just as hard as that of my disciple. If it is easy, it is the wrong way.'

Those monks who finally achieve understanding of the underlying meaning of *chöd* eventually dispense with the rite altogether. Its different phases may be called to mind in the course of silent meditation, but soon even this exercise may be omitted. Some enlightened *gomchens* (*sgomchen:* great meditator), however, may meet at intervals to celebrate *chöd* together. But then the weird, dismal rite changes its character and becomes a mystic feast in which the exalting monks rejoice over their complete freedom. Under the starry sky in the majestic wilds of the high Tibetan plateaus, Mme. David-Neel had the opportunity of observing a group of these freed monks as they danced to the music of their *damarus* and *kanglings*. On their faces shone the joy of having conquered the ' burning thirst ' and of having trampled down the fantasies and fears that ' keep the mind feverish '. Then they sank in endless meditations that kept them late after dawn sitting crosslegged, the body erect, the gaze cast down, motionless like stone images.

To what extent these monks have uncovered the repressed and actually freed themselves from the severity of their superego—their inner conscience—according to psycho-analytic standards of emancipation, is difficult to tell. It would require an extensive psycho-analytic study of many of these *gomchens*, preferably by psycho-analytic workers versed in the Tibetan language, in order to evaluate the actual effectiveness of their system. But it is not too far-fetched to think that some day such a study may be made.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(1) David-Neel, Alexandra. *With Mystics and Magicians in Tibet.* (London, 1931.)

(2) Davids, Mrs. Rhys. *Buddhist Psychology.* (London, 1914.)

(3) Rhys Davids, T. W. 'Buddhism.' *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 13th ed. (1926).

(4) Freud, Anna. *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence.* (New York, 1946.)

(5) Freud, Sigmund. *Psychopathology of Everyday Life.* (New York, 1915.)

(6) —— *Introductory Lectures in Psycho-analysis.* (London, 1929.)

(7) Humphreys, Christmas. *Buddhism.* (London, 1951.)

(8) Klein, Melanie. *Contributions to Psycho-analysis.* (London, 1947.)

(9) Lessing, Ferdinand D. ' Calling the Soul : A Lamaist Ritual.' *Semitic and Oriental Studies*, Univ. of Calif. Publications in Semitic Philology, **11**, 1951, pp. 263–284.

(10) Reik, Theodor. *Ritual, Psycho-analytic Studies.* (London, 1931.)

(11) Joe Tom Sun (Thompson, Joseph C). ' Psychology of Primitive Buddhism.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, **11**, 1924, pp. 39–47.

(George W. Digby in his *Meaning and Symbol*, London, 1955, refers to *chöd* in his interesting interpretation of the dismemberment and disembowelled features in the sculpture of Henry Moore.)

(Received 11 May, 1956.)

THE MEANING OF BARRIE'S 'MARY ROSE'[1]

By

MARIETTA KARPE, M.S.S.

AND

RICHARD KARPE, M.D., West Hartford, Connecticut

In the 18-year period from 1902 to 1920, James Matthew Barrie, best known as the creator of *Peter Pan*, wrote 20 plays, which fall into two basically different categories. Among them are pleasant, witty, and successful plays such as *What Every Woman Knows*, realistic both in their stories and in their characterization. On the other hand, there are a number of plays, obviously very dear to the author's heart, which are whimsical, magic and fantastic, such as *Peter Pan*, *Dear Brutus*, and *Mary Rose*. Barrie himself said that he wrote his magical plays with his left hand and his realistic plays with his right.

Mary Rose (3), the last of his successful plays, was first produced in 1920. Its story is a strange one, very puzzling not only to the audience and the actors, but even to the author himself. It is, in brief, as follows: a young married couple, Mary Rose and Simon, go on vacation to the Outer Hebrides, leaving their little son Harry behind with a nurse. While they are visiting a small island which is supposed to have magical powers, Mary Rose disappears without a trace, thus repeating an earlier disappearance at the age of 12, when she was on a fishing trip with her father and an intensive relationship developed between them. The first time she returned after 20 days, not realizing that she had been away, and her family never discussed the incident with her. The second time, she returns unexpectedly 25 years later, unchanged in appearance and unaware of her long absence. She looks for her son, expecting him to still be a baby, but in fact he ran away from home at the age of 12 to become a sailor, and later settled in Australia. Mary Rose dies soon after her return, but her ghost keeps haunting the house in search of her son Harry. Three years later, Harry comes back and meets the ghost. She does not recognize him, and is at first hostile until he takes her on his lap. She then becomes infantile and asks his permission to go out and play. He wants to help her find peace, but does not know how. Finally he succeeds in putting her to rest and returns to Australia, finding the meeting with her ghost very disappointing.

Barrie received many enquiries about the deeper meaning of this play, and asked his secretary, Lady Cynthia Asquith (1), as she records in her recent book: 'I wish you could tell me what it means and settle the matter once and for all.' But she too could not tell, and says in her book that she preferred to leave the play unexplained.

We are still more puzzled when we find that this play ended a period of 29 years of intensive productivity, during which time Barrie wrote 27 plays, almost all highly successful. When *Mary Rose* was first performed he was aged sixty, and in good health; no important external changes happened in his life thereafter, and though he lived for seventeen more years, he was unable to write anything except children's plays, staged at private performances. Not that he did not try. He began another play called *Shall We Join the Ladies?* shortly after *Mary Rose*, but completed only the first act. There followed a lag of productivity and occasional depressions, until in 1931 he wrote another ghost story, *Farewell Miss Julie Logan* (4), and three years later the ill-fated full-length play *Boy David* (2), performed a few months before his death in 1937. The free flow of his creativity seemed cut off after the writing of *Mary Rose*.

The play is obviously one about mothers and their sons, about life and death and the revival of the dead, and the problem: Should the dead return? Can they ever find a place again in the world of the living? The wish to revive a deceased person, so prominent in Barrie's magical plays, is the reaction to the loss by death of a loved one we were not ready to give up. We often find that the deceased comes back in dreams for a long time after death, and in children's games death wishes can be acted out without much guilt feeling because in the game the dead can be revived again, and so nothing really tragic happens after all. The tragic loss of a love object seems able to become a stimulating factor for an artist's or a child's creativity, as the revival in

[1] First presented at the meeting of the Western New England Psychoanalytic Society at New Haven, Conn., on 12 November, 1955.

fantasy of a lost object is one way of mastering that loss.

Dennis Mackail (8), in his comprehensive biography of Barrie (p. 546), writes: 'Audiences wept, sniffed, swallowed and choked, without ever being able to explain what had reduced them to this state. (But), . . . nobody knew (the meaning). The players certainly didn't, and the author had told everything by this time and had nothing more to say. . . . *He* didn't know where his heroine had been, or why she had been taken, or the reason for her return. *He* didn't know where ghosts come from, nor the meaning, even for the purposes of this story, of life and death.'

This play poses many questions which neither Barrie nor his audiences could answer; but an investigation of its author's life-history reveals valuable clues to the unconscious meaning of the play and its dynamic function at this time in Barrie's life. Barrie was born in Kirriemuir, a small Scottish town, the ninth of ten children and the third son in the family of a poor weaver. When he was three years and two months old, the last child, his youngest sister, was born. In his autobiographical book *Margaret Ogilvy* (6) Barrie tells us that he has a complete amnesia for the first six years of his life: 'It is all guess-work for six years.' We thus have no direct description of little James's reaction to his sister's birth, but we can guess from the unusually intensive relationship which later developed with his mother that he must have felt very deeply her preoccupation with the new baby.

At the age of six a tragic event occurred which had a deep and lasting influence on Barrie's whole life. He then had two older brothers, the oldest, Alexander, already grown up, and an adolescent brother David, a gifted and good-looking boy, destined to become a minister and much loved by the mother. When David was killed in an accident on the eve of his fourteenth birthday, while at a school headed by his older brother, the mother went into a deep depression. For many days she stayed in bed in a darkened room, her face to the wall, refusing food and paying no attention to her children, until little six-year-old James succeeded in arousing her interest in him again. From then on James took it upon himself to cheer his bereaved mother, and these attempts provide his first childhood memories. He recalls in his autobiography (6) how he sat in his mother's room, trying to entertain her by standing on his head or by similar childish tricks, and counting how often she laughed. He devoted a great deal of his boyish efforts and energies to cheering his mother by letting her talk about herself, and, almost like a psychotherapist, encouraged her to talk of her own childhood, her father whom she had adored, and her early hopes and experiences. This intensive relationship continued for the next 28 years until her death, even though James never completely succeeded in making her forget David, to whom she was always talking in whispers as if he were constantly with her. Barrie's mother also remained on intimate terms with other dead persons, a fact which must have been of great importance to him. When one of his sisters, after the death of her fiancé, decided to marry the dead man's brother, her mother begged the dead man's forgiveness, asking him to understand how sad and lonely is the life of a friendless girl.

Barrie had a good capacity for making friends and keeping them. His circle of friends included people of all ages, both male and female, and especially a number of small boys. Though he could be socially quite charming, he was given to periods of deep depression during which he refused to see anyone and cut himself off from all contacts.

In 1894, one year before his mother's death, he married a young and beautiful actress, Mary Ansell, in spite of his often expressed preference for older and motherly women. The marriage remained childless and in 1909 ended in divorce.

In 1896, a year after his mother's death, he wrote the autobiographical book *Margaret Ogilvy, by her Son James Barrie* (6), a deeply emotional tribute to her, and from then on we see the beginning of the trend of thought which crystallized many years later in the strange story of Mary Rose. The basic idea goes back to 1902, when he published *The Little White Bird* (5), a collection of short stories which are fantastic answers to the question: Where do I come from? In the chapter called 'Nightpiece', the author tells David, a little boy of five, what happened on the night of his birth. He tells how he, the author, walked the streets all night with David's father waiting for David's mother to have her baby, and surprisingly enough their thoughts turn to death and to ghosts. 'The only ghosts, I believe,' he writes, 'who creep into this world, are dead young mothers, returned to see how their children fare. There is no other inducement great enough to bring the departed back. . . . [But] what is saddest about [these] ghosts is that they may not know their child. They expect him to be just as he was when they left him, and they are easily bewildered, and search for him from room to room, and hate the unknown boy he has become.' In this quotation we have already in a nutshell the synopsis of *Mary Rose*. The death fantasy here expressed in connection with birth might have had its origin in the experience of the birth of the younger sister.

Frank Swinnerton, in his book *Georgian Scene* (9), writes that it was a standing joke in the Barrie family that in every one of his heroines Barrie painted but another portrait of his mother. It is not difficult to find her image once more in Mary Rose, who returns from death after twenty-five years, since his mother had died twenty-five years before the completion of the play. But even this analogy leaves many questions unanswered. Barrie's mother at death was an old woman, while Mary Rose is still

young when she disappears. Furthermore, Mary Rose at first does not die, but only disappears, to return unchanged after twenty-five years, as young and attractive as at her disappearance. This gives us the clue that the mother whom he really mourned and longed for and constantly revived in all his heroines was not that mother as an old woman, but his early image of her when he was a little boy. Mary Rose's little son Harry in the play is two years and nine months old when his mother disappears. Barrie was only five months older at the birth of his little sister Margaret, when he in a manner lost the mother because of her preoccupation with the new baby. This might explain why Mary Rose remains young and does not really die, because she represents a memory of Barrie's own young mother and her disappearance from his view when the new baby was born, when she too did not really die but got lost for him.

But while the events of Barrie's early childhood must necessarily remain ' guesswork ', as he puts it, we have a detailed description of the events which led up to the completion of *Mary Rose* and the unproductive years which followed, in Lady Cynthia Asquith's *Portrait of Barrie* (1). Lady Cynthia met Barrie during World War I, becoming in 1918 what he later called his ' private private secretary '; she worked for him until his death, and he became practically a member of her family. Lady Cynthia was married and the mother of two small sons, a fact which might have contributed much to the friendship, since Barrie always loved little boys and needed their proximity. He also became friendly with Lady Cynthia's mother, Lady Wemyss, an older and motherly woman. Lady Cynthia describes the days of depression and gloom when nothing could cheer him, with one exception: if she presented to him some trouble of her own, he immediately became interested in her problem and forgot his own sadness, obviously a repetition of his old tendency to cheer his grieving mother.

Lady Cynthia Asquith was distressed by the fact that Barrie's creative ability vanished after *Mary Rose*, and she blamed herself for this failure, suggesting that signs of bewilderment she might have shown when he shared with her his ideas about new plays and new characters might have discouraged the sensitive writer. But her self-blame seems only partly justified, and even so, not in the way she suggests. It seems more probable that Barrie's need to revive his mother lessened because of his newly-found friendship with his secretary, her mother, and her sons. His acceptance as a member of the Asquith family satisfied his need for his dead mother to such an extent that, for the time at least, he no longer needed to revive her.

In *Mary Rose*, his last successful play, his former need to console mothers for the death of their sons seems reversed. The play expresses rather the son's desire for the dead mother's return and his disappointment when this wish is really fulfilled. It also portrays the reversal of the mother-son relationship to a father-daughter relationship, when in the last act Mary Rose sits on her grown-up son's lap and asks his permission to go out and play, a reversal which actually took place at a very early age in Barrie's relationship to his own mother.

While these early experiences contribute significantly to the psychogenesis of the conflicts expressed in the play, another important event occurred about the time when the story of Mary Rose ripened into a stage production. In 1917 Barrie's former wife, who had divorced him in 1909 to marry another playwright, Gilbert Cannan, was again concerned in divorce proceedings. Rumours appeared in the press[2] that Barrie was considering reconciliation with his wife. Though Barrie said nothing publicly to this effect, there is no question that they saw each other again, and very probably the idea of remarriage entered his mind. A proof of his strong emotional attachment to his former wife, whose first name incidentally was Mary, is seen in the fact that when Cannan ceased supporting her and was finally hospitalized with a paranoid condition, Barrie resumed her financial support and continued this until his death. He even remembered her generously in his will.

But even if he did not consciously consider remarriage, there is strong evidence that Mary attempted to come closer to him again. Lady Cynthia Asquith recalls in her book (1) an incident in the summer of 1923, when Mary Cannan took up residence in the small town of Broadway, five miles from Stanway, Barrie's summer home, with the declared intention of resuming their friendship. This was three years after the production of *Mary Rose*, but the subject of ' the second chance ' was already in his mind in 1917, when he wrote *Dear Brutus*. He then rejected the second chance, saying that it could not work, and that one only repeats one's mistakes a second time, thus showing a deep intuitive insight into the inability of most people to free themselves from early-established behaviour patterns.

But Barrie still loved Mary, and the temptation to try again was apparently great. During this crucial time he met Cynthia Asquith and engaged her as his private secretary, possibly as a way out of the conflict into which he was thrown by Mary's reappearance on the scene. As a result of this conflict the story of Mary Rose crystallized, of the young wife who comes back from the enchanted island after 25 years. Some dates are interesting in this connection: He completed the play in 1919, 25 years after his marriage to Mary Ansell. The play was first produced in 1920, 25 years after his mother's death. While the relationship to his mother supplies the

[2] *The Cleveland Plain Dealer*, 9 December, 1917.

psychogenesis of his conflicts, that to his wife provides the psychodynamics.

Significant also is the author's choice of age for certain of the characters when important events take place. Mary Rose is 12 years old when she first disappears, and her son Harry is also 12 when he runs away from home ' to become a sailor ' or, as we might assume, to look for his mother. The pre-adolescent girl who disappears when alone with her father on a fishing trip, while a very intensive relationship develops between them, reminds us of Wendy in *Peter Pan*, also pre-adolescent, of Peter Pan himself, who is approximately the same age, and of Barrie's brother David, who died when he was almost 14 and therefore ' never grew up '. (7).

The final disappearance of Mary Rose takes place when her little boy Harry is two years and nine months old, and, as she says in the play, ' . . . and he says such beautiful things to me about loving me. Oh, rowan, do you think he means them? ' So we see that Mary Rose disappears both times when a strong incestuous relationship, first to her father and then to her son, threatens to become overwhelming. In contrast, when after 25 years she returns, expecting to resume her relationship to her baby, her husband, and her parents where it left off, it has all become meaningless and empty. She is nothing but a ghost, and Harry does not consider it worth his while to give up his life in Australia for this little ghost who once was his mother, and whom he once desperately needed and sorely mourned, but who cannot give him anything when she returns.

In summary, *Mary Rose* fulfilled in Barrie's life an important dynamic function: it helped him to reject the idea of remarriage, and it liberated him temporarily from his lifelong struggle with his mother's youthful image. This became possible because of the meaningful relationship which he established to his secretary and her family. Unfortunately, however, this had an adverse effect on his productivity. As his longing for his mother lessened, his imagination and ability for creative writing also decreased, and the spring of his productivity dried up for nine years. He lapsed into silence with occasional depression for several years, and the old ghosts finally came back again in *Farewell Miss Julie Logan* (4) and *Boy David* (2). His attempt to free himself from the ghosts of his childhood proved unsuccessful. Should the dead come back from their graves? Where do they go when they die? Where are the children before they are born? The eternal questions of life and death. Barrie's gallant attempt at solving them in his magical, illogical, and philosophical way did not succeed, and he died discouraged, a lonely old man, in spite of his many friendships.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(1) Asquith, Cynthia. *Portrait of Barrie.* (New York: Dutton, 1955.)

(2) Barrie, James Matthew. *Boy David.* (New York: Scribner, 1938.)

(3) ——. *Plays.* In one volume. (New York: Scribner, 1953.)

(4) ——. *Farewell Miss Julie Logan.* (New York : Scribner, 1935.)

(5) ——. *The Little White Bird.* (New York: Scribner, 1930.)

(6) ——. *Margaret Ogilvy.* (New York: Scribner, 1946.)

(7) Karpe, Marietta. ' The Origins of Peter Pan.' *Psychoanal. Review*, **43**, 1956.

(8) Mackail, Dennis. *Barrie, The Story of J.M.B.* (New York: Scribner, 1941.)

(9) Swinnerton, Frank. *The Georgian Scene.* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1934.)

(Received 25 June, 1956.)

LISTENING TO CLICHÉS AND INDIVIDUAL WORDS[1]

By

ADRIAN STOKES, London

Words are highly coloured and clichés are like patches of scarlet, the careless expenditure of which may irritate the eye.

You are invited this evening to surrender to the mere glow of words and phrases, a relaxing that will surely be the opposite to the usual call on our attention whereby we want to separate words, in the interest of abstract meaning, from the voluminous bodies that surround them. The words that denote ideas, and thus the ideas, are not only magnetized by particular associations but tend to bring physical being in their train. The word ' idea ' means an image, is derived from the Greek ' to see ': but for once we shall be encouraged to embrace an expression such as the one of ' entertaining a rough idea '. Also art conveys meaning of every kind in grossly sensuous terms: one of my points will be that art is an inevitable extension of the role of language, inevitable because instinct will suffer only a partial divorce from sensuous expression. Words bear witness.

Let the verb ' to express ' provide a starting-point. The basic sense is ' to squeeze out ': hence the facile and pompous clichés: ' to express concern ', ' to express appreciation '. We would not speak as a rule of expressing love. When we want to express concern or appreciation we may not wish to imply that concern or consideration has to be squeezed out of us. Nevertheless that is what we say, probably because it is what in part we feel. It seems to me that those who readily—no, inevitably—employ some such ready-made yet equivocal expression, are showing their insensitiveness to words because what I can only call a static supply of ambivalent feeling compels it. Of course I am not implying that the true meaning of ' to express ' should always be to the fore; but I am wondering why the cliché that employs the word is ' to express concern ' though not ' to express love '. A supplementary explanation might point to euphony and to the emphasis that euphony or other arrangements of sound contrive. I shall say something about it in a moment.

To continue with ' express '. It means also ' definite ', ' special ', as in ' express train ': so, when we ' express concern ' on some formal occasion, we brazenly suggest, in managing to squeeze out solicitude, that our offering is most valuable and special. This will be polite enough but only, it seems to me, if there exists small reason for us to harbour concern.

To what originally does the squeezing out refer? Nursing mothers sometimes must ' express their milk '—that is the medical phrase—to help the flow: they have to squeeze it out. They are subsequently squeezed out by their feeding babies. We too, as a rule, have in mind something good when we speak of expressing ourselves. But if the words that express judgement derive sometimes from ' the milk of human kindness ' they lend themselves as well to the nurture of all feeling and often possess an acid taste. Nevertheless, we may now relish fully the felicity of that trade name, ' Express Dairy', offering plentiful milk expressed from cows, expressly delivered at the door. Words must feed us: advertisers know it well. The script writer generally avoids the explosive cliché except as a quotation: he invents new luxurious phrases. This feeding comes from a distance, under the aegis of an unseen organization that reflects, it may be, a now misty aspect of the primal mother. However, an agent who would ' suck up ' to us will need to present himself to our developed ego. Without any certainty I take this very vulgar phrase to refer to fellatio.

Freud remarked the dream-like condensation where a single word has been used for, say, dark as well as for light. It is curious to realize—though, doubtless immediately apparent to foreigners, stimulating their indignation—that ' to go fast ' and ' to hold fast ' exemplify opposite meanings of the same word; the same word, not different roots with the same sound.

[1] Read to the Imago Group, London, 9 October, 1956.

Even with the help of puns that harp on antithetical meanings, we wonder little at such coincidence. Many words, particularly adjectives, have gradually reversed their sense. There are various reasons for it. You need only experience often enough the Italian waiter's *vengo subito*—'I come immediately, even suddenly'—to comprehend why in English, 'presently' and 'soon' no longer mean 'now' as formerly they did, as did 'anon' also and 'by and by'. Travesty occurs as well owing to adjectival euphemism. Thus the substitution of 'stout' for 'fat' has started 'stout' on the down-grade. Not a philologist, I speak with no authority whatever on the varying sense of words, often jostled by the introduction of new terms, a very abstruse subject. A change from active to passive and *vice versa* is easily understood, owing to the equivocal compounds in the formation of many English words. 'Troublesome' once meant troubled, 'unquestionable' uninquisitive. I am delighted to find that 'amorous' once meant worthy of love. Similar changes suggest a growing cynicism or experience. 'Plausible' meant worthy of praise, 'pert' skilful, 'pretence' any claim whatsoever, 'parsimonious' frugal, 'severity' discipline, 'sly' dexterous, 'curiosity' scrupulousness or taste, 'wilfully' with good will. It might be of interest to the historian as well as to the psycho-analyst that 'retribution' has meant simple payment uncharged with emotion; and 'remorse' compassion; 'to doubt' could also mean to dread. Such variation, of course, has not been in one direction only.

I do not know whether words of other languages are as richly striped with harmonics. A little acquaintance with early Italian, of far simpler origin than English, leads me in that case to think not. Such harmonics are the stuff of poetry, and I am inclined to believe that on occasion there is more poetry in Shakespeare today than when he lived; in Chaucer too, in all poets who are not contemporary. When we read in Chapman's Homer:

> As when of frequent bees
> Swarms rise out of rocks

we are not aware as a rule that 'frequent' could in his time have easily signified 'numerous'. Shakespeare wrote with what seems to us a very generous yet most precise poetry:

> The quality and hair of our attempt
> Brooks no division.

But there is evidence that 'hair' was a not uncommon synonym for texture or character. The state of Elizabethan English was Shakespeare's opportunity. But when he wrote 'Wherein of antres vast and deserts idle', the word 'idle' probably meant in ordinary speech, barren or empty. Nor must I forget Chaucer's beautiful 'The sweet jargon of birds'. Yes, we comprehend an essence of poetry when different, even opposite, senses in one word may signify in active harmony. But what are we to make of the Elizabethan use of the word 'owe', meaning both 'to owe' and 'to own'? In *King John* Shakespeare employs in consecutive lines the two opposed senses of the word. I do not think it would be rash to suppose that in alliance with the condensation dear to the id, the eternal vigilance of ambivalent feeling underlies and mingles with all the many other reasons for reversal of meaning, more apparent in those words where an anterior sense survives in some degree. Thus 'fond' once meant 'foolish', a not unknown usage even now. It is more startling to discover that the inevitable but frigid word 'nice' first meant ignorant or stupid and then wanton, loose-mannered, lascivious; that a possible derivation of 'dear' is from the Anglo-Saxon *derian*, to hate (cf. 'his dearest enemy'); that 'daft' is the same as deft or suitable, that 'smug' meant trim, elegant, even beautiful; on the other hand, that 'a frill' may be derived from the still-existing sense of the word that means pertaining to the mesentery or intestine, a history that would recall the process of reaction-formation. 'Phlegmatic' comes from the Greek for to burn, 'an anecdote' meant something which at all costs must not be published, 'hussy' meant a housewife, 'anathema' a thank-offering, 'sad' once indicated satiety, then resoluteness, 'prestige' illusion or imposture, 'school' derives from leisure, and 'to vegetate' is by derivation 'to enliven'; 'play' once meant brisk action, 'sacred' not only blessed but accursed, 'secure' careless; 'silly' meant innocent; hence 'ninny'. 'Innocent', of course, means not hurting; and it follows that one sense of the word used to be not far from 'unfortunate'. Nevertheless, it is psychologically just that the innocent man should be he who has not been aggressive. Since he who does not hurt, were there such a being, cannot himself be hurt psychically, 'innocence' has come to contain another secondary sense of 'untouched', 'unhurt'. The root of 'naughty' means a nothingness. The word's evolution provides an image for the process of the death instinct, for

the aggression arising from its active state. Many phrases more certainly bear witness to unconscious working. There is that strange phrase ' bowels of compassion ' which indicates perhaps clearer than any dream a long-lost feeling of beneficent bestowal in the act of defaecation. On the other hand there are similar phrases, equally loaded with feeling, for which it would be hard to find as direct a psycho-analytic counterpart. For instance, ' to wring a person's withers '.

I want to examine various slang synonyms for ' psychotic ': potty, balmy, crackers, nuts, gone off his rocker. I take them to be pithy terms not without interest to the cultured psychiatrist. Tonight we are listening to individual words with the attention that the psycho-analyst gives to the words of a patient in a particular context. There are often interfering factors: notwithstanding, to say that some one has gone off his rocker may be extremely expressive. We have been discussing a few id connotations of ordinary words. The slang terms for ' psychotic ', however, refer solely, it seems to me, to a state of the ego in accord with the rough distinction between neurosis and psychosis whereby the latter is defined in terms of the emergence of primitive ego states. Now, we shall find that the mature ego of popular phrase, of slang, of words in general, is forcibly conceived in physical and bodily terms. ' Insane ' itself means primarily unwell, physically unwell, as does ' unwell '. Similarly ' ecstasy ' means ' out of standing '. This does not suggest lying down, but a development so to speak of the phrase ' on tiptoe of expectation ', an expectation now gratified, as by orgasm. Parallel meaning appears in ' on tenterhooks ', i.e., extremely anxious, literally ' stretched on hooks '; and in ' off the hooks ', i.e., psychotic, crumpled up. We gather from this last phrase that psychosis is conceived as an unstrung condition without, as it were, shape, in spite of many taut symptoms. Mania, for instance, exhibits an ecstatic, on tip-toe, state, yet it is by no means ill-defined by the slang word ' balmy ', i.e., yielding a soft, fragrant smell or vapour, indistinct or else shapeless as smoke. We are given to understand that the ecstasies of mania lack body, and that body here means a regular as well as substantial shape, an almost Hellenic conception. ' Potty ' has a similar connotation, for there is reason to think that it means melted down, as in the phrase ' gone to pot '. I would add in parenthesis that no derivations are known for jug and mug. They may derive from a female's name, such as Jane, Margaret. When we speak of a friend's face as ' a mug ', we are referring to the not unpleasant congeries of receptive organs on the front of his head.

Sanity, then, is associated by popular language with the precision of a strong body. ' Imbecile ' means weak in strength, leaning on a staff, ' bacillus '. ' Ecstasy ', out of standing, meant madness to the Greeks. If we contrast with ' balmy ' and ' potty '—schoolboys used to call something very easy, ' potty '—if we contrast the expression, ' nuts', one that is more cheerful, as it were, but to the same effect as ' cracked ' or ' crazy ', which means dismembered, we note the suggestion this time of disparate physical pieces, each hard and rounded, maybe, yet unconnected. ' Crackers ' probably possesses the same schizophrenic connotation. The old greeting ' Hail ' simply means ' Be Whole '. It is ironic that never had anyone else so often been thus adjured as was Hitler, by name and at his own command.

I think a key to all other popular expressions for psychosis is the phrase ' to go off one's rocker '. It implies that the human mechanism, when sane, is capable of inclining towards the outside world and towards the inside world in a sliding, well-ordered manner, retaining the ego's axis. But once you come ' off your rocker ', ' off your head ', ' off the rails ', you are then ' deranged ', you have ' lost your bearings ' and ' balance ', you have become deeply ' out of sorts '. One should compare also the expression ' touched ' for psychotic, in reference to the traumatic experience that has ripped away the rind of the ego which is now touched ' on the raw '. Slang—even more, legal jargon—sometimes employs an older sense of a word. The expression ' touched ' for mad, calls to mind that an old sense of ' entire ' was ' untouched '.

But of anxiety, guilt, fantasy, one hears little in these ego expressions, since their terms are safely physical. Many phrases suggest that the ego is a rather delicate mechanism, easily ' thrown out ' if a ' screw is loose ', though it can possess ' a rough exterior ' and a ' heart of gold '. This substantial entity is apt to ' contract a chill ': it may have to ' face the music ' or be ' faced with ruin ': it may need to show a ' bold front ' when a task ' confronts it '. But it is also a recipient country on which an emotion or an idea ' suddenly dawns ' like a tropical sun. In all these phrases—and this is the point I want to make—some shapeliness is presumed as characteristic of the ego and of its objects. We are reminded of the Gestalt theory of perception. The more simple and precise the shape, the

greater the ego's power of decisiveness. It avoids the ' aching void ' and ' hollow tones ', has a preference for what is ' fair and square ', a ' square meal ', a ' round oath ', a ' square ' or ' straight deal ', often for the ' straight and narrow path ', for someone who is a ' brick ' (i.e., rectangular); it ' frames an excuse ', i.e., forms excuse into a rectangle, is sometimes not averse to ' hard facts ' and ' getting down to bedrock ', but will occasionally ' knock the bottom ' out of something or speak ' from the bottom of the heart '. These occasions, ' it goes without saying ', may be ' few and far between ', but that is ' neither here nor there '. I don't know whether you find ' the plot thickens ', that is to say, whether I succeed in ' licking anything into shape '; but the ' sum and substance ' of what I am trying to say should now be an ' open secret ', and ' that's flat '. The ' long and short of it ' is—' not to put too fine a point on it '—that we must ' fall to with a will ', accept, if need be, ' rough justice ' instead of allowing ourselves to be ' down and out '. We must ' keep our end up ', ' entertain high hopes ', ' pursue our purpose ' through ' thick and thin '. Some may think it ' crass (i.e., thick) ' stupidity ', a ' palpable lie '. But no. ' It stands to reason ' and it is by reason that one ' knows where one stands '.

My object in thus absurdly stringing these clichés together is to stress to you that particularly in matters which refer primarily to the activities of the ego and superego, expressions are paramount that convey not only simple shape but direction, texture, and stance. Man, we are told, is ' fearfully and wonderfully made ', that is to say I take it, a compound of hate and love but shaped none the less. Even from death, from dissolution, we borrow finality, definition, as of the contour of a silhouette, in ' deadly precision ' and ' deadly earnest '. A tincture of death seems often to colour numerical matters: precision or finality themselves suggest that our days are numbered. We speak of a ' dead certainty '. I do not wish to depose that the invention of zero has argued for a death instinct, but I would affirm that much popular phraseology suggests that the simplest conception of death provides one standard for any construction whether of the intellect or of the imagination, be it a work of art, a philosophical system, or a machine. Any estimation or judgement will aim at the decisiveness that has been already attributed to the incidence of death.

The static, of course, or what approaches to the static, can the more easily be *measured*, at any rate by the senses. Thus we read in huge white letters on some roads: ' Dead Slow ', a command issued in the interests of survival. There is a Bergsonian meaning whereby the intellect, in contrast with the so-called flux of instinctual life, transposes that flux to form, as far as possible with ' deadly precision ', a construction that rivals perhaps the one of ordered stone. This reminds me of the verb ' to calculate ' which is derived from the Latin word meaning a pebble, once used for calculations.

And now for a brief time I want you to listen to some words, employing a rather different attention: as well as to the content I want you to listen to the sound. Many phrases become clichés because their sound is very appropriate to their sense: indeed, that must ever be the case to some degree. I think all such felicity has common character, a combination of qualities present in what we name the Form in art; common, in fact, I hazard to guess, in all notable expressiveness, first, of course, as I have said, in language itself. Innumerable examples offer themselves. I will therefore take the cliché: ' odd assortment '. You will perhaps agree that the phrase progresses and settles acoustically after the sandwiching of the transmuted o of ' odd ' in the middle of ' assortment ', a settlement consonant with the sense; more than consonant, for it vivifies, even creates, the sense. ' Assortment ' has a clipped, crisp suggestion that encircles a vague meaning. It is tense and strong, and the word ' odd ' with a subsidiary sense of ' unique ' or ' single ', levers up ' assortment ', as it were, into a lean arc like the span of a bridge that curves over the multitudinous objects covered by the sense of ' assortment '. ' Odd assortment ', perhaps you too feel the tense span, a single object embracing many. Anyway, you will agree that the phrase pretends to a certain precision while pointing to ill-defined objects. Thus, even when we refer to chaos, we tend to have the sense of a definite and independent and shaped object, just as we do in the case of a work of art. And again, as with the work of art, we are drawn into the orbit of this independent object, or swamped by it. More truly, though, if the right qualities are present, we lend ourselves so as to be one with them. It is my belief that in any felicitous use of words to which we can lend ourselves, not only our awareness of a denoted object *qua* object is heightened, though, as I have said, the object is chaos itself, but that the oceanic feeling comes into play,

demanding in addition an entirely different kind of object-relationship. In naming a thing we seek not only to demonstrate, to define it, to give it the full status of an object with definite limits, but also to taste, to absorb, to drink it in, so that the whole world stands qualified by that experience. Such, it seems to me, is comprehension, in part, at any rate, an aesthetic act. Accuracy, it seems, involves, rather paradoxically, a mistiness, often ludicrous or equivocal, in regard to the corporeal suggestiveness of words. But I shouldn't say 'we': I do not refer, of course, to the scientist when he is acting as a scientist, or to many uses of words which would, if they could, ignore the values of this process. One aim of the more cumbersome scientific terms is to keep the denoted object at a proper distance from the ego: and the object itself must be denied, were it possible, the aesthetic seduction of an evocative shape. (Aesthetic experience is here regarded as the occlusion of significance within the mind by means of sensuous symbols so combined as to allow of their assimilation to primary objects that have been introjected. Not only symbolic representation but sometimes strong traces of concrete thinking have a part in aesthetic form.) It is difficult to know whether exposition, at any rate, will be notably successful without the aid of a little art; and in the matter of a little art I am thinking less of what is called presentation, more of a care for sounds, particularly the avoidance of reiteration, of weak copulatives; instead, an attachment to a variation and progression of vowel sounds. As well as from sense with brevity, clarity derives from sound. One wishes it otherwise; unfortunately words have so long been at the service of basic object-relationships, however practical their usage.

I would like to examine the phrase, 'deliberate falsehood' or 'to have a sneaking sympathy with someone': but I shall now leave the subtle matter of sound-with-sense in order to provide you with more phrases that point easily to psycho-analytic mechanisms.

'Comparisons are odorous' wrote Shakespeare. We say: 'Comparisons are odious', i.e., hateful. Many phrases and words recall anal-erotism and reaction-formation. The old phrase, 'It all goes down Gutter Lane', refers to a glutton. Now, Gutter Lane in London was once inhabited chiefly by the gold- and silversmiths. It is surely very neat that 'to wash one's hands of something' means to disown, as does 'to start with a clean sheet'. Blue, of course, is the colour opposite to that of excrement. Hence 'true blue' means unstained, and anything that should fall from a blue sky, for instance, a 'bolt from the blue', is doubly unexpected. On the other hand, 'a fit of the blues' perhaps refers to a depression over loss of good excrements. It is similarly unpleasant 'to be cleaned out' of money, very different from being 'hard up' whereby a constipated hold is largely maintained on what we have: when retention becomes impossible, the situation may 'cost a pretty penny'. We spend money at other times 'like water' or 'make a pile', a 'pot of money'. At a nearby target we 'take a pot-shot'. Among the vulgar names for money are 'filthy lucre', 'filthy pelf.' We infer possibly the strong presence of the sadistic component in that rather unkind phrase, 'the odour of sanctity', in 'browned off' or in 'bundle of resentment', a phrase of immense vividness. 'Flogging a penny' introduces a masochistic element. Another phrase is, 'gutted by fire', and we speak, perhaps unexpectedly, of someone 'smacking of the soil'. Very likely the exclamation: 'Oh fudge', in its perpetuation, belongs to this category.

I turn now to the oral position. It is odd that to 'take to one's bosom' means to marry: it goes to show that breast feeding is the fount of all good things, though it would be a cardinal mistake to regard a girl only as a 'peach'. Advertisements, of course, and in their wake, much popular culture with an intensified feeding rôle, will represent her thus. The probable root of the word 'bachelor' suggests an attendant upon cows. One may wonder how far the power to prolong a love relation, in the cherishing of the partner, is more the work of the good internal mother than a sublimation of genital love itself. There follows after the marriage a 'sumptuous feast' and a great deal of 'chronicling of small beer', 'crying over spilt milk', 'eating of humble pie', 'wholesome respect', it is to be hoped, 'upsetting the apple-cart', 'taking the cake', 'making no bones about it' (i.e., swallowing), the failure 'to mince matters' the easier for digestion, 'Dead Sea fruit', 'the opening of the flood-gates of affection', 'thirsting for someone's blood', 'sucking someone's brains'. Still, 'the apple of one's eye' may persist as such, especially if she brings 'an apple-pie order', and if there has been no question of 'stolen fruit'.

More interesting is evidence from certain words and phrases of oral sadism and masochism: 'nagging' which means 'gnawing' has

been remarked: also ' to fret ' means to gnaw. I am thinking of ' to kiss the gunner's daughter ', an old nautical phrase, meaning to be flogged, of names of various instruments of torture and of execution such as the ' Iron Maiden of Nuremberg ' or the Elizabethan expression ' to kiss the scavenger's daughter '. We have here references to the fantasied oral counter-attack, to a very early conception, of the bad mother. She it is who shows herself a ' whited sepulchre ' concealing a wealth of badness within, providing a more frightening conception, perhaps, even than the castrating father who in the course of time as partner to the ' whited sepulchre ', sits on the step, a ' wolf in sheep's clothing '. ' A whited sepulchre ' is surely the antithesis to the inevitable phrase for a cathedral or for any vast and stalwart building, that is to say, ' a venerable pile '.

When we were at the breast it did for most of us ' a world of good '. I wish I knew what we mean when we say something or somebody, as likely as not a person greatly cherished, is ' gone for good '. Glancing once more at the word ' express ' and its derivatives, we can see that the embarrassing cliché, ' organ of the press ', beloved by smaller provincial newspapers, provides equation of nipple with penis. If ' Adam's apple ' shows the introjected breast in physical guise, it does not portend the comfortable enjoyment of the good object as we find it in the phrase ' like a giant refreshed ', or as when we say we feel ' a different person '. In demonstration of the mechanisms of introjection, we know ' in our heart of hearts ' that there are ' wheels within wheels '. We take ' a leaf out of someone's book ' or ' turn over a new leaf ' as if we ourselves and our objects resembled many distinct pages. The psycho-analytic view considers that ' the iron entered the soul ' at a very early age. The cliché, ' the inner man ', used to refer to the soul and now means the belly. Words may tend to become more abstract, but in this case the underlying compulsion towards the embodiment of thought has naively reasserted itself as it does in most slang. ' Guts ' is of course used for courage, as is the parallel ' pluck ' which means the lights or pluckings from butcher's meat. Undeveloped symbolism, or lack of symbolism, continues to function in the huge symbolic structure of language. As long ago as 1920, in this Journal, Ernest Jones, quoting Ferenczi, pointed to the concrete thinking implicit in obscene words and indeed in many homely terms. Anthropologists refer to numerous societies wherein even a person's name is equated with him in a manner far more complete than we ourselves experience. The progress of language has on the whole been analytic, the disentangling into sentences of the many references contained in a word which was itself ideally suited for perhaps only one kind of occasion. Generalized or abstract terms and a simplified grammar have been evolved from a multitude of unique references. All the same, after thousands of years, words keep a graphic character: the poetic image, that is to say, the corporeal image, tinges all our bare, our would-be, prose. The power of abstraction is not only great but indispensable for understanding: nevertheless any substance that is *not* a body can be called ' a foreign body ': the phrase seems inevitable in some contexts. Words are symbols. Prime symbols are of parts of the body and perhaps of whole bodies too. Developed symbolism merely retains that origin, whereas art, being a symbolic exercise in the creation of symbolic structures, insists upon it.

I wish I could say something about the strange phrase, ' much of a muchness ' and ' by word of mouth ' or ' eggs is eggs '. This last phrase is said to be a corruption of the mathematics demonstrator's conclusion: ' X is X '. But why does the phrase continue to please anyone; is it an amplification as well as a satirical comment upon the prim satisfactions of logic? And why do we go on using such a phrase as ' cooking someone's goose for him ' when we have no idea of a manifest meaning in this phrase to indicate the circumventing of that person? Doubtless it was coined for a particular occasion or, like many clichés, refers primarily to the process of some trade or to a custom. An origin can usually be cited, but what concerns us is a phrase's persistence, the strength of the currency and perhaps its sudden failure. Again, I wish I felt I understood fully the extraordinary phrase: ' he was beside himself with rage '. ' Beside ' retains the original meaning of near to, on the same level: it has come to mean also ' apart from ' as in: ' that is beside the point '. I think the two meanings coalesce, that the thing beside the point sits bluntly next to it, the position of the ego when one is beside oneself with rage. Rage has become the point, projected as a bad object and now sitting in the ego's place; a bad object perhaps hardly to be distinguished, in view of projective identification, from the outer object against which rage is sent. The situation is possibly the one of an identification between

destructive elements, inside and out, enacted outside, just as to be beside oneself with joy is further witness to the oceanic feeling. To be always ' beside oneself ' is, of course, to be ' out of one's wits ', to lack those cohesive units found in ' a man of parts ' (very different from those of ' nuts '); to have lost the ego inside, the distinctiveness from objects, to be mad. A similar expression is ' abject terror ' which means literally the opposite of ' entire terror,' since ' abject ' signifies ' cast out ', ' rejected '. We can be wiser than the objecting lexicographers. What has been cast out is doubtless the defence system of the ego and superego, so that terror, and the object that provokes it, embrace, to the neglect of the ego. ' Blank despair ' may be similar. It is interesting that extreme despair is thought of as blank, i.e., white, unrelieved by the active marks of other mental states. One is reminded that white was the Imperial Chinese colour for mourning. Another cliché is ' blank amazement '.

I do not feel that anything I have said can be regarded as conclusive: but surely, in a far more intense study of words, a very rich field of investigation would be discovered, immediately to hand and so far almost untouched. Were it so, we might welcome in no very distant future a dictionary of some thousands of words and phrases and grammatical mistakes viewed psycho-analytically.

I will end with a sample of the numerous references to genital activity of one kind or another. In the rueful saying: ' a pretty kettle of fish ', one divines the bad vagina seething with castrating phalli, a very different state from the one of being ' hand in glove '. ' A feather in the cap ' may well be the means of ' warming the cockles of the heart '. A cockle is a boat: the phrase describes the genital act ' in a nutshell '. The word ' zest ' is derived from a root that means to make a cleft, the same Greek root as the one of the word ' schizoid '. With zest one ' sows wild oats ' before ' putting all one's eggs in one basket '. But ' to play the giddy goat ' ' up to the hilt ' may be a ' game that is not worth the candle ', especially if one should find oneself ' in a cleft stick '. It would be better ' to draw in one's horns ' or ' to hand on the torch '. If one fails in ' screwing up courage to the sticking point ', it will be the only thing to do, though adopting a position even more unpleasant than when being ' fooled to the top of one's bent ' (bent means bendableness). It is to be hoped that one does not ' cut off one's nose to spite one's face ': but it is impossible fully to discuss now the ' ins and outs ' of the matter.

Such phrases would be immediately interpreted—or most of them—in any public house, and I must apologize for their vulgarity. There are homosexual and sadistic references, however, which would not be admitted. Thus, ' to put a spoke into someone's wheel ', ' to spike someone's guns ' or even ' to go for him bald-headed ' or ' to be cross as two sticks '. Helped by this last punning phrase, we may wonder whether one meaning of the Sign of the Cross may refer to submission of the son's penis to the upright penis of the father. There is an Australian bush expression: ' Don't give me the raw prawn ' which means, and perhaps explains, our vaguer cliché: ' Don't try to put anything over on me '. A vivid phrase is ' to pay through the nose ', i.e., to be forced to part with the precious semen, far more precious than the anal product. The interesting point is that the slang term for money, ' rhino ', will have derived from the Greek word for nose, *rhinos*. In this case the psycho-analyst can easily supply the derivation, whereas the Oxford Dictionary is unwilling to make a suggestion.

Finally, to show how widespread are genital references, I will instance the phrase ' to open up a country '. The concealed meaning is clear enough: what may escape the enquirer is the vividness. For, if he searches for the derivation of the verb ' to open ' he finds that the first sense is to draw up a curtain for entering. That is perhaps a dull note on which to finish, yet suitable enough if thereby I indicate once more that I have scarcely moved the edge of the veil that overlies a vast and, indeed, unending, subject.

(Received 1st November, 1956.)

JUSTICE, AGGRESSION AND EROS

By

F. R. BIENENFELD, London

In an earlier publication (4) the attempt was made to apply Freud's discoveries to the problems of justice and law in order to demonstrate that psychological trends which can be observed in infancy form the whole framework of every legal system. They do so by repeating in the relations between citizens in society the attitude of brothers and sisters to each other, and in the relations of subject to ruler the attitude of every child towards his parents.

The application of psycho-analytical thought to the field of law is rare in the literature of psycho-analysis, but by no means unknown. In his excellent book *Man, Morals and Society* (10), Flügel quotes essays and books by analysts such as F. Alexander (2, 3), Theodor Reik (50), Hesnard and Laforgue (26), all of whom discussed the idea of justice. It is remarkable, however, and has some bearing on the present theme, that nearly all analysts and other psychologists (49*a*) who deal with the problem of justice confine themselves to an enquiry into criminal law and the consciousness of guilt. It would appear as if the legal system consisted mainly of criminal law, and justice were therefore based on the desire and the obligation of the ruler to punish, and on the wishes of the subjects either to get rid of feelings of guilt or to satisfy their impulse to vengeance.

It is not the purpose of this paper to draw attention to the disregard by psychologists and analysts of an aspect of justice whose driving force created sections of law which are at least as vital for the survival of society and of individuals as is criminal law. This disregard and the reason for it is a problem in itself, which will not be discussed at present. In this paper, after attention has been drawn to the existence of parts of the legal system which are not based on aggression, an unusual method of investigation is suggested. Up to now psycho-analysts have verified that Freud's discoveries and the methods and observations of psycho-analysis are able to shed light on facts and developments in the sphere of what in German, in contrast to natural science, is called 'Geisteswissenschaften,' such as sociology, political economy, the theory of art and of law (in the latter field mainly criminal law), and I myself used the same method in my book on Justice. Now another course of investigation is proposed: the existence of undeniable facts manifest in the legal systems may lead to conclusions in respect of problems on which the theory of psychoanalysis has not yet arrived at a definite view. In other words, an attempt will be made to contribute to the ego-psychology in psychoanalysis, starting from the fact that there are in being in all legal systems sections whose very existence permits of conclusions as to the driving force and the origin of the impulses which created them.

Every legal system is designed to obtain security for the individual in society, and for this end employs two methods: one in which aggression on the part of the ruler is apparent and where the laws serve mainly, though never exclusively, to achieve this end by force, by giving vent to feelings of aggression and vengeance. This part of the legal system comprises primarily criminal law and military law. The first is directed against the wrong-doer, the internal enemy of society; the second establishes the rules for the organization and operation of the aggressive forces of the community against the enemy without, who is either threatening its very existence or is an obstacle to its desire for greater glory or power. The other method used by all legal systems seeks to achieve its end by providing the subjects with the resources necessary for their existence, and not by aggression, punishment, or threats. This domain of law embraces social laws, such as social insurance, benefits for the unemployed, rationing in times of scarcity, compensation for industrial accidents where payment is made without taking into account the guilt either of the employer or of the worker. They thereby create rights and liabilities without

the imputation of fault, and play an outstanding part in the private law on torts, and even more in public law (5). There is a third section of the legal system in which these two elements are mixed, and it is hardly possible to distinguish whether its purpose is the defence of security by aggression and vengeance or by the means inherent in social laws. To this section belongs, for instance, civil law, with its rules governing contracts, compensation, and the making of restitution or reparation in case of broken contracts or of accidents arising from negligence (10).

It is outside the scope of this paper to explain the schemes of private or public law (4, 56, 37); it is relevant only to state that there is a vast domain of law in which punishment and aggression are of no significance, and whose purpose is to establish security by providing or distributing what is indispensable for the survival of the protected. It is permissible to assume that the very existence of such essential sections of law, which aim at security by means of support, must be based on fundamental impulses, on a certain trend in human nature which has its source in drives apparent in infancy, and in the behaviour of the parents towards those drives normally displayed after the birth of the child.

There is one fundamental objection which could be raised to this assumption. It could be maintained that social laws—the social insurance laws, the laws permitting the formation, and recognizing the legal personality, of Trade Unions, the laws regulating unemployment benefits, workmen's compensation, old age pensions, and free education—are all of recent origin. It could be pointed out that the Trade Union Movement started in the 1830s and took eighty years to be legalized, that the first social insurance laws in Europe were enacted in Germany on the initiative of Bismarck in the 1880s, that it was only recently that the Beveridge Report introduced the British Health Service, or that the idea of free elementary education was proposed by Pestalozzi no earlier than the end of the eighteenth century. If this objection were upheld it would follow that since the desire to guarantee the survival and well-being of the masses by means of support arose in a particular period of Western history, and that since the impulses which created the whole domain of social laws have been a driving force only in recent times—for the last 100 or 150 years approximately—they could not be considered to represent a permanent and inherent feature of human nature. The appearance of these impulses would be due to historical incidents, although it would be difficult to explain whence the impulses originated and from what psychological source they gathered their enormous momentum.

The objection would not, however, be a valid one, for it fails to recognize the true course of history. For in all periods of history—in early times even more conspicuously than in our own day—security and survival through social institutions, regulations, or customs have always been the dominant aim of every legal system, and have everywhere formed one of its most essential parts in the West as well as the East. Anthropologists agree (27, 43, 44) that in primitive societies it was the prerogative and the sacred duty of the ruler, whether matriarch or patriarch, to distribute among his subjects whatever goods were available for the community and had been acquired by hunting, by war, or, after the end of the nomadic period, by cattle-breeding or agriculture. This did not follow from the principle of equality; the ruler could retain a large part as his own share and apportion more to his advisers or to magicians than to the bulk of his subjects. Every family, however, had to get a share to secure survival. If the ruler was not able to fend off starvation, this was attributed to the failure of his *mana*, and he was removed because he was unable to fulfil his chief obligation. Responsibility for the security and survival of the members of the tribe by means of support was the subject of an unchangeable and holy law, and was more important than the protection of individual possessions or even than defence against external enemies. This prime responsibility of the ruler has continued to form an essential part of every legal system in all those primitive societies which still exist to-day. The claim of every member to receive the means of survival by distribution of the common stock was his sacred natural right at that stage, and corresponded to the sacred duty of the king and all heads of families.

This natural right to a minimum of subsistence sufficient for survival continued to be recognized, after the dissolution of primitive societies, in all periods of history and in every legal or economic system. A few examples chosen at random may suffice to support this statement. In ancient Egypt, the cradle of civilization, the dreams of the Pharaoh, as reported in the Bible, of the seven well-favoured

and the seven fat-fleshed kine, and of the seven rank and the seven thin ears of corn, testify that even his sleep was haunted by his duty to keep his subjects alive by collecting and storing reserves of food against a period of famine. He was forced by his conscience excitedly to seek an interpretation of the dreams from all his priests and magicians. The proper interpretation offered by Joseph was so important that the Pharaoh made him second-in-command in Egypt because only in this way could the royal *mana* which was the source of life for his subjects be retained. In Rome (17, 47), in the time of the Empire, it was *panem et circenses* which the emperor had to provide, thereby affording the means for bodily survival of the poor and unemployed, and caring for their pleasures. Furthermore, the whole social system of Rome was based on patronage in the sense that an aristocracy destined by birth or fate to lead ought to be rich and powerful, and had the inescapable moral and legal obligation to guarantee the existence of those dependent on them. The mighty personage was bound to protect and maintain his clients, servants, freedmen or slaves, who, in turn, owed him allegiance, handed over to him their earnings, enabled him to live in accordance with his rank, and even more important, to support all of them. Even if they were allowed to retain the fruits of their labour, their possessions still legally belonged to the master. In China (39, 40, 41, 4, p. 179 f.) the head of the family, however numerous its members were and even if they lived far away from his home, was responsible for their well-being and entitled to dispose of their assets—a legal and moral principle which formed the basis of Chinese society for many thousands of years. The divine emperor was the father of his people in the same way as the head of the family distributed and dispensed the means of livelihood for all its members. In medieval times feudalism (1, 46, 55), at least in theory, resembled a pyramid, the king being the highest liege lord who entrusted fiefs to the vassals. The vassals, in turn, supplied the knights in their service with property which guaranteed their standard of living and enabled them to support all those dependent on them, and, by this system, to safeguard the maintenance of the masses. Later on, after the towns had gained in importance, every independent townsman usually belonged to a guild (23), which had to help him in times of need and scarcity of work, while he himself had the same duty towards his subordinate journeymen and their families.

In fact, it is not the appearance of Trade Unions, old-age and unemployment benefits, and all the measures for support and survival which is surprising, and they were not introduced as a result of a sudden outbreak of humane feeling. What is surprising is the disappearance of all such institutions during some 100 to 150 years from the middle of the eighteenth century up to the end of the nineteenth. This disappearance was really due to a historical incident—the Industrial Revolution, which, in spite of all the advantages it brought about in the long run, caused in its initial stages panic, disorder, and economic chaos which all of us who were born and educated during this period felt in our youth to be the 'natural' state of society, whereas, in fact, the conditions were highly exceptional. In a panic the most self-evident desires may temporarily vanish, and only after its termination are feelings resuscitated and measures in harmony with them once more taken. Thus, after the chaos caused by the Industrial Revolution in the economic and legal sphere had been overcome—frequently by political revolutions and upheavals—the basic and eternal task of every government, that of guaranteeing the rights of the subject to survival by means of support, was re-established.

Since a vital part of the legal system in every period of history, past or present, has been dedicated to the welfare and survival of the subject with the aim of realizing security by support, and not by aggression, the psychological sources of the existence and practice of such laws must be deeply rooted in human nature—in experiences and typical situations which all human beings have to undergo in early childhood. The whole problem is closely connected with that of the psychological origin of law and justice in general, both of which are of an even more universal and eternal character.

In earliest infancy situations can be observed which are bound to give rise to direction by the mother and to conduct by the child in harmony with that direction. From birth onwards two overriding urges are prevalent in every child: for sleep and for food. The security the child enjoyed in its mother's womb and the seclusion from the outside world is preserved as far as possible by sleep for twenty out of the twenty-four hours during the first four weeks after birth (19). This is interrupted, apart from cleaning after urination and defaecation, only

by the necessity to receive food. The mother usually recognizes both desires, that for sleep and that for food, as natural and legitimate. She therefore takes care of the security and survival of the child by protecting his sleep and by producing and giving milk for feeding from her breast or, failing this, by bottle feeding.

The human child is not able to take food without the mother's assistance. When placed by her in a position to take her breast he is often reluctant on the first occasion and has to be induced by gentle force (19, 28, 45). But even if he responds readily to the invitation to take the nipple, he must first be brought into the position for sucking without, or even against, his will. By sucking, his need and his desire for food will be satisfied. Sucking, moreover, offers the first satisfaction of the erotic drive with the help of a body outside his own by bringing the erotogenous zone of the lips in contact with the erotogenous zone of the nipple (20, 63 f.). The feelings of the infant during and after sucking are usually pleasant, as may be seen from the few expressions it is able to display, or even from some activities during sucking which cannot be explained except as symptoms of love. The act of sucking is very complex (20, 28, 42, 45), and the description given of it therefore inadequate. Nevertheless, it may be stated that, in the majority of cases, the *first demand, or admonition, or advice*—howsoever it may be called—*received in life is one imposed by the mother on the infant for the purpose of his survival and accepted by him.* He does not yet respond to a law; he responds, however, to what may be described as a precursor of law.

The feelings for justice and law show five characteristic components which are only partly present when breast-feeding takes place for the first time. They all, however, make their appearance soon afterwards. These basic components are (29): first, law must express a demand or at least an advice by the ruler as to how to behave, and should have the effect of evoking a corresponding reaction by the ruled. (Authors who deny the element of command in law (34, 7*a*, 18) do so from a strictly legal standpoint, and do not intend to explain the psychological source which led to the establishment of justice and law. The 'doctrine of pure law' (34, 7*a*) which excludes all sociological and psychological elements from the *notion* of law does not deny that commands play an outstanding part in the *origin of the feelings* for law.) Secondly, inseparable from justice and law is a certain amount of threatening, and, if threats have not the desired effect of overcoming resistance, a certain amount of force. Thirdly, law must be of a permanent character; if not practised in typical situations repeatedly, consistently, and in accordance with fixed principles as a matter of course, actions or decisions of the ruler are based on isolated considerations, that is on discretion and not on law. Fourthly, the psyche of both ruler and subject must be pervaded by a strong feeling that what the ruled ought to receive, be it benefits or penalties, is *due* to him, although the two may not be in agreement as to *what* is due. Finally, in law and justice there must be two parties, the ruler who dispenses them, and the ruled who voluntarily or by constraint accepts them. These five psychological components of the feeling for justice and law—the demand to behave, force, permanent rules, the granting and receiving of what is due, and the presence of two parties, ruler and ruled—are all apparent in the situation of suckling.

The first element, the admonition or demand to behave in a prescribed manner, is inherent in the mother's action of bringing the suckling into the appropriate position without his will—which action in itself means the application of a certain amount of force—and, following this, in the invitation to take the nipple. If the child happens to be reluctant to do so, particularly on the first occasion, the mother forces it into his mouth, and if he sometimes falls asleep during sucking without having fed sufficiently, she may awaken him by a tender tap (45). In this she resorts again to the second element of law, to force, gentle though it is. In the first few weeks or months after birth the mother may even interrupt the child's sleep for the act of feeding (45) and then again gentle force is exercised to overcome apathy or reluctance. The suckling, too, having been brought into the position to suck without his will, experiences in a vague way the influence of force, and may experience in the same vague way the first inkling of the advantage of giving way and obeying which in spite of initial unpleasantness leads to, and ends in, the enjoyable act of sucking.

These two elements of the feeling for justice which are present from the very beginning in the act of sucking do not, however, bring any law into existence on the first occasion, because other essential components are still lacking. They too soon make their appearance through

the regular repetition of the event. When the child is fed six times a day during the first four weeks and four times during the next months in a more or less regular rhythm (9, 14) necessitated by the refilling of the breast and by the temporary disappearance of hunger, sucking becomes an established institution for many months, that is, for what is an eternity in the life of the new-born child. The concerted actions of mother and child create by their natural repetition the first rule of, and rule in, life which is imposed by the mother and accepted by the child in the sure expectation that the rule will be permanently applied in the future.

Nearly all philosophers of law past and present agree that another fundamental element of justice consists in the obligation of the ruler to give to everyone his due, corresponding with the demand of every subject to receive his due: according to the old maxim of Simonides (24) *suum cuique* is the essence of justice. Unfortunately, this tenet is of a merely formal character and contains no statement of *what* is due. The merit of my book *Rediscovery of Justice* (4, 198 *sq.*) may have been its attempt to clarify the minimum content of what is due to every human being as his natural right in our present age. It is not proposed to discuss the problem that rulers and ruled are frequently at loggerheads as to *what* is due. For the present purpose it is sufficient to state that the ruler's feeling of being under an obligation to grant everyone his due and the corresponding feeling on the subject's part of being entitled to receive his due constitute a feature of justice which is never absent. In the situation of sucking it is present in the mother's mind from the very beginning; she feels it is due to her child that he be fed by her and that it is her duty to grant him his due. This does not imply that mothers do not have unconscious and sometimes even conscious drives of aggression against the child or unconscious wishes for his death (11, 14, 16, 30, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 52). These aggressive urges, opposed as they are to the urge to feed, are frequently responsible for the mother's incapacity to feed in spite of her conscious desire to do so, and may lead to serious mental disturbances. Even in cases, however, where aggressive impulses lead to the employment of wet-nurses or to bottle feeding, the mother finds consolation in her belief that she has given the child, albeit by substitution, what is due to him.

The suckling himself, in spite of the fact that he has not yet developed an ego (25), has in any case a feeling of what is due to him, perhaps an even stronger feeling than in later life, since in the earliest period all emotions are much stronger and are not restricted or regulated by reason. This feeling is apparent and expressed in distinct protests—hunger cries as Gesell calls them (19) when occasionally the child's expectation of being fed at the accustomed time is disappointed.

Lastly, even at this stage, there are two parties involved in the rule. The mother is alive to her rôle as a ruler in the business of sucking; she is conscious of her duty to guide the child, if necessary by gentle force, and of her obligation to grant him his due. Unconsciously she may feel that there is no other person present but herself, because the child is still a part of her, her own flesh and blood, and not yet separate from her (12, 49); consciously she has to admit that he has desires and a destiny of his own. The child, though not an ego during the first period and not distinguishing between himself and the outer world (25, 13), identifies himself with the mother, with her good or bad breast, by the processes of projection and introjection (26*a*, 31, 36, 37, 38). There are therefore in his vague conception of the events two persons present: he is the omnipotent ruler in his identification with the guiding power of the mother, and at the same time he is the ruled as to his emotions.

Nevertheless, although all the elements of law and justice are apparent in the rules established for sucking, it may well be asked whether and why these rules for survival by support are the *earliest* rules to come into force. The aggressive impulses of the suckling, as Sigmund Freud, Anna Freud, and Melanie Klein emphasize (12, 14, 15, 16, 36, 37, 38), are tremendously powerful. Why, therefore, are not criminal laws, the very core of which is aggression, the first and basic laws to come into existence, the more so as in the life of every human being aggression precedes love?

The answer is that two periods in the functioning of aggression during the first year of life must be carefully differentiated. One is that of resistance against unpleasant demands of the mother; these demands are made at a later period of infancy, mainly at the time of weaning and cleanliness training. They meet with resistance from the child, frequently give rise to tantrums, and owing to their unpleasant character and the sacrifices they entail, strengthen the impulse of aggression against the mother.

At the same time the mother's aggressive impulses may also be increased by the necessity to break down the infant's resistance. It is this kind of aggression on the child's part which is combated by counter-measures and often by punishment. Its appearance and its subsequent suppression by the mother are the main source of criminal law. This aggression, however, provokes rules several months *after* the rules for sucking—and thereby the earliest law for survival—have been firmly established.

The other and earlier period of aggression sets in immediately after birth, and is based on a comprehensible biological instinct. The infant has to go through new, dangerous, and highly unpleasant experiences at the beginning of life, such as the trauma of birth, the terrifying changes in temperature, light, noises, disturbances of breathing, and many others. All these events are ascribed by the suckling (and by adults in primitive societies) in a vague way to hostile forces outside and inside himself, which at this stage means the same thing. The child's aggressive urge at this earliest period aims at removing his anxiety and at finding instinctively security by counter-attacks or by outbursts of fury against imagined attacks of an imagined enemy (42). Crying and tantrums, which are expressions of his aggression, are his only means of calling for protection and security; they are cries for help, support, and survival. They are understood as such by the mother, and do not usually incur even gentle punishment. On the contrary, the mother normally does everything she can to discover and eliminate the cause of the unpleasure which led to tantrums and prolonged crying. She rocks the child to assure him of the presence of a protective power and to replace his feelings of extreme discomfort by pleasurable experiences. She gives him extra warmth if she thinks his fury is caused by cold. It is highly probable, as Melanie Klein and her followers have impressively described (26*a*, 30, 31, 36, 37, 38), that the suckling nonetheless sees in the same mother who represents his only bridge to the outside world also the cause of his torments, and that he may desire to destroy her. His actions to this end are, however, not taken seriously, and even if they are recognized as attacks, are generally thought to be somewhat tragicomic. They do not normally call forth at this early stage any aggressive or punitive measures on the mother's part. The child is left free to urinate or defaecate as he wants, and to make his futile attempts to bite or to destroy. None of these activities leads to countermeasures or gives rise to the creation of rules. Their result is frequently to induce actions on the mother's part which again, like sucking, aim at protecting the child against real or imaginery dangers threatening a helpless being. Though parental attitudes show many variations (7), suppression of aggression on the child's part rarely leads to the introduction of rules at the earliest stage and accordingly does not produce criminal law at this period. Removal of anxiety, security by means of help and support are at this period normally the ruler's main aim and the subject of the first rules and the earliest laws.

Ernest Jones in his basic investigation into ' Fear, Guilt and Hate ' (32) has illuminated the problem of guilt by demonstrating that a pre-ideational anxiety (*Urangst*) exists from the very beginning of life and creates different phases of guilt feeling in the course of early development. His observations and conclusions are not intended to deal with the aim and attitude of the mother or with the urge for reparation, and they appear to be compatible with the description given above. Melanie Klein and others (30, 31, 36, 37, 38, 52), though emphasizing the process of introjection of the good mother at the earliest stage, stress simultaneously, and even more emphatically, the enormous importance of an impulse to make reparation which is created by the intense feeling of the suckling three months after birth and subsequently to have hurt and destroyed the mother by his aggressive drive; thus he wants to repair and revive her. No criticism (6, 10, 21, 56) of her observations is intended; it may be indicated, however, that, even if fully accepted, they may lead to divergent conclusions.

If the urge to make reparation for damage caused constituted an essential and effective force of the human mind at the earliest stage, and if its impetus were so conspicuous, it would have been bound to build up an essential part of all legal systems, as the aggressive urge did in forming criminal law or the impulse to support in creating social law. In fact, an impulse to make reparation is hardly apparent in any law. At present, it is true, the restoration of the defeated enemy is an object of international politics. The attitude of the victorious Powers is not, however, based on a desire to make reparation; its main result is the renunciation of reparations which victors have felt entitled to demand throughout the course of history. It

is a matter of interpretation whether the custom of some primitive tribes of mourning over the foes they have killed and the sacrifices to the spirits of slain enemies could be attributed to an impulse to make reparation, or rather to the urge to console these spirits and avert their vengeance. There is, of course, in every legal system an important part—the law of Torts—dedicated to the regulation of reparation, compensation, and restitution. This part, however, was not created by the desire of the perpetrator of the faulty action to *make* restitution, but, on the contrary, by the desire of the victim to *receive* restitution—and this desire alone is really a fundamental psychological urge, as is shown by the illuminating observations of Kelsen (35) and Roechlin (53).

Only small traces, if any, of an urge to *make* reparation can be found in legal institutions. The conclusion is therefore permissible that the strength of an early and basic urge of this kind in infancy, which would have led, by necessity, to corresponding universal legal concepts seems to have been somewhat exaggerated.

The further undeniable fact that in the development of legal tenets guilt was set up as a condition of responsibility on the demand of those who suffered damage, and not on that of those who caused it, also permits some doubt as to the validity of the hypothesis that a feeling of guilt pervades the mind of an infant three to six months after birth to such an extent that the urge to make reparation is dominant. Normally a feeling of guilt arises only when a rule has been violated (49*a*, p. 344). ' There is no morality '' as P. Schilder (54) convincingly stated, ' which is not superimposed by an executive power. Law and morals are, therefore, identified at this stage of development.' At this earliest stage it may happen that rules are imposed on the suckling by an aggressive tendency on the part of the mother (7, 20, 34, 36, 45), as is the case when punctuality of sucking at regular intervals is required too strictly and the child is left hungry for a time in spite of his hunger cries. Mothers may also frequently become impatient and thereby show their disapproval of certain behaviour on the part of the suckling (7). Owing to the empathy between mother and child (49) the suckling may feel in a vague way that his behaviour is disapproved of by the mother (11, 12, 45). If the mother frequently disapproves, the child may realize that a rule was imposed upon him and that he has broken the rule. As a result a rudiment of guilt feeling may arise; even so, there is a difference between the rules given for sucking and those which give vent to some aggression on the part of the mother. In the act of sucking there is normally a concerted and organized action of mother and child which leads to the satisfaction of them both. The child accepts the rule joyfully, while rules created by the aggression of the mother evoke his resistance and do not usually at this stage lead to counter-measures to break that resistance. It is doubtful whether the breaking of a rule which is not accepted and does not lead to actions on the ruler's part for its realization can create a feeling of guilt causing an urge for reparation. It is conceivable and probable that a rudiment of guilt feeling exists in the psyche of the suckling; it is not proved, however, and not probable, that this rudiment could create an overwhelming urge to make reparation.

These considerations lead directly to the last problem to be discussed, namely the origin and the influence of the superego or of conscience, which is responsible for the establishment of morals, law and justice (11, 14, 15, 33, 36, 38, 48). The superego—or a precursor of the superego (9, p. 102)—comes into existence earlier than was originally taught. The ego is not apparent at the very beginning of life (11, 12, 25); it gains in strength during the first year after birth in continuous close connexion with the superego. From the outset the suckling identifies himself with the mother by the processes of introjection and projection. He takes over, therefore, the rulings of the good mother who cares for his survival by support and protects him against dangers; by identification the benign image of the good mother and her advice becomes a fundamental part of his superego. At the same time he ascribes his sufferings to the bad mother who also has tremendous power, and thereby another part of his superego is something of a devil. There is, nevertheless, a difference between the two parts or elements of the superego; the benign ego-ideal enforces pleasant rules in the very first weeks after birth; the cruel superego—at this stage—does not create effective rules. Several months later prohibitive rules are effectively imposed upon the infant during weaning or cleanliness training or, maybe, by restricting auto-erotic satisfaction. The influence of the father also increases, and matriarchy which so far has governed the life of the infant is partly replaced by patriarchy with its much harder rules. As Freud stated,

the Oedipus complex by the prohibitions connected with it creates, and contributes to, the formation of the cruel side of the superego (14, 15, 33, 48). The fundamental fact, however, remains and should be kept in mind that the benign part of the ego-ideal of the mother creates effective rules first and retains its basic influence in the later life of the individual and of society. In prayer the cries for help of the suckling repeat themselves and reappear in the silent invocations even of the agnostic in moments of despair which, against his will, are directed to a supreme benevolent Power.

To sum up and to conclude: the superego comes into existence at the same time as the ego. The infant incorporates the benign mother as part of himself, and accepts her rules and advice as his ego-ideal. Several months afterwards he takes over as another part of his superego under protests and resistance the severe rules imposed on him, whose infringement may lead to punishment. Like the ego, both parts of the superego form, after many difficulties have been overcome, a unity which is very frequently unhomogeneous and unharmonious (33, 33*a*, 48). Law and justice due to the superego owe their origin and strength to Eros and aggression (11, 14, 15, 16, 33, 33*a*, 38, 48). Eros, however, created the *first* effective rules, and for this reason a most vital part of the legal and social order is based on his influence. Morals too are composed of two elements (14, 15, 16, 33, 48): that which calls for cruel measures against oneself, against one's fellow-men and against enemies, and the other which demands selflessness, love, sacrifice for others, and pity for oneself. In spite of all wars, all persecutions, all famines, of the atomic bomb, of the suppression of natural rights in many places and at all periods, security by means of support has, nevertheless, been established to such an extent that in unhappy Europe alone the population has increased from about 100 million in 1900 to 250 million to-day, and the population of the world to about 2,500 million. Eros thereby shows his overwhelming power, even though the momentum of his impetus may frequently lead to increased unhappiness for many. The reappearance of social laws is but a symptom of the strength of Eros.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(1) Adams, G. B. 'Feudalism.' *Encyclopedia Britannica* (edition of 1946), **10,** 964 *sq.*

(2) Alexander, F. 'Remarks about the Relation of Inferiority Feelings to Guilt Feelings.' *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **19,** 1938.

(3) —— and Healy, Wm. *Roots of Crime.* (New York: Knopf, 1935.)

(4) Bienenfeld, F. R. *Rediscovery of Justice.* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1947.)

(5) —— *Die Haftungen ohne Verschulden.* (Berlin-Wien: Springer, 1933.)

(6) Brierley, M. *Trends in Psycho-Analysis.* (London: Hogarth, 1951.)

(7) Coleman, R. W., Kris, E., and Provence, S. 'The Study of Variations of Early Parental Attitudes.' *Psychoanal. Study of the Child.*, **8,** 20 *sq.*

(7*a*) Ebenstein, W. *The Pure Theory of Law.* (Madison: Univ. Wisconsin Press, 1944.)

(8) Ehrenzweig, Albert A. Psychoanalysis of Negligence, North-Western Univ. Law Rev. 47.

(9) Fenichel, O. *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neuroses.*

(10) Flugel, J. C., *Man, Morals and Society.* (London, 1945; Penguin ed., 1955.)

(11) Freud, Anna (1949). 'Aggression in Relation to Emotional Development.' *Psychoanal. Study of the Child*, **3.**

(12) —— (1954). 'Psychoanalysis and Education,' *ibid.*, **9.**

(13) —— (1953). 'Some Remarks on Infant Observation,' *ibid.*, **8.**

(14) Freud, S. *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Standard Ed., **18.**

(15) —— *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, *ibid.*, **18.**

(16) —— *Civilisation and its Discontents.*

(17) Friedländer, L. *Sittengeschichte Roms*, **1.** (Leipzig, 1901.)

(18) Friedmann, W. *Legal Theory*, 3rd ed. (London: Stevens, 1953.)

(19) Gesell, A. *Infant and Child in the Culture of Today.*

(20) Glover, E. *On the Early Development of the Mind*, **1.** (London: Imago Publ. Co., 1956.)

(21) —— (1945) 'Examination of the Klein System of Child Psychology.' *Psychoanal. Study of the Child*, **1.**

(22) Groddeck, G. *The Book of the It.* (London: Vision Press, 1950.)

(23) Gross, Charles. 'Guild.' *Encyclopedia Britannica*, edition of 1946, **10.**

(24) Hamburger, M. *The Awakening of Western Legal Thought.* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1942.)

(25) Hartmann, H. (1956). 'Notes on the Reality Principle.' *Psychoanal. Study of the Child.*, **11.**

(26) Hesnard, A., and Laforgue, R. 'Les Processes d'autopunition.' *Rev. Française de Psychoanal.*, **4.**

(26*a*) HEIMAN, P. 'Introjection and Projection' (in) M. Klein. *Developments in Psycho-analysis.*

(27) HOCART, A. M. *Kingship.* (London: Watts, 1941.)

(28) HOFFER, W. (1949). 'Mouth, Hand, and Ego-Integration.' *Psychoanal. Study of the Child*, **3.**

(29) HOLLAND, E. T. *The Elements of Jurisprudence*, 13th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924.)

(30) ISAACS, S. *Childhood and After.* (London: Kegan Paul, 1948.)

(31) —— and HEIMANN, P. 'Regression' (in) M. Klein. *Developments in Psycho-Analysis.*

(32) JONES, ERNEST (1929). 'Fear, Guilt and Hate.' *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **10.**

(33) —— (1926). 'The Origin and Structure of the Super-Ego.' *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **7**, 303 *sq.*

(33*a*) —— 'The Genesis of the Super-Ego' (in) *Papers on Psycho-Analysis.*

(34) KELSEN, H. *General Theory of Law and State*, 1945.

(35) —— *Society and Nature.* (London: Kegan Paul, 1946.)

(36) KLEIN, MELANIE. 'The Early Development of Conscience in the Child' (in) S. Lorand, *Psychoanalysis To-day.* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1948.)

(37) —— 'On the Theory of Anxiety and Guilt' (in) *Developments in Psychoanalysis.* (London: Hogarth, 1952.)

(38) —— and RIVIERE, JOAN. *Love, Hate and Reparation.* (London: Hogarth, 1953.)

(39) LANG, O. *Chinese Family and Society.* (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1946.)

(40) LEVY, M. T. *The Family Revolution in Modern China.* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1949).

(41) LIN YUTANG. *The Importance of Living.* (London: Heinemann, 1938.)

(42) MCDOUGALL, WILLIAM. *An Outline of Psychology*, 13th ed. (London: Methuen, 1949.)

(43) MALINOWSKI, B. *Crime and Custom in Savage Society.* (London: Kegan Paul, 1932.)

(44) —— *The Foundation of Faith and Morals.*

(45) MIDDLEMORE, M. P. *The Nursing Couple.* (London: Cassell, 1941.)

(46) MITTEIS, H. *Der Staat des Hohen Mittelalters*, 2nd ed., 1944. Boehlaus Nachf.

(47) MOMMSEN, TH. 'Die Römische Clientel' (in) *Römische Forschungen*, 1864, **1.**

(48) MONEY-KYRLE, R. E. *Psychoanalysis and Politics.* (London: Duckworth, 1951.)

(49) OLDEN, CH. 'On Adult Empathy with Children.' *Psychoanal. Study of the Child*, **8**, 153.

(49*a*) PIAGET, J. *The Moral Judgment of the Child.* (London: Routledge, 1932.)

(50) REIK, TH. *Geständniszwang und Strafbedürfnis.* (Vienna: Psychoanal. Verlag, 1925.)

(51) RIVIERE, JOAN, and KLEIN, MELANIE. *Love, Hate and Reparation.* (London: Hogarth, 1953.)

(52) —— 'General Introduction' in: Melanie Klein and others, *Developments in Psycho-analysis.* (London: Hogarth, 1952.)

(53) ROECHLIN, G. 'Loss and Restitution.' *Psychoanal. Study of the Child*, **8**, 1953.

(54) SCHILDER, P. 'Problems of Crime' in: S. Lorand, *Psychoanalysis To-day.* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1948.)

(55) STEPHENSON, C. *Mediaeval Feudalism.* (New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 1942.)

(56) ZETZEL, E. R. 'An Approach to the Relation between Concept and Contact in Psychoanalytic Theory.' *Psychoanal. Study of the Child*, **11**, 1956.

(Received 15 December, 1956.)

BOOK REVIEWS

On the Early Development of Mind. By E. Glover, M.D. Selected Papers on Psycho-analysis: Vol. I. (London: Imago Publishing Company Ltd., 1956. Pp. 483. 45*s*.)

In his preface to this first volume of selected papers, Dr. Glover once again proclaims his scientific credo: he will not accept any theory that is not consonant with clinical observations, respectful of psycho-biological probability and continuous with the basic concepts of psycho-analysis. Once again, he thunders against the ' hypothetical reconstructions ' of early development and ' the moulding of theory in accordance with individual speculations '. He is (and perhaps this is a national characteristic) a fundamentalist, however much he may talk of ' breaking new ground ' or tease the student for his ' virginal ' reaction to theory or for ' a tendency to regard it like the Ark of the Covenant as a sacred untouchable structure '.

He openly hopes for the victory of the orthodox side (ambivalent though he feels towards it) because ' Freudian principles are still vital to the development of psycho-analysis '. The general impression conveyed is one of a deep and abiding devotion to psycho-analysis as conceived by Freud and a desire to see it develop through evolution and not revolution. He seems only too ready to observe that there is nothing new under the psycho-analytical sun. What is new is not true or else it is old. He remarks on the frequent bursts of exultation on the part of newcomers over apparently fundamental discoveries (' a little more reading may, however, lead to the rather dashing realization that the discovery is one of Freud's accepted observations ') and he recommends them to ' constant browsing in his (i.e. Freud's) earlier works before proceeding to publish discoveries '. He insists that ' since the death of Freud in 1939 no advances of importance have been made in the field of psycho-analysis in Great Britain ', and that ' a survey of so-called progress in psycho-analysis during the past twenty years shows conclusively that it still consists for the most part of giving body to the skeletal structure set up by Freud '. Conclusively to whom ? one might ask.

The articles in the book are uneven in quality and content. They are general articles, classificatory articles, and metapsychology. The general articles have to do with the past and present of psycho-analysis, the training of its practitioners, and the hopes and fears the author entertains for its future. Here he is at his best, the doyen of all training analysts. He describes the many and varied defences against the psychological approach and he warns against the obsessional therapist, the most dangerous of all, who always seeks to preserve the *status quo* and who, despite his talent for ' archaic psychic dialects ' is liable to exact toll for his gift in the form of refractory results. He is also, alas, antipathetic to the average psychiatrist who ' has neither the education nor the cultural background necessary for psycho-analytical research '. May we not claim to-day an increasing number of psychiatrists who are scientifically literate, or are we confusing, as the author thinks, science with magic? He reminds us of the exhortative, persuasive and sometimes negative, organically-minded physicians, who once ' drew the dyspeptic spinster's teeth, removed the unconscious homosexual's appendix, scoured the conversion hysteric's uterus, purged the latent paranoid hypochondriac's bowels, and injected all and sundry with vaccines or glandular extracts '. To-day, when Harley Street again resounds to ' a hum of admonition punctuated by firm slamming of doors ', with the endocrinologist standing on the very pinnacle of psychiatry, this amounts almost to blasphemy! At his worst, he becomes over-systematic and classificatory, and reading becomes tedious. It seems very doubtful to me whether his elaborate classifications will ever lead to any useful end. Psychiatrists will find the book too analytical and analysts too precise for their vague diagnostic purposes.

Looking back at his earlier essays in metapsychology, Dr. Glover comments on their naïveté but includes them for their historical interest. His main theoretical contributions are on orality in its many different forms (it is interesting to observe how fascinated is this gifted verbalizer with the oral stage of development) and the justly famous nuclear theory of ego development. ' One of our enthusiastic and skilled laboratory psychologists ' (colleagues in the medical section of the B.P.S. may not recognize the celebrity in this guise) is quoted as saying ' all that the Goldman-Eisler study has done is to confirm in a very impressive manner Abraham and Glover's original observation of a correlation ' (regarding the oral character). What analyst to-day would not be prepared to die for such scientific approval? However, Dr. Glover is not so flattered that he cannot castigate Professor Eysenck for his lack of a close acquaintance with the text of the original papers or with the works of Jung (who had a prior claim to the introversion-extraversion typology).

It is surprising how closely the historical development of the author's thought reflects that of psycho-analysis, so that in these pages we can live through

many of the trials and tribulations that punctuated the early days of the movement. A fine example of his critical sensitivity is offered to us by the reproduction of two reviews of the same book (Freud's *Hemmung*) separated by a gap of twelve years. The first gives a fairly subdued account of the book's scope and the climate of analytical opinion in which it was engendered. The second review is much more authoritative, and whilst praising the ' remarkable book ' and Freud's capacity to revise his own theory, severely analyses its ' disjointedness ', which was attributed to the ' old-fashioned nature ' of the clinical material, the ' old-fashioned classification ' of phobias, and to the neglect of the projective-introjective mechanisms, to which Glover, by this time, was deeply committed.

If the content has changed only slightly over the years, the style has changed hardly at all, and in this case the style is very much the man, pointed, tight and pungent. One can hardly forbear from quoting the many felicities of expression that adorn these pages, viz. ' a tendency to drowsiness during the dog-days of an analysis ' (what analyst cannot recall some of these when he lay becalmed in the doldrums of a stubborn resistance ?) and again, when speaking, almost rhapsodically, of the babe at the breast with its ' mystifying appreciation of two domes each like a face with an eye in the middle (? the source of the Cyclops legend) . . . a circumambient whiteness, a cosmic vantage point of brown. . . . (This is not psycho-biology; this is poetry!) . . . At times when the nipple is cracked there is mingled with milk a taste of blood.' What a picture of infantile savagery and barbarism do those last three words succeed in conjuring up !

His mastery of language is displayed especially in his attack upon concepts or opponents. For example, of the part-object he writes ' a specious but totally misleading concept . . . which has debauched so much of recent psycho-analytical thinking '; of counter-transference, ' towards which, indeed, there has been recently manifested a degree of almost fetichistic over-estimation '; of restitution, ' devotees to restitution-psychology, of whom there are not a few in this country, should note that Freud himself is the Father of Restitution-psychology '. Against opponents he is ruthless. His favourite target remains the ' neo-Jungianism ', which is described as ' a pseudo-mystical type of religious psycho-biology '. At times his pen runs away with him, and the style becomes manneristic and slightly ludicrous, as for example when he talks of ' a subacute inflammation of all his relations to reality '; or the ' sudden pallor of character indicates an internal drenching psychic hæmorrhage '.

His picture of child analysis is clearly influenced by this same militant viewpoint. Nothing worthwhile has been happening in the study of the child, apart from some beginnings in the psychology of the preconscious; twelve volumes of the *Psychoanalytical Study of the Child* are thus committed to oblivion. With regard to child development his views give rise to a certain uneasiness. He seems caught up in verbal concepts. He describes normal development in terms of a psychosis-neurosis pattern —*normal* psychosis and *normal* neurosis. The child is sequentially schizophrenic, with or without melancholic elements, paranoid, obsessional, and finally hysterical. Any accentuation of anxiety may lead to an abnormal (clinical) neurosis or psychosis. The reasons why these psychotic reactions have not been recognized (even by Freud) is that we are prone to think of psychosis in adult clinical terms, because we are reluctant to reactivate the memory in ourselves, and because we have sentimental feelings about the child. It is this sort of thesis and argument that the clinical psychiatrist finds incomprehensible and ' maddening ' (probably an infantile psychotic reaction but not, mark you, the reanimation of a ' position '). We have all been ' larval psychotics ' since infancy, and that is why we turn out to be so normal; the catch-phrase to all this is: ' no adult normality without an infantile " psychosis " '. The psychiatrist may bite his fingernails, but we know what Dr. Glover thinks of the psychiatrist.

Finally, a word about the title, which is a bit misleading. I have already met one irate reader who purchased the book on the strength of its title and then felt she had been sold a pup in that ' mind ' for her was in no way synonymous with the psychoanalytical mental apparatus. While sharing her view about this, I have advised her to read it diligently and experience the same pleasure and enlightenment gained by the reviewer. I cannot refrain, however, from adding one deliberate misquotation from Tennyson, which provides, I feel, an appropriate comment on some aspects of the book.

' The old order changeth, giving place to new,
And Freud fulfils himself in many ways
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world.'

E. J. Anthony.

The Trickster. By Paul Radin, with commentaries by Karl Kerényi and C. G. Jung. (London: Routledge, 1956. Pp. xi + 211. 21s.)

This book by the American anthropologist, Paul Radin, is of importance to psycho-analysts. It describes the American Indian version of one of the most basic of all human myths—the myth of the trickster. The trickster is a primitive being with a dual character—he is sly and stupid at the same time. His slyness shows in his playing pranks and cunning tricks on others. His stupidity expresses itself in jesting and buffoonery which causes him to look ridiculous and to be laughed at. This character appears in myths of all types; he is epitomized by Hermes in Greek mythology and by Till Eulenspiegel in the Middle Ages. He is the Court Jester, the in-

fantile cunning and funny character. He encourages the whole of nature to laugh at his antics, but at the same time is engaged in sly and destructive pursuits.

In the North American Indian myth—particularly that of the Winnebago tribe described by Dr. Radin —the trickster takes the form of a grotesque individual, possessing huge digestive organs and huge sexual organs; he combines some of the characteristics of a human being with added characteristics of animals and of a god. He has no conscious control over his activities. He has a massive appetite—both oral and sexual—but this insatiable appetite is never satisfied in any of the stories. He is actively concerned with trying to play sly and cunning tricks upon others, to fool them and dupe them, but his tricks usually recoil upon himself so that he appears as a mere buffoon and a butt of jokes and laughing.

At the same time, along with his sly cunning and his jesting buffoonery, the trickster attempts to create goodness in the world. He is both creator and destroyer, and his activities finally result in his becoming a being not unlike a man. He is so split that his left hand does not know what his right hand is doing; he carries out his destructive and his creative activities simultaneously without one part being aware of what the other is doing. This combination of creativity and of sly destructiveness, Dr. Kerényi points out in his commentary, is very familiar in mythology. It is not unlike, for example, the relationship between Prometheus and Epimetheus—Prometheus the creator of man and the giver of fire; Epimetheus his brother, the fool, the stupid one who marries Pandora and brings trouble (and hope) to the world.

Psycho-analysts will recognize the play of some of the most primitive unconscious phantasies in this myth, and herein lies the significance of the book. Splitting is described in its most deeply unconscious forms. There is the operation of the life instinct and the death instinct side by side; appetite is voracious and insatiable. The Trickster's use of slyness and cunning on the one hand, and stupidity on the other, as a means of maintaining the separateness of good and bad objects, and omnipotent control over them, contain revealing parallels to Mrs. Klein's descriptions of paranoid infantile anxieties.

The myth itself is well described by Dr. Radin, and Dr. Kerényi's comparisons with Greek and medieval mythology are most enlightening.

Elliott Jaques.

Sex in Christianity and Psycho-analysis. By William Graham Cole. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1957. Pp. xiv + 329. 21s.)

This book by an American Protestant minister is unlikely to interest psycho-analysts. Competent, readable, and unprovocative in the manner of the *Reader's Digest*, it will appeal to those who prefer ready answers to pointed questions.

Mr. Cole's method is to give digests of the views on sex held by some eminent Christians from St. Paul to the present day, which he follows by digests of the views of Freud and some other psycho-analysts. In the final chapter he attempts 'a critical reconstruction of Christian interpretations of sex'.

H. J. Home.

The Object Relations Technique. By Herbert Phillipson. Foreword by J. D. Sutherland. (London: Tavistock Publications, 1955. Pp. 224. 21s. Text together with the 12 plates of Test Material 3 gns. Test Material only 52s. 6d.)

The book, which explains this projective test devised by Mr. Phillipson and his colleagues, is dedicated to Henry A. Murray, the explorer of personality. This is an acknowledgement of the fact that the new technique had its origins in Murray's Thematic Apperception Test—the 'T.A.T.' The T.A.T. consists of four series of pictures, one for boys, one for girls, one for men, and one for women, about which the subject is asked to tell stories. There are human figures in most of these pictures and their sex and age are usually recognizable; the situations in which they are shown are more or less ambiguous; the drawings are mostly in the style of popular illustrated story-magazines.

The Object Relations Technique (O.R.T.) has a similar purpose, but differs from the T.A.T. in many respects. It consists only of 12 plates and one blank card which may be given to subjects of both sexes and a very wide range of ages. There are three sets of four cards, each set presenting one person, two and three persons, and a larger group. In the first set, the drawing is in light shading and the environmental setting is not defined; in the second, the shading is dark, almost black, with the environmental setting clearly defined, and in the third, the figures appear in a detailed environmental setting with the outlines lightly sketched and with different colours introduced.

The human forms in the first and second set of the O.R.T. are for the most part presented so that their sex, age, and race cannot be determined from the drawing; they bear a vague resemblance to the statues of Mr. Henry Moore and some other contemporary sculptors; those in the third set are only a little less ambiguous. This ambiguity is, in fact, the outstanding advantage of the test. The subject, asked to describe the situation in the picture and make up a brief story about it, is almost obliged to begin by finding identities for the characters. The ambiguous picture stimulates a special type of day-dream which can, of course, be studied psycho-analytically.

Extreme ambiguity is, of course, a quality of the Rorschach Test. It has been shown that the use of shading in creating a Rorschach response is an expression of anxiety, and there is some evidence that

the use of colour in that context indicates the degree and kind of emotional response to the environment. The human forms in the O.R.T. lead the subject to talk about people, and his reactions to the darkness, the lighter shading, and the colours provide clues to his emotional state.

The idea of combining these valuable features of the Rorschach and the T.A.T. was a brilliant one, and Mr. Phillipson and his team have put it most successfully into practice. His artists, Miss Elizabeth Carlisle and Madame Olga Dormondie, are to be congratulated. The drawings, while not intended to be works of art, are pleasing and would probably not be disturbing to the vast majority of psychiatric patients.

The simplicity of the pictures should enable the investigator to apply statistics to the material without too much difficulty; a start has been made by Mr. Phillipson himself, who gives some normative data for 50 psychiatric out-patients, as well as by Mrs. O'Kelly, some of whose findings for 40 normal adolescent girls are quoted. The technique, like its better-known predecessors, is, however, primarily a means of studying mental processes and not a measuring instrument. Many possible uses of it suggest themselves; in psychiatry it may prove valuable in the differential diagnosis of psychotic, neurotic, and organic conditions; in anthropology it could be used for cross-cultural comparisons. Much research will have to be done before we can fairly estimate the value of this promising method. It is hoped that this will not deter clinical psychologists and research workers from using the technique in their own explorations of personality.

The technique has a sound empirical foundation, but it is also based upon the theory of internal objects as developed by Fairbairn and Ezriel and upon some modern hypotheses relating perception to personality as a whole, for instance those of Bruner. These theoretical views Mr. Phillipson strives to integrate into a theory of his own which is then most ingeniously and industriously applied to actual O.R.T. material. Consequently his book contains much that is controversial. It is very difficult to discuss this complex subject fairly in a review. A couple of quotations will serve to indicate Mr. Phillipson's point of view:—

(1) ' This conclusion, that the process of perception is primarily determined by, and therefore understandable in terms of personal relationships, implies that it should be possible to develop concepts in these terms to characterize, for example, an individual's perception and interpretation of a social situation, a T.A.T. picture or a Rorschach ink blot.'

(2) ' Stated more generally: in any sequence of behaviour in a given stimulus situation (e.g. specific social situation, a T.A.T. picture or Rorschach ink-blot presentation) an individual will select from the perceptual field, and structure what he selects, to fit with unconscious object relationships which in early life were phantasied to satisfy a primitive need. At the same time he will characterize what he sees in terms of object-relationships which have been built up in order to guard against the consequences he fears might result from his unconscious wishes.'

Those who wish to use this admirable standard means of tapping phantasy-material will find some useful information in Mr. Phillipson's text. This material can be interpreted and analysed in many different ways and from various theoretical standpoints.

Victor B. Kanter.

Migration and Mental Disease. By Benjamin Malzberg and Everett S. Lee. Social Science Research Council. (New York: 1956. Pp. x + 142. $1.50.)

This research was carried out under the aegis of the Committee on Migration Differentials. It is a study of first admissions to psychiatric hospitals in New York during 1939–1941. The results are very striking indeed: during that period, admissions were markedly higher for migrants than for non-migrants, regardless of sex and colour. This was true for all psychoses including those of old age. The differential was even more marked for recent than for earlier migrants. The authors warn against rash interpretations. Although their data suggest that rates of mental illness are higher for migrants than for non-migrants, a number of reservations have to be made before drawing such a conclusion. Admission to hospital is not a reliable index of the incidence of mental illness among a special section of a population. This study is a model of its kind, especially through the absence of special pleading in favour of a particular etiological factor.

E. Stengel.

Rorschach Location and Scoring Manual. By Leonard Small. (New York and London: Grune and Stratton, 1956. Pp. 214.)

This is a well-prepared and comprehensive manual which covers the commoner Rorschach responses. It is really a mechanical aid to Rorschach scoring, even though the authors stress that it should not be used as such. It is conveniently thumb-indexed, and if one uses Rorschach's test in the conventional way, should be a great asset. Like all mechanical aids, however, its use may detract from the more spontaneous psycho-analytic assessment of Rorschach responses. For those who work with Rorschach, and find scoring manuals useful, this book should have a great appeal. It is certainly beautifully prepared and generously laid out.

Joseph Sandler.

Fundamental Statistics in Psychology and Educaiton. By J. P. Guilford. 3rd rev. ed. (New York

and London: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc., 1956. Pp. xi + 565. $6.25 or 47*s*.)

Guilford has occupied a well-deserved position among students of psychology and education for many years. His *Psychometric Methods* (1936) has been followed by the present volume, now in its third edition.

Professor Guilford is a born teacher, and his subject is a difficult one. He has always managed to convey the most difficult of statistical concepts without demanding too much in the way of mathematical training from the student. His textbook provides a balanced account of the various statistical procedures in common use, and the new edition includes Bartlett's test of homogeneity of variance, and some of the non-parametric tests of significance which will certainly be finding a useful application in psychometric work. One may however criticize Guilford on the ground that he tends to be a trifle too conservative and wedded to the older psychometric methods. But this does not detract from the excellence of the volume.

Joseph Sandler.

Annual Review of Psychology. Paul R. Farnsworth and Quinn McNemar (eds.). Vol. 7. (Stanford, California: Annual Reviews Inc., 1956. Pp. 448. $7.00.)

This is, as usual, a goldmine of information, and the present volume is perhaps the best of those published to date. The sixteen chapters cover the usual range of psychological topics, and include abnormalities of behaviour, psychotherapy, counselling, and a new chapter on gerontology.

With the growth of psycho-analytic psychology as distinct from psycho-analytic psychopathology and therapy, the research psycho-analyst will find this book useful as a reference source to psychological material which can be integrated into a psycho-analytic mode of thought. It is a pity that most of the authors seem to equate progress in psychology with the increased application of psychometric methods. Theories as such are given scant attention in the discussion, but this is a consequence of the necessity for condensation.

It is to be hoped that in forthcoming editions psycho-analytic psychology will find a chapter of its own. Nevertheless this book is a valuable asset to research workers who want to scan and trace relevant new contributions with speed and ease.

Joseph Sandler.

Perversions, Psychodynamics and Therapy. Edited by Sandor Lorand, M.D. Associate Editor, Michael Balint, M.D. (New York: Random House, 1956, $7.)

This is a symposium consisting of articles written by seventeen distinguished workers in the field representing several different countries, all of whom accept Freud's basic formulations on perversion. All except two of the contributors are psychoanalysts. In the introduction it is stated that the book is intended to offer a summary of current views on perversion, and that promise has been admirably fulfilled. Despite the fact that the contributors are by no means homogeneous in their opinions, the work has been well articulated, so that there are no confusing contradictions.

The subdivision into sections is a helpful one in that it enables the reader more easily to look up what he needs at any given time. Each contributor has an individual slant upon the subject; e.g. Balint's concept of perversions as being attempts to escape from the two main demands of mature genitality; (1) accepting as real the intense need in ourselves for periodic regressions in the form of heterosexual coitus, and (2) accepting the necessity of the work of conquest (by which he means the winning of the object for genital partnership). General theory is presented by Gillespie in a clear and systematic way. Muensterberger deals with cultural aspects of perversion and states that what often seem to be contradictions are actually culture-bound adaptations, rooted in the interaction between physiological, psychological, and environmental forces, following Freud's allusion to this phenomenon in a paper written as early as 1908. Feldman stresses the importance of traumatic situations in forcing the gratification of an originally heterosexual impulse through the détour of homosexuality.

Bychowski discusses the relationship between homosexuality and psychosis. He refers to the personality structure of drug addicts, many of whom show homosexuality, but the group is far from being a homogeneous one. Bacon, in discussing the development of female homosexuality, confirms with examples Freud's formulation that the child is impelled to repeat actively any experience which he had been forced in the past to suffer passively. The sections on sado-machochism, male exhibitionism, and fetishism are very helpful. Finally, the section on therapy is valuable.

It would be invidious to make comparisons between the various papers, all of which preserve a uniformly high standard. What one tends to do, however, is to concentrate upon those articles which provide the answer to the particular clinical and theoretical problems with which one is at present confronted. Following this preamble, I should like to underline the practical importance and value of Lorand's article on the therapy of perversions, which is the last chapter of a worthy book.

A. H. Williams.

ABSTRACTS

Contents:

Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, **4**, 1956, No. 4.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, **25**, 1956, No. 4.

Bulletin d'Activités, Association des Psychanalystes de Belgique, Nos. 26–28.

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHO-ANALYTIC ASSOCIATION **4**, 1956, No. 4.

Robert Waelder. 'Freud and the History of Science.'

The development of the scientific attitude led to a situation where enquiry into topics which were incapable of objective verification was considered 'unscientific'. Such subjects were the concern of religion, metaphysics, and the like. The cleavage between the humanities and science was further accentuated by the tendency to differentiate between the so-called 'higher' and 'lower' manifestations of human life. By destroying the artificial divisions which existed between each and every aspect of thought and behaviour Freud bridged the gap between the humanities and science. Freud combined a powerful imagination with an equally exacting scientific conscience. The former enabled him to be free in his thinking and the latter demanded a test of theory in the process of his analytical work.

Little has been added to psycho-analysis since Freud. Waelder suggests that there are valid reasons to account for this relative stagnation of post-Freud psycho-analysis. The long period of training, the small number of cases which any psycho-analyst treats, the difficulty of pooling clinical experience, and the obstacles which impede the dissemination of this material are only several of the factors involved. A comparison is made with the abrupt ending of Greek mathematics about 200 B.C. In this case breakdown of the oral tradition and the absence of a symbolic notation are regarded as two of the basic causes. In a similar way psycho-analysis is dependent on personal contact and the oral tradition. The development of psycho-analysis might be greatly accelerated if there was developed a language or a system of concepts which would make it possible to describe personality structure with a high degree of specificity so that it could be correctly and quickly understood by all.

Karl A. Menninger. 'Freud and American Psychiatry.'

This paper begins with an interesting and vivid account of the early years of American psycho-analysis and of the men who laid the foundations for its future growth. Psycho-analysis changed American psychiatry from a predominantly diagnostic system to a therapeutic science. This occurred because of the understanding which psycho-analysis imparted to the clinical phenomena encountered in psychiatric work. The acceptance of the need for personal analysis became in time the keystone of the psycho-analytic movement. The author believes that it was Freud's inherent optimism which appealed to the idealism of American doctors; it was a new way of helping people and building a better world.

Ernest Jones. 'Our Attitude toward Greatness.'

Jones begins by drawing attention to the outstanding features of Freud's achievement. First there was the loneliness of the task, and second the enormous resistance which was generated as a reaction to the insights which he had won. The opposition to Freud's discoveries was essentially different to the opposition encountered even by such figures as Copernicus and Darwin. In the case of psycho-analysis the opposition was internal and itself unconscious. It was therefore inaccessible to the usual influences which change people's attitudes and opinions.

Our attitude toward greatness is determined basically by the various attitudes which a son may have, consciously and unconsciously, towards his father. Opinions which have been expressed about Freud and his work reflect the vicissitudes of the father-son relationship. Openly negative, positive, and ambivalent feelings have been uttered by numerous writers in psychology, neurology, sociology, and literature. Examples of such opinions and their relevance to psycho-analysis are discussed.

Martin Grotjahn. 'A Letter by Sigmund Freud with Recollections of his Adolescence.'

This letter by Freud is of particular interest. Its contents throw light on the motives which lay behind Freud's choosing the house in which he was to live for forty-seven years.

Ernst Kris. 'The Personal Myth: A Problem in Psychoanalytic Technique.'

Excerpts from the analyses of three patients are presented in this paper to illustrate why in certain

cases the personal history assumes the importance of a treasured possession. Such autobiographies have a double function. They are defensive inasmuch as they prevent wishes and affects from becoming conscious. They are also heir to important phantasies of early childhood. The repressed phantasy is a variation of the ' family romance '.

In the latter part of the paper the obsessional quality of the patients is referred to. Those features of the personality arising from anal-sadistic trends are outlined. The author then discusses the prematurity of ego development which is assumed to be characteristic of obsessional neurotics. Kris points out that it is not only prohibitions which are internalized in early childhood. It is his impression that the first noticeable manifestation of prematurity of all ego functions related to internalization is originally linked to the early development of memory. The matrix of the memory function is the re-finding of the needed and later beloved object. Memory functions can be distinguished according to their degree of autonomy. One set, with high autonomy, are those concerned with the ability to acquire, retain, and recall. A memory function with low autonomy is that concerned with the self, i.e. autobiographical memories. The usefulness of this distinction is illustrated by the selective character of the infantile amnesia. It (the amnesia) includes the experiences of the self, but does not include the impact of reality testing, skills, conceptualization or information acquired during the same period of time. Where the self is concerned, where memory is autobiographical, autonomy in the broadest sense is never fully achieved, distorting influences never cease to play their part, and recollections remain connected with needs and affects.

Thomas Freeman.

THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC QUARTERLY
25, 1956, No. 4.

William G. Niederland. ' River Symbolism. Part 1.'

This paper contains a general survey of river symbolism in most of its aspects—as a male and a female symbol, as a symbol of the body, of the breast, of healing, etc. The author stresses particularly the condensation of symbolism around the process of birth, and emphasizes the fluid components of the earliest experiences, which enter into the Isakower phenomenon and the dream screen. The suckling wakes first with a desire for food, and Niederland believes that in dreams of flowing water an oral component may be discerned below the urinary. Drowning, or ' going under ', as an aspect of drinking, may be the nearest representation of death which the unconscious can muster. The author believes of dreams of rivers what Friedman believes of dreams of bridges, that they tend to occur at crucial intervals in analysis, broaching new material of a deeply repressed kind.

Morris W. Brody. ' Clinical Manifestations of Ambivalence.'

The term ambivalence loses meaning when applied to every psychopathological bipolarity. In this paper ambivalence (of love and hate) is regarded as a psychic striving with narcissistic and hedonistic aims; its origin and mode of functioning are discussed. It is most intense in the infant who has been subjected to gross oral and anal deprivations, as a result of which he can form relationships only with part-objects. The ambivalent person is so painfully dependent that he cannot express or feel his hatred of frustration; instead he reacts with further helplessness. This behaviour enables him both to externalize his problem and to achieve a magical omnipotence. He therefore lacks a realistic frame of reference for appraising reality. As a result it becomes as though he neither loved nor hated. Whenever the ambivalent person believes himself to be hated he withdraws love as a magical manoeuvre to compel the object to bestow love.

Ernest A. Rappaport. ' The Management of an Erotized Transference.'

An erotized transference is one in which the patient expects the analyst to behave like a parent in reality without this wish being ego-dystonic. The gnawing hunger of these patients, ultimately for the mother, is too urgent easily to allow of the analysis becoming a learning experience. Such patients have had parents with whom they could establish no real contact. The only contact they have known is that of argument and brawl; and this they try to re-establish with the analyst, thinly disguised, if the analyst is of the opposite sex, in stormy demands for genital contact.

None the less, they can still be influenced by corrective emotional experience provided the analyst is completely sincere. He must bring into the open the patient's subtle attempts to manipulate him, indicate that he can stand an analytic failure, and show the patient the feelings of inferiority behind the defence of antagonism. The term ' erotized transference ' is Blitzsten's, and his advice is several times quoted with respect.

Gustav Bychowski. ' General Aspects and Implications of Introjection.'

Introjection is for the author the ego's way of internalizing all aspects of reality in order to adapt to it. He describes some applications of this concept in fields other than psycho-analysis. For example the innate images postulated by the ethologists may in this way be equated with introjects, since every instinctual drive operates in relation to an inherited Gestalt, formed from the summation of an infinite series of experiences. Such an idea of imagery

corresponding to the apperception of reality as inherent in the ego of both man and animals had been postulated previously in the philosophy of Leibniz. Bychowski concludes with some historical examples of the cultural externalization of introjects in various societies with its consequences.

Eric Berne. 'The Psychological Structure of Space with Some Remarks on Robinson Crusoe.'

An interest in space or spaces may usually be classified according to the instinctual drive it chiefly represents. Mental or physical interest in exploration, measurement, or utilization are sublimations, respectively, of oral incorporative, anal obsessive, and phallic intrusive and erective attitudes. Clinical evidence is presented to demonstrate that, in one case, exploration pursued as an end in itself appeared to follow an orderly psychosexual sequence, with an initially predominating oral incorporative component. Such systematic explorers as Sven Hedin and the patient here studied are believed to proceed through a sequence of sublimated pregenital activities. Robinson Crusoe shows an intense oral fixation, and for this reason his explorations were incomplete and inefficient. The psychological organization of space is a highly individual process, but there are universally basic factors, as shown by the literature on the subject and by experiences in group therapy.

(Author's summary.)

Marcel Heiman. 'The Relationship between Man and Dog.'

The dog is for civilized man what the totem animal was for the primitive, a protector against the fear of death, which is first experienced as separation anxiety. Since separation anxiety gives rise to an increase in the cannibalistic drives the dog is also in that sense a protector. The similarity of the psychic apparatus of dog and man facilitates the maintenance of equilibrium by identification and projection. The dog is also of service, especially to women, in sublimating pre-oedipal (and oedipal) drives. Thus the dog is an important aid in sublimating unconscious forces incompatible with civilization.

John Klauber.

BULLETIN D'ACTIVITÉS, ASSOCIATION DES PSYCHANALYSTES DE BELGIQUE

No. 26.

F. Duyckaert, in relation to Freud's Centenary, compares psycho-analysis and modern rationalism from a methodological point of view. S. Nacht discusses 'life or death instinct', and expresses the opinion that the auto-destructive trends are related to the early conditions of life and may be cured. They are not acted out with the unconscious goal of leading the individual back to an undifferentiated state.

The rôle of identification in the analytical process is discussed by J. Lampl-de Groot, who thinks that the psycho-analyst has to provide his patient with satisfactory identifications and that this is not inconsistent with neutrality. In the same way, P. Luquet writes about some non-verbal factors of recovery in the psycho-analytical cure, and includes the introjection of the objectivity, the understanding mind, and the kindness of the psycho-analyst.

F. Lechat presents a detailed paper on the consequences of early object relations on adulthood, especially of the loss of the fundamental object. According to him the following process takes place:

(i) Aggressive trends are directed toward the object.
(ii) The aggressive trends become jammed by fear.
(iii) The feeling arises that all contact may be dangerous both for the object and the subject, and anxiety is always latent.
(iv) The individual refrains from winning or accepting another's affection. Both love and aggression are blocked and he is only able to discharge by pseudo-love and pseudo-aggressiveness toward pseudo-objects.

Beside the above-mentioned papers, Bulletin No. 26 contains an excerpt from A. Freud's 'Some Remarks on the Observation of Newborns', notes on the 'Integration of Behaviour' by T. M. French, and a summary of Glover's inquiry on psycho-analytical technique.

No. 27

List of Contents:

S. Lebovici et R. Diatkine: *Les obsessions chez l'enfant.*
P. Marty: *La relation d'objet allergique.*
S. A. Shentoub: *Quelques remarques concernant la structuration dynamique des mécanismes obsessionnels.*
D. Luminet: *Thérapie brève de l'asthme bronchique.*

No. 28

List of Contents:

R. Spitz: *Dépression infantile et syndrome d'adaptation.*
G. Zilboorg: *Aux frontières de la Psychanalyse.*
K. Victorius: *Le Moïse de Michel-Ange de Sigmund Freud.*
S. A. Shentoub: *De quelques problèmes dans l'homosexualité masculine active.*
R. Held: *Difficultés de l'analyse de certaines résistances intellectuelles.*
N. N. Dracoulides: *La complexualité de Platon.*
A. J. Siegman: *La sentimentalité, une défense hystérique.*
F. Lechat: *Autour du principe de plaisir.*

NEWS, NOTES AND COMMENTS

20TH CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

This international gathering of psycho-analysts took place in Paris from 28 July to 1 August, 1957, and a full report will shortly be published in the *Bulletin*. Our French colleagues deserve our thanks for the splendid work of organization and for the hospitality they extended to the members and guests of the International Congress. The Congress was opened by the President, Dr. Heinz Hartmann, who with this Congress brought to a close his third term of office. Dr. Ernest Jones, our Honorary President, was the first speaker, and over 700 members and guests gave him an ovation before and after his paper. The majority of the papers read, including two of the three Panel Discussions, will be published in Volume 39 of this Journal during 1958.

OFFICERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

The 20th Congress of the International Psycho-Analytical Association elected the following officers for the period of two years: *President:* Dr. W. H. Gillespie (London); *Immediate Past President:* Dr. Heinz Hartmann (New York); *Honorary Vice-President:* Mme. Marie Bonaparte; *Vice-Presidents:* Miss Anna Freud (London), Dr. Maxwell Gitelson (Chicago), Dr. Willi Hoffer (London), Dr. Jean Lampl-de Groot (Amsterdam), Dr. S. Nacht (Paris), Dr. Raymond de Saussure (Geneva); *Hon. Treasurer:* Dr. Phyllis Greenacre (New York); *Hon. Secretary* (appointed by the President, Dr. W. H. Gillespie): Miss Pearl King (63 New Cavendish Street, London, W.1, England).

21st CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

This Congress will be held in the summer of 1959 at Copenhagen, Denmark. The President, Dr. W. H. Gillespie, has appointed the Programme Committee, with Dr. W. Hoffer as Chairman and Dr. Paula Heimann as Hon. Secretary. Communications should be addressed to Dr. Paula Heimann, Hon. Secretary, 32 Eamont Court, Eamont Street, London, N.W.8, England.

SOCIÉTÉ PSYCHANALYTIQUE DE PARIS

The Institute of Psycho-Analysis in Paris announces a Postgraduate Course to be held in Paris during 1958. It is hoped that twenty-five participants will meet and discuss present-day problems of psycho-analytic theory, clinic and technique; adult and child cases will be discussed in smaller groups and in great detail. Enquiries should be addressed to: Dr. S. Nacht, Directeur de l'Institut de Psychanalyse, 187 rue Saint-Jacques, Paris.

CHARLES FREDERICK MENNINGER AWARD

The American Psychoanalytic Association at its annual meeting in Chicago on 12 May, 1957, conferred the first Charles Frederick Menninger Award on Dr. Charles Fisher. Dr. Fisher is on the staff of the Mount Sinai Hospital, New York, and is a training analyst of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute.

The Award was established a year ago by Dr. Karl A. Menninger and Dr. William C. Menninger, of the Menninger Foundation, as a memorial to their father, who was the founder of the original Menninger Sanitarium at Topeka, Kansas. The Award is to be given annually for original research in psycho-analysis. The members of the Award Committee are five former Presidents of the Association: Dr. Leo H. Bartemeier of Baltimore, Maryland; Dr. Maxwell Gitelson of Chicago, Illinois; Dr. M. Ralph Kaufman of New York City; Dr. Robert P. Knight of Stockbridge, Massachusetts; and Dr. Karl A. Menninger of Topeka, Kansas. Dr. Fisher received the Award in recognition of experimental work on the role of primary modes of perception in dream formation. In a series of carefully controlled experiments he was able to verify some of the basic theoretical principles originally postulated by Freud in his work on dreams. The work was carried on in the Department of Psychiatry of the Mount Sinai Hospital and was made possible through the assistance of the Foundations' Fund for Research in Psychiatry.

The papers in which the result of this work is presented were published in the *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association:* 'Dreams and Perception', **2,** 1954, 389–445; 'Dreams, Images, and Perception', **4,** 1956, 5–48

PROFESSOR HEINRICH MENG, M.D.

Widely acclaimed by his colleagues, co-workers, and patients, Dr. Heinrich Meng celebrated this summer his seventieth birthday. Dr. Meng was highly thought of by Freud and became closely associated with the late Dr. Paul Federn, with whom he edited well-known encyclopedias on

general medicine as well as on psycho-analysis. To-day Dr. Meng is considered the outstanding representative of psycho-analysis in the German-speaking countries of Europe. Dr. E. Blum, one of the oldest members of the Swiss Psycho-Analytical Society, expresses his and his colleagues' appreciation of Dr. Meng in a special issue of the Swiss periodical, *Der Psychologe*.

THE ERNST KRIS MEMORIAL MEETING

The New York Psychoanalytic Society and Institute and the Western New England Psychoanalytic Society arranged the Ernst Kris Memorial Meeting at the Academy of Medicine, New York City, on 24 September, 1957. Chairman of the afternoon session was Dr. Ruth Loveland, President of the New York Institute; Dr. Lawrence S. Kubie introduced Dr. Phyllis Greenacre, who presented her Memorial Lecture entitled 'The Family Romance of the Artist'. Dr. Leo Stone, Dr. David Beres, and Dr. Robert C. Bak spoke as discussants. This was followed by a paper based on Dr. Kris' Discussions of Case Presentations in the Gifted Adolescents Research Project, and presented by Dr. Leo S. Loomie, Dr. Victor H. Rosen, and Dr. Martin H. Stein. Dr. Mary O'Neil Hawkins acted as Moderator, and Dr. Bertram D. Lewin, Dr. Annie Reich and Dr. Margaret S. Mahler as discussants. After the recess, a paper, 'Influence of Early Mother-Child Interaction on Identification Processes as Observed in a Longitudinal Study' was presented by Dr. Samuel Ritvo and Dr. Albert J. Solnit. Dr. Charles Brenner was Moderator, and Dr. Rudolph M. Loewenstein, Dr. Jacob A. Arlow, and Dr. Robert P. Knight discussed the paper.

In the evening session, with Dr. Robert C. Bak in the chair, Dr. Heinz Hartmann introduced Miss Anna Freud, who gave her Memorial Address on 'Problems of Development', the discussion being opened by Dr. René A. Spitz.

ANNA FREUD, LL.D., IN WORCESTER MASS.

A lecture entitled 'Adolescence', by Dr. Anna Freud, was delivered before the Child Guidance Association under the chairmanship of Dr. Joseph Weinreb on 18 September, 1957. This was followed by sessions on two subsequent days in which clinical problems and those of management arising from the therapeutic work with children were discussed. In addition to Dr. Anna Freud the following were the main speakers; Dr. Grete L. Bibring (Boston), Dr. Anna Katan (Cleveland), Dr. Marianne Kris (New York and Yale University), Mrs. Berta Bornstein (New York), Dr. Elizabeth Geleerd-Loewenstein (New York), Dr. Anna Maenchen (San Francisco), Mrs. Beata Rank (Boston), Dr. Milton Senn (Professor of Paediatrics, Yale University), Dr. Janeway (Professor of Paediatrics, Harvard School of Medicine), Mrs. Edna Furman (Cleveland), Dr. Sally Provence (Yale), Dr. Joseph Weinreb (Clark University), Miss Polly Deweese. The final lecture, concluding the scientific sessions, was delivered by Dr. Anna Freud on 'Termination of Treatment'.

A statue of Professor Freud, the work of the sculptor Nemo, was unveiled in the presence of Dr. Anna Freud, the speakers on this occasion being Professor Jefferson for Clark University, Dr. R. M. Loewenstein, President of the American Psychoanalytic Association, and Dr. Grete L. Bibring on behalf of the Boston Psychoanalytic Society. This was followed by a formal lecture delivered by Dr. David Rapaport (Stockbridge) on: 'Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology'.

VIENNA PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Dr. Alfred Winterstein has been elected Honorary President of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society; Dr. Wilhelm Solms, Dozent at the University Clinic of Neurology and Psychiatry, has been elected President.

DR. ABRAM KARDINER

On 30 June, 1957, Dr. Abram Kardiner retired from his post as Director of the Columbia Psychoanalytic Clinic for Training and Research, and accepted an appointment as Lecturer in the Department of Psychiatry. Dr. George E. Daniels was appointed Director of the Columbia Psychoanalytic Clinic.

ARGENTINE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION

The following List of Authorities applies for the period April, 1957 to March, 1958: Dr. Angel Garma, President; Dr. Heinrich Racker, Secretary; Dr. Jorge M. Mom, Treasurer; Dr. Leon Grinberg, Publishing Director; Dr. Mauricio Abadi, Voter; Dr. Arnaldo Raskovsky, Voter.

CHANGE OF ADDRESS

Los Angeles Institute of Psychoanalysis and the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society have opened new offices at 344 North Bedford Drive, Beverly Hills, California.

K. R. Eissler, M.D., 300 Central Park West, New York, 24, N.Y.

Ruth S. Eissler, M.D., 300 Central Park West, New York 24, N.Y.

Miguel Prados, M.D., Suite 48, 1390 Sherbrooke St. West, Montreal, Que., Canada.

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW

The Psychoanalytic Review, An Educational American Journal of Psychoanalysis, was founded by William A. White and S. E. Jelliffe in 1913. Now in its forty-fourth year of existence, it announces cessation of publication before the end of the present year.

BERLINER PSYCHOANALYTISCHES INSTITUT

The Institute announces its training programme for the winter term 1957–58. Eleven series of lectures and seminars are listed.

FOUNDATIONS' FUND FOR RESEARCH IN PSYCHIATRY

The Foundations' Fund for Research in Psychiatry wishes to announce that 1 February, 1958, is the next deadline for the submission of applications for research fellowships in psychiatry, psychology, sociology, neurophysiology, and other sciences relevant to mental health. Interested persons and departments are invited to write for details to: Foundations' Fund for Research in Psychiatry, 251 Edwards Street, New Haven 11, Connecticut, U.S.A.

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC FOUNDATION

The Psychoanalytic Foundation, Incorporated, is accepting applications for grants to advance the science of psychoanalysis as outlined in the works of Sigmund Freud; to conduct research in the theory, practice and application of psychoanalysis and to make voluntary grants of fellowships, scholarships and professorships in furtherance of any of these purposes. For further information write to Dr. Peter B. Neubauer, Secretary, 117 East 80th Street, New York 21, New York.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

CONCEPT OF PROBABILITY AND ESP

SIR,

In connection with the recent discussion on Extra-Sensory Perception (ESP) I would like to draw attention to some aspects of the concept of probability, for it is indeed on this concept that the believers in ESP rest their claims. In this communication, neither the data nor their interpretation are of primary interest to me.

Let me at once grant the proponents of ESP their main point; the evidence they present *cannot* be explained by chance. Then what? What meaning can we attach to the statement that the findings are due to non-chance? The matter is not as simple as the proponents of ESP would have us believe. They imply that since the evidence cannot be explained as non-chance, it must be explained on the basis of some lawful causality. This however is a basic error in logic.

The thinking of P. W. Bridgman on this question is of singular interest to all those concerned with ESP.[1] I will quote the essential points he makes.

'We have to ask what we mean when we say "this event was not chance." Since we have already made an attempt to tell what we mean when we say "this event *was* chance", we might be tempted to think that our new question is trivial and that its answer is implied in the answer we have already given. I think, however, and this is perhaps the crux of this note, that this is by no means the case. "Was chance" and "was not chance" are not simply related to each other as two terms in traditional Aristotelian logic, subject to the rule of the excluded middle. . . .

'There is a deep-seated difference between the way in which positive and negative probability arguments are fruitfully applied in practice to concrete situations, to which we have seen that the concept of probability does not rigorously apply at all. If the situation is a positive one, which we can characterize by saying "Here we have the play of chance", then we can draw fruitful conclusions from the mere statement, without going further. This is shown by countless examples, as in the tables of a life insurance company, or the kinetic theory of gases, or the theory of the atomic nucleus with its calculation of the best construction for a hydrogen bomb by the Monte Carlo method. But if the situation is a negative one, characterized by saying "Here we do *not* have the play of chance" we have something radically different. Here we *are* compelled to go further, and fruitful application is not achieved until we succeed in exhibiting the regularity that we suspect. . . . ESP, with its statement of non-chance, but with its utter failure to exhibit any regularities or to perform a single repeatable experiment, is the only instance of which I am aware in which a serious claim has been made that non-chance should be capitalized simply because it is non-chance.'

I am, etc.,

LEO ANGELO SPIEGEL, M.D.

40 East 83rd Street,
New York 28, N.Y.

---

[1] F. W. Bridgman. 'Probability, Logic, and ESP', *Science*, 6 January, 1956, **123**, pp. 16-17.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

(Appearance in this list does not preclude subsequent review.)

The Criminal, the Judge and the Public: a Psychological Analysis. By Franz Alexander and Hugo Staub. Revised edition. (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press and Falcon's Wing Press, 1956. Pp. xxii+239. $4.00.)

Psychiatric Research Reports of the American Psychiatric Association. No. 6: *Application of Basic Science Techniques to Psychiatric Research.* (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1957. Pp. 211. $2.00.) No. 7: *Stress; Experimental Psychology; Child Psychiatry.* (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1957. Pp. 88. $2.00.)

Le Psychodrame analytique chez l'enfant. By Didier Anzieu. (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1956. Pp. 183. Frs. 720.)

The Doctor, his Patient and the Illness. By Michael Balint. (London: Pitman Medical Publishing Co., 1957. Pp. x + 355. 40*s.*)

Problems of Human Pleasure and Behaviour. By Michael Balint. (London: Hogarth, 1957. Pp. 300. 25*s.*)

Juvenile Delinquency Proneness. A Study of the Kvaraceus Scale. By Joseph K. Balogh and Charles J. Rumage. (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956. Pp. 35. $1.00.)

Psychotherapy of the Adolescent. Edited by Benjamin Harris Balser. (New York: International Universities Press, 1957. Pp. 270. $5.00.)

Human Relations in International Affairs. A Guide to Significant Interpretation and Research. By Seymour W. Beardsley and Alvin G. Edgell. (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956. Pp. vi + 40. $1.00.)

Being Lived by My Life : a Sort of Autobiography. By Charles Berg. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957. Pp. 256. 21*s.*)

The Psychology of Learning. By B. R. Bugelski. (New York: Henry Holt; London: Methuen, 1956 and 1957. Pp. xiii + 523. 50*s.*)

Variations in Sexual Behaviour. By Frank S. Caprio. (London: John Calder, 1957. Pp. xxxi + 344. 30*s.*)

Sex in Christianity and Psychoanalysis. By William Graham Cole. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957. Pp. xiv + 329. 21*s.*)

Perspectives in Personality Theory. Edited by Henry P. David and Helmut von Bracken. (London: Tavistock Publications; New York: Basic Books, 1957. Pp. xii + 435. 38*s.* or $6.50.)

From Medicine Man to Freud: an Anthology. Edited by Jan Ehrenwald. (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1956. Pp. 416. 50c.)

Neurotic Interaction in Marriage. Edited by Victor W. Eisenstein. (London: Tavistock Publications, 1956. Pp. xv + 352. 30*s.*)

Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XI. Edited by Ruth S. Eissler *et al.* (New York: International Universities Press; London: Imago Publishing Co., 1956. Pp. 470. 45*s.* or $8.50.)

The Dupont Theory. The Theory of Gravitation in Mental Fields. By John Evelyn. (London: Favil Press, 1957. Pp. 29. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

The Dynamics of Anxiety and Hysteria. By H. J. Eysenck. (London: Routledge, 1957. Pp. xiv + 312. Illus. 32*s.*)

Annual Review of Psychology. Vol. 8. Edited by Paul R. Farnsworth. Palo Alto, California: Annual Reviews Inc., 1957. Pp. ix + 502. $7.50.)

Instinct in Man. By Ronald Fletcher. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957. Pp. 348. 40*s.*)

Progress in Psychotherapy 1956. Edited by Frieda Fromm-Reichmann and J. Moreno. (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1956. Pp. xii + 352. $8.50.)

Medicine in a Changing Society. Lectures to the Laity, No. XVIII. By Iago Galdston. (New York: International Universities Press, 1956. Pp. x + 166. $3.00.)

Mental Acts. Their Content and their Objects. By Peter Geach. (London: Routledge, 1957. Pp. x + 136. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

Beyond Laughter. By Martin Grotjahn. (New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1957. Pp. xvi + 285. 45*s.*)

Towards a Measure of Man. The Frontiers of Normal Adjustment. By Paul Halmos. (London: Routledge, 1957. Pp. viii + 250. 28*s.*)

The Psychology of Perception. By D. W. Hamlyn. (London: Routledge, 1957. Pp. vii + 120. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie. Vols. 1 and 2. By Hans Hoff. (Basel and Stuttgart: Benno Schwabe, 1956. Pp. xv + 922. Sw. Fr. 56.)

Sigmund Freud: Life and Work. Vol. III. *The Last Phase, 1919–39.* By Ernest Jones. (London: Hogarth, 1957. Pp. xvi + 536. Illus. 35*s.*)

Collected Works of Carl Gustav Jung. Vol. 5. *Symbols of Transformation; An Analysis of the Prelude to a Case of Schizophrenia.* (London: Routledge, 1956. Pp. xxix + 567. 35*s.*)

The Idiom of Contemporary Thought. By Craw-

ford Knox. (London: Chapman and Hall, 1956. Pp. x + 206. 18*s*.)

Der Wahnkranke im Lichte alter und neuer Psychopathologie. By Kurt Kolle. (Stuttgart: Georg Thieme, 1957. Pp. 56. DM. 4.80.)

La Psychanalyse. Vol. 2. *Mélanges Cliniques.* Edited by Jacques Lacan. (Paris: Société Francaise de Psychanalyse and Presses Universitaires de France, 1956. Pp. 323. Fr. 960.)

The Person in Psychology: Reality or Abstraction. By Paul Lafitte. (London: Routledge, 1957. Pp. x + 233. 25*s*.)

Methodische Probleme der klinischen Psychotherapie. By Dietrich Langen. (Stuttgart: Georg Thieme, 1956. Pp. viii + 120. DM. 10.50.)

Fantasias Eternas a la Luz del Psicoanálisis. By Marie Langer. (Buenos Aires: Editorial Nova, 1957. Pp. 157.)

Straight to the Heart. By George Lawton. (New York: International Universities Press, 1957. Pp. xxiv + 347. $5.00.)

Interpersonal Diagnosis of Personality. A Functional Theory and Methodology for Personality Evaluation. By Timothy Leary. (New York: Ronald Press, 1957. Pp. xix + 518. $12.00.)

Die Störungen der Schriftsprache (Agraphie und Alexie). By A. Leischner. (Stuttgart: Georg Thieme, 1957. Pp. viii + 283. DM. 30.)

Perversions, Psychodynamics and Therapy. Edited by Sandor Lorand and Michael Balint. (New York: Random House, 1956. Pp. xii + 307. $5.00.)

Eduard Mörike: the Man and the Poet. By Margaret Mare. (London: Methuen, 1957. Pp. x + 278. Illus. 25*s*.)

Experiment in Depth: A Study of the Work of Jung, Eliot and Toynbee. By P. W. Martin. (London: Routledge, 1955. Pp. 275. 25*s*.)

L'Inconscient dans l'oeuvre et la vie de Racine. By Charles Mauron. (Aix-en-Provence: Publications des Annales de la Faculté des Lettres d'Aix-en-Provence, 1957. Pp. 352. Fr. 1,300.)

Remotivating the Mental Patient. By Otto von Mering and Stanley H. King. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1957. Pp. 216. $3.00.)

Nostalgia: a Psychoanalytic Study of Marcel Proust. By Milton L. Miller. (London: Gollancz, 1957. Pp. xii + 306. 21*s*.)

The Character of Man. By Emmanuel Mounier. (London: Rockliff, 1956. Pp. x + 341. 42*s*.)

La Psychanalyse d'aujourd'hui. Vols. I and II. By S. Nacht *et al.* Preface by Ernest Jones. (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1956. Pp. 867. Fr. 1,400.)

Religious Factors in Mental Illness. By Wayne E. Oates. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957. Pp. xv + 239. 16*s*.)

Anxiety and Magic Thinking. By Charles Odier. Transl. by M. L. Schoelly and M. J. Sherfey. (New York: International Universities Press, 1956. Pp. xii + 302. $5.00.)

Experimental Psychology and Other Essays. By I. P. Pavlov. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. Pp. 653. $7.50.)

Art and Psychoanalysis. Edited by William Phillips. (New York: Criterion Books, 1957. Pp. xxiv + 552. $8.50.)

Myth and Guilt. The Crime and Punishment of Mankind. By Theodor Reik. (New York: Braziller, 1957. Pp. xiii + 432. $5.75.)

Schizophrenia: Somatic Aspects. Edited by Derek Richter. (London and New York: Pergamon Press, 1957. Pp. viii + 181. 50*s*.)

Selected Contributions to Psycho-Analysis. By John Rickman. Compiled by W. Clifford M. Scott. (London: Hogarth, 1957. Pp. 411. 30*s*.)

Freudiana. By A. A. Roback. (Cambridge, Mass.: Sci-art Publishers, 1957. Pp. 240. Illus. $5.00.)

Dance in Psychotherapy. By Elizabeth Rosen. (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1957. Pp. xx + 178. $4.50.)

Being and Nothingness: an Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. By Jean-Paul Sartre. (London: Methuen, 1957. Pp. lxvii + 636. 50*s*.)

Group Processes. Transactions of the 2nd Conference, October, 1955. Edited by Bertram Schaffner. (New York: Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation, 1956. Pp. 255. $3.50.)

Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences. By Sidney Siegel. (New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1956. Pp. xvii + 312. 49*s*. or $6.50.)

Psychology in the Soviet Union. Edited by Brian Simon. (London: Routledge, 1957. Pp. viii + 305. 32*s*.)

Personality, Stress and Tuberculosis. Edited by Phineas J. Sparer. (New York: International Universities Press, 1956. Pp. xviii + 629. $12.50.)

The Road to Inner Freedom: the Ethics. By Baruch Spinoza. Edited by Dagobert D. Runes. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. Pp. 215. $3.00.)

Structural Psychology: De Humani Mentis Fabrica. By D. and K. Stanley-Jones. (Bristol: Wright, 1957. Pp. vi + 179. 21*s*.)

The Unconscious Motives of War: a Psycho-Analytical Contribution. By Alix Strachey. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957. Pp. 283. 25*s*.)

Dynamics of Psychotherapy: the Psychology of Personality Change. Vol. II. *Process.* By Percival M. Symonds. (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1957. Pp. xlv + 398. $6.50.)

Pain and Pleasure. By Thomas Szasz. (New York: Basic Books; and London: Tavistock Publications, 1957. Pp. xvi + 302. $5.50 or 30*s*.)

Heilwege der Tiefenpsychologie. Edited by L. Szondi. (Bern and Stuttgart: Hans Huber, 1956. Pp. 188. Sw. Fr. 18.0.)

La Table Ronde. (Paris: Plon. No. 108. December, 1956. Pp. 217. Fr. 300.)

Discussions on Child Development. Vol. 2 of the Proceedings of the Second Meeting of the World Health Organization Study Group on the Psychobiological Development of the Child, London, 1954. Edited by J. M. Tanner and Barbel Inhelder. (London: Tavistock Publications, 1956. Pp. 271. 28*s.*)

The Three Faces of Eve. By Corbett H. Thigpen and Hervey M. Cleckley. (New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1957. Pp. ix + 308. $4,50.)

The Dispossessed. By Geoffrey Wagner. (London: Ward Lock, 1957. Pp. 206. 10*s.*)

A Short History of Psychotherapy, in Theory and Practice. By Nigel Walker. (London: Routledge, 1957. Pp. xii + 188. Illus. 25*s.*)

Hospital Treatment of Alcoholism. By Robert S. Wallerstein *et al.* (New York: Basic Books, 1957. Pp. 212. $5.00.)

The Psychology of Economics. By Walter A. Weisskopf. (London: Routledge, 1955. Pp. viii + 266. 25*s.*)

Comparative Psychology of Mental Development. By Heinz Werner. Revised edition. (New York: International Universities Press, 1957. 2nd imp. Pp. xii + 564. $6.00.)

The Child and the Family. First Relationships. By D. W. Winnicott. (London: Tavistock Publications, 1957. Pp. 147. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

The Child and the Outside World. Studies in Developing Relationships. By D. W. Winnicott.(London: Tavistock Publications, 1957. Pp. 190. 16*s.*)

Disaster. A Psychological Essay. By Martha Wolfenstein. (London: Routledge, 1957. Pp. xvi + 231. 23*s.*)

Hamlet's Mouse Trap: a Psychoanalytic Study of the Drama. By Arthur Wormhoudt. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. Pp. 221. $3.50.)

Family and Kinship in East London. By Michael Young and Peter Willmott. (London: Routledge, 1957. Pp. xix + 232. 25*s.*)

INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 1959

The 21st Congress of the International Psycho-Analytical Association will be held under the auspices of the Danish Psycho-Analytical Society in Copenhagen late in July or early in August 1959.

The London Section of the Programme Committee has just started the planning of the Scientific Programme. Members of the International Psycho-Analytical Association who intend to offer a paper are requested to inform the Hon. Secretary, Programme Committee, of the subject of their contribution. There will be a discussion of a pre-published paper; its title will be announced in the near future.

DR. W. HOFFER,
Chairman, Programme Committee.

DR. PAULA HEIMANN,
Hon. Secretary, Programme Committee,
32 Eamont Court, Eamont Street,
London, N.W.8.

INDEX

Acidity, and ulcers, 78–9
Acting out: of beating fantasy, 23; in Chöd ritual, 404; and commitment, 243; in traumatic neurosis, 20
Agglomeration, of ' particle ' objects, 270, 274
Aggression(s): and analyst testing, 192; and depersonalization, 260; and displacement, 313; and ego cathexis, 219; and fees, 193, 194; a gratification technique, 318; and hate, 138; inhibition by analyst, 186, 194; justice and Eros (Bienenfeld), 419–27; neutralized, 350, 357; as object, 229; and *pavor nocturnus*, 151; in primates, 101–2, 103; religion and O.N., 89; and sado-masochistic analytic relations, 198, 201; and submissiveness, 323; superego, in peptic ulcer (Garma), 73–81; and ulcerative colitis, 348; unmodified, 357
Aim(s): of instincts, 139, 223, 323; of psycho-analysis, 167, 171–2, 175–8; serial sexual, 312; subject-object union, 317
Alexander, F.: re alimentary wishes and ulcers, 78, 79, 80; on counter-transference and therapy, 194
Ambivalence: in Abraham's ' pre-ambivalent oral phase ', 208; and ego nuclear defect, 352; and reversal of meaning, 413–4
Anaclitic: clinging, 351; psychotherapy and ulcerative colitis, 347–8
Analysis (see also Psycho-Analysis): interminable, 196, 198, 202; living, 253–4; micro-behavioural, 370; self-, 246; termination, 177, 178; therapeutic and training, 177–8, 180; of traumatic elements in borderline case (Hayman), 9–21; of unconscious beating fantasy in woman (Lester), 22–31
Analyst('s): emotional stress on, 187; human feelings, 186; -patient relationship and transference neurosis, 197, 202–3; testing of, 190, 191–2; total response to patient's needs, ' R ' (Little), 240–54
Analytic(al) situation: chess model of, 169–72; comments on (Haak), 183–95; dissolution of, 175; implications of restriction to, 168–9; ' no man's land ', 199; and transference, 155
Anthropology: and psycho-analysis, 369–70; and tribal responsibility, 420
Anxiety(ies): and breast deprivation, 326; depressive, 224, 229, 230; an ego function, 221; and ego instincts, 139; re infancy, 370; and ' lack ', 224; lactating, 373; and libidinal dependence, 149, 150; *pavor nocturnus*, 150–3; psychotic, 245, 246; and rôle, 322; shame-, 387; and symbolization, 396–7
Aristotle, on dreams, 94, 96
Artemidorus of Daldis (Dream Book), 92–6
Autistic character, 350, 353, 356–8
Automomic discharge and trauma, 9, 10, 20
Autonomous: behaviour, 155; functions of ego, 220; innate factors, 350; trauma, 151
Autonomy: ego, 142, 144, 210, 218–9, 220; of ego-fragments, 328

Beach, F., *Hormones and Behaviour*, 306–7, 314, 315
Beating fantasy (Lester), 22–31
Behaviour: animal and human, 309–10, 323; appetitive and consummatory, 318–9; immature, 312–6, 323; modern researches on, 369–70; psycho-analytic view of, 307–8; three modes, 308–9
Benedek, T., on oral-alimentary symbiosis, 380
Berman, L., on testing analyst, 191
Body(ily): and depersonalization, 260–1, 263, 264–5; -ego, 211, 214; and skin contact, 327–9; and symbiosis, 351
Brain and psyche, 307–8

Cancer, significance of death from, 164–5
Cannibalism, 326; and Chöd ritual, 405; and cosmic mother, 329
Case histories (clinical illustrations, etc.): analyst-inhibited aggression, 186; analyst-testing, 192; ' bad ' primary identifications, 385–7; Barrie's life story, 409–11; beating fantasy, 23–31; ' borderline ' Ann, 10–19; character, autistic and symbiotic, 353–6; compulsive male, 321, 322; defensive Catholic, 83–7; depersonalization, 256–9; dying patient (Sandford), 158–65; Edward (symbolic equation), 394; exhibitionist, 331; films, ' First five days New Guinea baby ', 371, ' Samni Jaki ' (reindeer birth), 372; Freda (' R '), 246–51; gastric ulcer, 73–5, 79; hospitalized TB (correspondence), 33–47; Lancashire witches, 396; Monica (introjection), 380; Mozart and Don Juan, 212–3; oral-sadistic woman, 406; psychopathological stratification, 227–8, 228–9, 231–9; reactions to smugness, 2–3, 3–5, 5, 6, 7; rejected son, 311; reparative repetition, 153–4; schizophrenic ' interplay ', 270–3; schizophrenic processes and sun-myths, 336–8; self-defence against oral invasion, 204–7; smug patients, 6, 7; Sue (infant), 380, 385, 388; telepathic dreamer, 56–7; ticklish man, 399; ulcerative colitis, 341–7; veiled transference, 184–5; violin-genital symbolists A and B, 391; worm-eating warbler, PSI incident, 52–6
Castration: and depersonalization, 259–60, 265; dreams, 96; fear and need for reparation, 201; a functional reality (primates), 102; and Oedipus complex, 152; and primary depression, 225
Cathexis(es): defective object and self, 352, 353, 356; in depersonalization, 262; displaceability of libidinal, 315, 316; ego, 211, 214, 215, 217–18, 219–21, 222; of food, 73; in sleep and schizophrenia, 212, 217; in smugness, 6, 8; specific objects, 149
Catholic Church, attitude to sin and scrupulosity, 87–8, 89
Chance, M.R.A. and Mead, A.P., on sexual and social life in primates, 101–2
Character: disorders, 242; modern definition of, 143; preoedipal (Silbermann), 350–8
Chöd, Tibetan Lamaist ritual (Schnier), 402–7
Choice and aim, 171–3, 177
Clichés and individual words, listening to (Stokes), 412–18
Coitus: animal and human, 314; and circumcision, 399; neurosis and, 322
Commitment, analyst's, 242–3
Communication: in Athens, 107; faulty, 178; and neurosis, 83; and orality, 112; and symbol formation, 395–6
Conditioned response, 146
Conflict(s): actual, in peptic ulcer (Garma), 73–81; bisexual, 352; concept of, 144; and conflict-free situations, 218; and displacement activity, 310; life-death (schizophrenia), 266; re-activation of infantile, 183; resolution *via* symbolization, 396; social, in primates, 100–3
Continuity of instinct motivation, 306, 315, 323
Correspondence, psycho-analytic psychotherapy by (Alston), 32–50
Couch and regression, 187–8
Counter-transference: defined part ' R ' (total response), 241; and fees and non-success, 194; and interpretation, 183; manipulation, 192; and modification of technique, 201; and prolonged transference neurosis, 197–8; recognition of, 171, 245–6, 253–4; traps, 186

Culture(al): data, clinical relevance of psycho-analytic study of (Devereux), 398–401; ingredients of schizophrenia (Moloney), 325–40; and organic function, 113–14; urban, parent-child relations in (Mead), 369–78

Death instinct, 138, 139, 140, 142, 144: erotic-destructive, 223, 229, 230; Hartmann v. Federn, 219; libidinization of, 165; and 'naughty', 413–14; in schizophrenic, 266
Defence(s): in correspondence therapy, 48–9; depersonalization, 259, 260, 261; and displacement, 315–16; ego functions, 218; negativism, 204; responses to pain, 255; and social institutions (Novey), 82–91; against trauma, 9–10, 19, 20, 147, 148, 153, 154
Demons: in Chöd ritual, 403, 405, 406; and dreams, 95
Denial: and depersonalization, 260, 263; of superego, 264; and trauma, 9, 19
Dependence: libidinal and transference, 148, 149, 150, 154–6; love-, in gastric ulcer, 75, 78, 80–1; oedipal, 150–3; psycho-analysis and, 348; pubertal, 153–4
Depersonalization, 256–65, 331, 248
Depressive: position (situation), 224, 225, 226, 267, 268, 274; and symbol formation and sublimation, 394–7
Descartes and Federn, 210
Deutsch, H., on 'as if' and depersonalization, 264
Devereux, G., on latency amongst Mohaves, 99
Dickens, C., on TB boy, 164
Discussion on PSI hypothesis, etc. (Brenner, Eisenbud, Brunswick, Servadio), 51–7
Displacement activity, 310, 311–16, 323
Dreams (individual): children's, 151; Emperor Hadrian's, 94; oedipal and incestuous, 95–6; Pharaoh's, 420–1; pink pig and ship, explosions, 40–3; of smug patients, 3, 7; of stomach ulcer patient, 74, 75; telepathic-precognitive, 56, 57; trauma repetitions, 19, 20; up and down (O.N.), 59–60; wolf-man's, 152
Dreams (theory): and dreamer, 316; Freud on, 141; 'id passage' in, 213; interpretation in Talmud (Lorand), 92–7; and *pavor nocturnus*, 150–1; in traumatic neurosis, 10, 19, 20
Drive(s): -dualism, 210–11, 212, 214, 218; and ego, 218–21; instinctual, and ego psychology (Novey), 137–45; and 'lack', 223–5
Driving forces, 305–7

Education, mass methods of, 370
Ego: analyst as patient's, 242; *Anlage*, 137, 140, 144, 350; aspect of transference (Stern), 146–57; concepts (Weiss), 209–22; descriptions of, 414–15; evolution of and primates, 100, 103; and gratification techniques, 319–20; -id matrix, 208; ideal, 383, 425–6; identity, 264–5; and latency, 98–9; nucleus, 350–2, 353, 356–7; in neurosis and psychosis, 267; and object splitting, 268, 269, 270, 274–5; pattern and content, 383; and primary and secondary experiences, 224–7, 229–30; and psycho-analysis, 170, 173–8, 187, 188, 201; psychology and re-evaluation instinctual drives (Novey), 137–45; and rage, 417; skin, 327–9, 330; and superego in smugness, 5, 8; and symbol formation, 392–3, 394, 397; and transference interpretation, 246, 251–3; and trauma, 9, 10, 19, 20; and unreality, 259
Einstein, A.: on means and goals, 171; on science and values, 175; on scientific thinking, 169
Elation and smugness, 6–7
Endocrines and instinct activation, 306–7, 314–15
Energy(ies): borrowed, 214, 218; common reservoir, 218, 220; non-instinctual or self-preservative, 137, 138, 139, 142, 144–5
Eros, 137, 140, 142, 144–5: justice, aggression and (Bienenfeld), 419–27
Erotic instincts (Ostow), 305–24
Ethology: appetition and consummation, 318–19; and human behaviour, 308, 309–11, 311–12, 369, 372; and instinct, 305–7, 323, 383–4; and passivity, 323
Experiences (situations): aesthetic, 416; depressive paranoid, manic and table of strata, 224–7; traumatic and pain barrier, 262–3
'Express', basic sense and cliché, 412

Fantasies (phantasies): devouring, 326; infantile as paradigm, 320–1; and 'lack', 224–5; new, from cultural data, 398, 400; persecutory, 229; symbolic communication, 396
Farrington, B., on science, 167
Father: and 'cruel' superego, 425–6; modern and primitive, 374–5
Fear: kinaesthetic (mother-infant), 375; and oral 'lack', 224; and pain, 255; in primitive man, 325
Federn, P.: on body delineation, 260; on depersonalization, 256; ego concepts compared Freud, 209–22
Feeling(s): analyst's, 243–5; ego, 209–12, 220, 221; of unreality (Bird), 256–65
Fees, question of, 192–4
Femininity and beating fantasies, 30
Fenichel, O.: on character, 143; on identification, 381; on social institutions, 82
Ferenczi, S., on latency period, 99
Fixation: on frustrating object-imago, 225; and stratification, 213; and transference, 146, 150, 156
Free Association, deformations of, 190
French, T.: on functional readiness, 214; and unconscious integrative activity, 213
Freud, Anna: on denial, 260; and ego psychology, 141, 351, 352, 357; and identification, 230, 381; on infant fears, 375; on latency and ego development, 98; on magic belief, 191; on negativism as defence, 204, 207, 208
Freud, S.: Acropolis unreality, 256; on beating fantasies, 22; on dreams in antiquity, 92, 97; on ego, 209–22; on erotic instincts, 305–6, 308, 313, 317, 320; on fees, 193; on instinct theory, 138–41; joint parricide, Irish legend as proof of (Veszy-Wagner), 117–20; on latency period, 98, 99; on mother-object, 330; on nature of analysis, 177; on neurosis and psychosis, 267; on neutrality, 185; on pain and reality, 262, 263; on precondition of sublimation, 394–5; on primal repression, 313; on psycho-analysis and medicine, 172, 178; on religion and O.N., 88–9, 90; on superego formation, 264; on transference, 146, 188, 321; on transference neurosis, 197; on trauma, 9, 147, 148; on unconscious thought and consciousness, 269; on *Weltanschauung*, 166; on wolf-man's dream, 152
Frustration: and anxiety, 224; and gratification in analysis, 200–1; and instinct, 223; and libidinal situation, 225–7, 229

Genital: frustration and gastric ulcer, 75, 77; references, 418
Gitelson, M., on 'cure', 175
Glover, E.: on analyst's difficulties and post-analytic transferences, 187; on analyst testing, 192; on counter-transference traps, 186; on the id, 217; nuclear theory of ego and Federn's unitary cathexis, 221; on transference detection, 184
Goal: of psycho-analysis, intermediate and final, 175–6, 180; of wishes, 317, 318
Goethe, on science, 167
'Going all out', 245
Gratification: and frustration in analysis, 200–1; techniques of instinctual, 317–20, 321–2, 323
Greenacre, P.: on analyst-analysand loan function, 242; on analyst testing, 192
Grotjahn, M., on correspondence therapy, 32–3, 49

Guilt: analyst's, 192, 244; Freud's Acropolis, 256; and hunger, 5, 8; and law, 424–5; patient's, 194; plural, 117, 119; and primary and secondary situations, 225, 226, 227, 230

Halliday, J. L., on Thomas Carlyle, 75, 79
Hallucination: and 'id passage', 213; negative and depersonalization, 263; and self-mothering, 327–8; and trauma, 147, 148, 149
Hartmann, H.: ego concepts, 215–16, 217, 218–19, 220, 350, 351, 353; on social reality, 82
Hendrick, I., mastery instinct, 214–15
Hermann, I., on latency period, 100
Hero: -child, the rejected (Levin), 105–16; son-, 117
Hoffer, W.: on ego development, 351, 352; on negative hallucination, 263; on 'pain' and 'not pain', 262
Homeostasis, and trauma, 147, 148
Hostility: expressed *via* smugness, 7; to the smug, 1, 2
Hunger and guilt, 5, 8

Id: and ego development, 209–10, 211, 212, 350–1, 356–7; and ego stratification, 213; and energy reservoir, 220; inner foreign country, 216, 217; primary process and symbols, 383; undifferentiated ego-, 141, 142, 144–5
Identification(s): on (Grinker), 379–90; analyst-patient, 243, 244; and ego cathexis, 215, 220; with enemy, 398–9; as gratification technique, 318, 322; pathological, 357; with persecutor, 230–1; projective, 266–70, 274–5; and psychopathological stratification, 224–7; and rage, 417; with sated nursling, 7; and symbol formation, 393
Imitation and identification, 385
Incest: and impiety, 399; in Irish legend, 118, 119; -taboo secondary, 113
Incorporation, 384–5
Incubation and dreams, 93, 94
Industrial Revolution and social responsibility, 421
Infantile sexuality and mammalianization, 310–11
Influence (psycho-analytic) or treatment?, 178
Inhibition: of instinctual drives, 394–5; maturational, 312–15, 323; in symbol formation, 392; and trauma, 9, 10, 19
Instincts, erotic (Ostow), 305–24
Instinctual: activity and endocrines, 306–7, 308–9; behaviour, timing and activation, 308–16; drives, re-evaluation of and modern ego psychology (Novey), 137–45; and ego development, 350, 356–8; and identification, 385; wishes, 316–23
Integration: and depressive position, 396–7; and dream-work, 213; and ego, 214–15
Intelligence: as deflection of function, 112, 113–14; and force, 107, 109
'Interests', ego, 139, 145
Interpretation(s): bases of, 183; and behaviour, 241; and feeling, 244; and 'interminable' transference neurosis, 199, 200; myth-, 113–14; query re schizophrenic, 274–5; as technique, 170, 171; timing, 186; transference, 246, 251–3
Introjection: and internalization subject-object transactions, 382; of patterned subject-object relationships, 388–9; and projection, 387

Jacobson, E., on identification, 381–2
Jocasta, 108–9, 110
Jones, E.: on guilt, 424; on sexual instinct, 141; on symbolism, 393–4
Justice, aggression and Eros (Bienenfeld), 419–27

Kanner, L., autistic infantile psychosis, 352
Keating, G., *History of Ireland*, 118–19
Klein, M.: depressive anxieties, 224, 229–31; on inhibition in symbol formation, 392; and negative aspect mother-infant relation, 207; and paranoid-schizoid phase, 267, 268; on reparation, 424
Kubie, L. S., on fees, 193

Lampl, H., on latency period, 100
Lampl-de Groot, J., on ego development, 98
Langer, S., on 'outgrowing', 175
Latency period: and continuity and displacement, 315; and internalization, 153; and maturational inhibition, 313; origin of man and (Székely), 98–104
Law: criminal (and military), 419, 423–4; infantile precursors and five components of, 421–3, 424–5; social, 419–21, 426
Legend, Irish and joint parricide (Veszy-Wagner), 117–20
Letters (therapy), 33–4, 44–7, 49–50
Levels (phases): libidinal evolutionary, 225–7; positions and situations, 229–31
Lewin, B., on immortal superego fusion, 164–5
Libido: ego-, 217, 222; and neutralization, 357; theory, 138–41, 143
Lilith and erotic dreams, 95

Macalpine, I., on classical technique, 176, 187
Macropsia, 326
Magical demands (patient-analyst), 187–91
Mahler, Schoenberger-, M., symbiotic infantile psychosis, 352
Malinowski, B., on myth as primitive reality, 105
Mammalianization, 309, 310–11
Man, origin of and latency period (Székely), 98–104
'Mary Rose', meaning of Barrie's (Karpe, M. & R.), 408–11
Masochism: and fees, 193–4; individual primary, 224, 229; and neutrality, 200
Mastery instinct, 214–15
Masturbation: and depersonalization, 263; infantile, 328; and oedipal situation, 224–5
Mating behaviour (primates), 100–1
Maturation, 149, 152, 155–6: delayed, 351, 357, 358; of ego, 218; emotional, 171, 179; and identifications, 383; instinctual and primal repression, 311–15, 321, 323; normal, 330, 338–9; sexual and reality sense, 265
Meaning: antithetical and reversal of, 412–13; of Barrie's 'Mary Rose' (Karpe, M. & R.), 408–11
Medusa, 108–9
Memory: and body schema, 328, 339; defective skin, 330; and pain, 255; primordial and ego nucleus, 350
Micropsia, 329
Mother: 'bad' internalized (peptic ulcer), 73, 75, 79–80; Barrie's heroines, 409; and biological adequacy, 372–3; -child relations, 329–31, 338–9, 369, 371–3, 375–6, 386; -child symbiosis, 148, 149, 152, 165, 351–2, 356–8, 380; and depersonalization, 260, 261; -earth, 111; -infant dual-unity, 207; initial object, 316, 317; rejection by (exposure myths), 105, 106, 107, 109, 113; skin contact with, 327–9; -suckling and origins of law, 421–3, 424–5; sun as, 325–6
Myth(s): about analyst, 187, 189; Clothra, 118–19; exposure (Oedipus and Samson), 105–16; Kaineus and Centaurs, 398–400; projection of ego dystonic insights, 400; sun, 108–9, 332–5, 336–8; Zeus and Titans, 117

Nacht, S., objection to primary ego autonomy, 142–3
Narcissism: and ego instincts, 138, 139; and ego psychologies, 212, 215, 216–17, 222; and patient's needs, 251; 'phallic awe' and oralization of vagina, 399–40; and reality sense, 260–1; and schizophrenia, 209; secondary, 216; and smugness, 7
Nature and the 'unnatural', 376–7
Needs, analyst's total response to patient's (Little), 240–54
Negativism, 204
Neurosis(es): choice of, 318; and ego defect, 214; and immature behaviour, 313–14; sites for, 322; transference, 36, 48–9, 175, 187, (Nacht) 196–203; trauma theory of, 147; traumatic, theory and clinical features, 9, 10, 19, 20; utilization of social institutions as defence technique in (Novey), 82–91

Neutrality: analytic, 186; and transference neurosis, 197–201, 202–3
Neutralization: of drives, 350–1, 352, 357; of libido and aggression, 219; trauma, 9
Nightmares, 95
Nunberg, H.: on depersonalization, 256; on will to recovery, 188–9
Nursing couple, 371–3

Oberndorf, C.P.: on depersonalization, 256; erotization of thought, 262
Object-relations(ships): and depersonalization, 259–61, 262; in depressive position, 394, 396–7; faulty, 356; hetero-homo fluctuations, 321; and libidinal dependence, 149; new and psychosomatic, 348; schizophrenic, 266–70, 274–5; in smug, 7; social institutions and neurotic defence, 83; and symbol formation, 393; and wish contents, 316
Oedipus: and Irish heroes, 118; and Samson (Levin), 105–16
Oedipus(al) conflict (situation, etc.): dreams, 95–6; and latency period, 98, 99; masturbation and primary experiences, 224–5; preliminary in primates, 102; and reality-sense, 264; and religion, 89, 90; and superego, 383, 425–6; and transference, 146, 150–3
Omens and dreams, 95
Omnipotence: in analytical situation, 188, 189; phantasy (schizophrenic), 267; and ulcerative colitis, 348
Oppenheimer, J. R., on progress, 167–8
Oral: -digestive superego aggressions and actual conflicts in peptic ulcer patients (Garma), 73–81; incorporation, 326; invasion and self-defence (Sterba), 204–8; ' lack ', 224; pattern of internalization, 387–8; sadism and Chöd ritual, 405, 406–7; -sadistic impulses, 224, 225; satiety, 7–8

Pain, (Ernest Jones), 255; and depersonalization, 262–3; of ' lack ', 224
Paranoid-schizoid phase (situation, position), 224, 225, 226, 267, 268, 274, 393
Parent-child relations, changing patterns of in an urban culture (Mead, Ernest Jones Lecture), 369–78
Parricide: joint, Irish legend as proof of Freud's theory of (Veszy-Wagner), 117–20; and oedipal crime, 111
Parsons, T., on social internalization and personality development, 382
Pavor nocturnus, 150–3
Penis, award as compensation for rape (Devereux), 398–401
Persecution, 224–7, 229
Personality(ies): of analyst, 202–3; development, 171; differentiation of psychotic from non-psychotic (Bion), 266–75; and dream interpretation, 96; ego core of, 210; and identifications, 387, 389; inadequately integrated, 353, 356; structural concepts and, 215; ' total ' or ' ego ', 215
Piaget, J.: on assimilation and adjustment, 382; on continuity of intelligence and biological processes, 329; and normal child development, 369; on structure and concept, 328
Praying for dreams, 94–5
Precipitating factor of peptic ulcer, 75–6, 78
Precognitive: cultural ingredients of schizophrenia (Moloney), 325–40; telepathic-dream (Brunswick, Servadio), 56, 57
Preconscious: and ego-feeling, 212–13; thought and object-impression linkage, 269
Preoedipal character disorders (Silbermann), 350–8
Primal: herd hypothesis and ape behaviour, 102; repression, 311–15; scene, 19, 152, 155, 260–61, 262
Primates, mating behaviour, social life and psychodynamics, 100–103
Probability (and PSI), 52, 53, 55
Projection: and introjection, 268–9, 387; and primary and secondary situations, 230; and sublimation, 395
Prophecy and dreams, 93, 94, 97
PSI hypothesis, facts, coincidence and (Brenner), 52–3; comments on (Eisenbud), 54–6
Psyche and brain, 307–8
Psycho-analysis (see also Analysis): and anthropology, 369–70; and behaviour, 307–8; and Buddhistic concepts, 404–5; classical routine, 183; and gastric ulcer, 80; and law, 419; and medicine, 172–4; and retention of religious belief, 89–90; science and, 166–7, 167–8
Psycho-analytic(al): ego concepts, comparative study of (Weiss), 209–22; psychotherapy by correspondence (Alston), 32–50; study of cultural data, clinical relevance of (Devereux), 398–401; treatment, theory of (Szasz), 166–82; treatment of ulcerative colitis (Sperling), 341–9
Psychodynamics of primate behaviour, 102–3
Psychoneurosis(es) and trauma, 9–10, 20
Psychosis(es): ego diseases, 218; Kanner's autistic infantile and Mahler's symbiotic, 352; and preoedipal character disorders, 356–8; and trauma, 9
Psychotic: personalities, differentiation from non-psychotic (Bion), 266–75; slang synonyms, 414
Puberty and dependence, 153–4

' R ', analyst's total response to patient's needs (Little), 240–54
Rangell, L.: on correspondence therapy, 49; on oral factors in poise, 7
Rank, O., on exposure myths, 105
Rapaport, D., on Hartmann's ' primary autonomy ', 218–19
Rape, penis as compensation for (Devereux), 398–401
Rapoport, A., on judgment and choice, 172
Reaction-formation and trauma, 10, 19
Reality (sense): and depersonalization, 260–1, 262; and ego cathexis, 211–12; and ego development, 350; impairment of and technique, 251–3; and maturation, 338–9; and pain, 262–3; schizophrenic and, 266–9; and skin contact, 327; superego and, 263–5
Re-duplication in myths, 117
Re-education, 191
Regression: and couch, 187–8; and depersonalization, 260–1; in dreams, 213; oral-digestive, 73, 79; puerperal, 380; in sleep, 212; and trauma, 9, 10, 19
Reich, A., on narcissistic object relations, 7
Rejection: and culture, 105, 106, 113–15; mother and baby, 372; and sneezing, 337–8
Religion: Lamaism and Buddhism, 403; and O.N., 88–90, 402
Reparation and law, 424–5
Repetition: and displacement activity, 315–16; and infantile wish paradigm, 321; symptomatic, in kingship customs, 118; in transference, 146, 153–6; and trauma mastery, 9, 10, 19, 20
Repression: and object relations, 321, 322; and pain, 255; primal, 311–15, 323; and pseudo-ulcer, 75; and splitting, 270, 275; and trauma, 10, 19
Responsibility: analyst's, 241–2, 253–4; guilt and law, 425; for tribal security, 420–1
Ritual: Chöd, Tibetan Lamaist (Schnier), 402–7; socially approved and neurotic, 89
Roheim, G., Eskimo and Polynesian tales (sun myths), 332–4
Rôle: social, 379, 382; of subject in wishes, 317, 320, 322–3
Rule(s): and aims, 171–2, 179; nature and function of 169–71; pedantic adherence to, 190

Sadism in schizophrenia, 266
Sado-masochism and transference neurosis, 198, 201
Samson, Oedipus and (Levin), 105–16
Satiety, sleep and smugness, 5, 6, 8
Schizophrenia: analogies to sun-devouring myths, 335–8; and ego libido, 209, 212, 217; and gratification tech-

Schizophrenia:—*continued*
nique, 318; intrinsic characteristics, 266; precognitive ingredients of (Moloney), 325–40; splitting in, 268; and symbolic equations, 393, 396–7; and ulcerative colitis, 341
Science and psycho-analysis, 166–7, 167–9
Scientific attitude as final goal psycho-analysis, 175–8
Security: and identification, 380; and law, 419–21; in primitive societies, 376; survival by support, 421–3, 426
Segal, H., on symbol formation and depression, 268, 274
Self: affirmation of analyst's, 245–6; -defence against oral invasion (Sterba), 204–8; -experience, 210, 212, 218; 'I' or total personality?, 215–16; and identifications, 383, 389; -mothering, 328–9; and not-self, 330, 339; and object transactions, 384–5; -preservation, 137–40, 142, 211; in wish content, 316
Sexual (contact) apparatus, 316, 317, 321, 322
Sharpe, E., on unaltered dreams and past experiences, 10
Sillman, L.: concept of mammalianization, 309, 310–11; displacement and aggression, 313
Simmel, E., on self-preservation, 142
Skin: contact with mother, 327–9, 338; erotization of, 310
Sleep: ecstasy and immortality, 104–5; ego libido and, 209, 212; infantile disturbances of, 150–1; satiety and smugness, 5, 6, 8
Smugness (Arloff), 1–8
Social (cultural): attitudes to exposure, 105, 106, 112–15; institutions and defence technique (Novey), 82–91; life of primates, 101–2; rôles and primary introjects, 389
Sphinx, 108, 109, 110, 112, 119
Splitting, 268, 269, 270, 274
Stratification: of ego states, 213; psychopathological, problem of (Racker), 223–39
Stunkard, H. W., on security quest, 380
Sublimation: as appetitive technique, 319; definition of, 323; pseudo, 353; and symbolism, 392
Sucking: innate and learned components, 385; plasticity of technique, 319–20; situation and origins of law, 421–3
Sun: a cosmic mother figure, 325, 329, 332; -myths, 108–9, 332–5, 336–8
Superego: aggressions in peptic ulcer (Garma), 73–81; depressive situation, 226–7; and ego cathexis, 215; and ego in smugness, 5, 8; immortal, 164–5; and latency period, 98, 99; and neonatal experiences, 383; origins, 425–6; and reality sense, 263–5; and speech and writing, 50
Suspense, 325, 326
Symbiosis, 148, 149, 152, 165, 351–2, 356–8, 380
Symbol(s): breast-field-soil, 109; dream (Artemidorus and Talmud), 93, 95–6; necessary properties of, 322; and psychodynamic root identities, 108; serpent, 112; sun and darkness, 108–9; words, 417
Symbol formation, 268, 269; notes on (Segal), 391–7
Symbolic: character, 350, 355, 356–8; equation, 393–5; thinking, 146–8
Symbolism: body origins, and art, 417; and physiological accents, 107–8; in traumatic dreams, 20; of ulcer symptoms, 79; wider concept of, 392
Table of psychological stratification, 227
Talmud, dream interpretation in (Lorand), 92–7
Technique: and aims, 171–2; changes in and need for experiment, 251–4; and counter-transference, 194; defence, in neurosis (Novey), 82–91; delusional, 253; final goal inherent in, 176–8; of instinctual gratification, 317–20, 321–2, 323; interpretations, 170, 171; primary model, 169, 173, 179; query re schizophrenic, 274–5; and therapy, 167; transference, 155–6; transference neurosis (Nacht), 196–203
Terms: confusion re counter-transference, 240; no agreement on, 209, 222
Testing: of analyst, 190, 191–2, 245; of identification hypotheses, 389–90; reality, 262–3
Thought in schizophrenic, 268–9, 274, 393
Tinbergen, N.: on appetition and consummation, 317; on displacement activity, 310, 311–12; on instinct, 305–6, 307, 383–4; on submissiveness, 323; and threat situation, 103
Transference: contamination, 186; delusional, 251, 253; ego aspect of (Stern), 146–57; in gastric ulcer, 80–1; liquidation of, 199; and 'mirror' analyst, 245; post-analytic, 187; and primary paranoid situation, 229; and re-education, 191; in schizophrenia, 266–7; and self-indulgence, 328; in the smug, 6; in traumatic neurosis, 20; in ulcerative colitis, 347, 348; veiled, 183–6
Transference neurosis: in correspondence therapy, 48; dissolution as end-point, 175; handling of (Nacht), 196–203; test of skill, 187
Trauma: birth, 348, 351, 352, 357; and culture, 105, 113; early, 224, 229; mastery, 9, 10, 19, 20; narcissistic (analytic situation), 191; precognitive, 332; primary (shock) and psychic, 147, 148; and transference, 146–9, 157
Traumatic elements in borderline case (Hayman), 9–21
Treatment (therapy): by correspondence (Alston), 32–50; failure of, 196–7; method of, 223; of ulcerative colitis (Sperling), 341–9; or understanding, 167–8
Tylor, E. B.: on exposure myths, 105; on Herakles myth, 111

Ulcerative colitis, psycho-analytic treatment of (Sperling), 341–9
Unreality, feelings of (Bird), 256–65
Urban culture, parent-child relations in (Mead, Ernest Jones Lecture), 369–78

Weiss, E., on drives, 142
Wish(es): contents, 316–20; and drive activation, 312; organization and structure, 320–3; 'sick', 348
Wish-fulfilment: and dreams, 92–4, 97; failure of, 150; transference expectations of, 154, 187–91
Words: individual and clichés, listening to (Stokes), 412–18; in schizophrenia, 268
'Will to recovery', 187–91
Work: activities, 322, 323; principle,214
Working through, 251
Worm-eating warbler, 52–6

Zuckerman, S., on mammalian mating behaviour and social life, 100, 101–2

VOL. XXXVIII JANUARY—FEBRUARY 1957 PART I

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

and Bulletin of the
INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

FOUNDED BY ERNEST JONES

Editor
W. HOFFER
London

with the assistance of
MARJORIE BRIERLEY
Keswick
W. CLIFFORD M. SCOTT
Montreal
ROBERT P. KNIGHT
Stockbridge
CHARLES F. RYCROFT
London

In collaboration with

L. G. DE ALVAREZ DE TOLEDO, *Buenos Aires*
HARRY E. AUGUST, *Detroit*
CATHERINE L. BACON, *Philadelphia*
MORTON BARNETT, *Detroit*
WILLIAM G. BARRETT, *San Francisco*
GRETE L. BIBRING, *Boston*
M. MAURICE DUGAUTIEZ, *Brussels*
FELICE M. EMERY, *New Haven*
RUDOLF EKSTEIN, *Topeka*
PHYLLIS GREENACRE, *New York*
NILS HAAK, *Stockholm*
HEINZ HARTMANN, *New York*
ERNEST JONES, *London*
HEISAKU KOSAWA, *Tokyo*
NORMAN A. LEVY, *Beverly Hills*
FABIO L. LOBO, *Rio de Janeiro*
SANDOR LORAND, *New York*
M. MACKENZIE VAN DER NOORDAA, *Amsterdam*
ANNA MAENCHEN, *San Francisco*
DURVAL MARCONDES, *Sao Paulo*
HENRY H. W. MILES, *New Orleans*
JOHN A. P. MILLET, *New York*
SUHRIT C. MITRA, *Calcutta*
CARL MUELLER-BRAUNSCHWEIG, *Berlin*
CESARE MUSATTI, *Milan*
DOUGLAS NOBLE, *Washington*
LEO RANGELL, *Los Angeles*
PHILIPP SARASIN, *Basle*
MARC SCHLUMBERGER, *Paris*
LOUIS B. SHAPIRO, *Chicago*
PAUL SLOANE, *Philadelphia*
SARAH S. TOWER, *Baltimore*
CARLOS WHITING, *Santiago*
D. W. WINNICOTT, *London*
H. WINNIK, *Jerusalem*
ALFRED WINTERSTEIN, *Vienna*

PUBLISHED FOR
THE INSTITUTE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS
BY
BAILLIÈRE, TINDALL AND COX, LTD.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

is issued every two months. It publishes contributions to the theory and practice of Psycho-Analysis and to its application in the Sciences and Arts. It also contains Abstracts, Reviews, and the *Bulletin* of the International Psycho-Analytical Association, including the biennial List of Members of the Association.

SUBSCRIPTIONS

1. The Annual Subscription is 50*s*. per Volume of Six Parts. Canada and U.S.A. $8.50.
2. The Journal is obtainable *by subscription only*, the parts not being sold separately.
3. Subscriptions and correspondence relative to administrative matters should be addressed to the publishers, Baillière, Tindall & Cox, Ltd., 7 and 8 Henrietta Street, London, W.C.2.
4. Unbound copies of some back volumes are available. Prices on application to the Publishers.

MEMBERS' SUBSCRIPTIONS

Subscription at a reduced rate is offered to MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION and its AFFILIATE SOCIETIES, *also* to STUDENTS IN TRAINING who are registered with an Institute or Training Centre recognized by the International Psycho-Analytical Association. These subscriptions can be accepted only from an individual member (student) and by the Editor and not later than 15 March of the year for which subscription at the reduced rate is desired. All correspondence to be addressed to: The Editor, International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 63 New Cavendish Street, London, W.1.

EDITORIAL

1. All editorial communications, manuscripts as well as review copies of books and exchange numbers of periodicals should be addressed to the Editor, International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 63 New Cavendish Street, London, W.1.
2. Editorial communications from U.S.A. should be sent to Dr. Robert P. Knight, M.D., Austen Riggs Center, Inc., Stockbridge, Massachusetts.
3. Manuscripts, preferably in duplicate, must be typed, with full spacing throughout. Footnotes should be avoided whenever possible. A copy of MS should be retained by the author. All references to books must include: full name of author, full title, place of publication, publisher, year of publication. References to Periodicals must include: full name of author, full title of article (neither of these must be underlined), title of periodical (this should be underlined and, if possible, given according to World List of Abbreviations) followed by year, volume and page number. Bibliographies should be in alphabetical order.
4. A form for reprints to be ordered from the Publishers at the author's own cost will be sent by the Editor shortly before publication.
5. All matter in this Journal is protected under the Berne Convention. It may not be reproduced by any means, in whole or in part, without permission. Applications with regard to reproduction should be addressed to the Editor.

SPECIAL NOTICE

The Publishers will be glad to receive copies Numbers I—II of Volume XXXII of the Journal which are no longer required by subscribers. Credit of 10*s*. per copy will be allowed for returned copies of these numbers.